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ABSTRACT 
 
Qualitative knowledge is about types of things, and their excellences. There are many 
ways we humans produce qualitative knowledge about the world, and much of it is derived from 
non-quantitative sources (e.g., narratives, clinical experiences, intuitions). The purpose of my 
dissertation was to investigate the possibility of using Bayesian inferences to improve 
quantitative analysis in special education research with qualitative knowledge.  
It is impossible, however, to fully disentangle philosophy of inquiry, methodology, and 
methods. My evaluation of Bayesian estimators, thus, addresses each of these areas. Chapter 
Two offers a philosophical argument to substantiate the thesis that Bayesian inference is usually 
more applicable in education science than classical inference. I then moved on, in Chapter Three, 
to consider methodology. I used simulation procedures to show that even a minimum amount of 
qualitative information can suffice to improve Bayesian t-tests’ frequency properties. Finally, in 
Chapter Four, I offered a practical demonstration of how Bayesian methods could be utilized in 
special education research to solve technical problems.    
In Chapter Five, I show how these three chapters, taken together, evidence that Bayesian 
analysis can promote a romantic science of special education – i.e., a non-positivistic science that 
invites teleological explanation. These explanations are often produced by researchers in the 
qualitative tradition, and Bayesian priors are formal mechanism for strengthening quantitative 
analysis with such qualitative bits of information. Researchers are also free to use their favorite 
qualitative methods to elicit such priors from experts.
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Is it ever advisable to let an expert with qualitative knowledge influence our statistical 
analysis? I think so. My guess is their potential contribution to the work of quantitative analysts 
is far reaching. Their judgments may even improve how we make sense of experimental findings 
in special education research. The purpose of this dissertation is to test my hunch. 
Imagine the principal investigator of a research project hands over the results of an 
experiment to her statistical analyst, Jen. She asks Jen to see if the intervention of interest raises 
state test scores. Jen knows nothing about the context of the experiment, besides what is in the 
data set. She never visited the school site where the study took place, saw the new intervention 
implemented, or watched how participants reacted.  
In contrast, Lisa is a renowned qualitative researcher with a wealth of knowledge. She 
makes ongoing visits to the school site where the experiment was done. Wholly incidental to her 
personal research interests, she happened to observe educators using the selected intervention in 
classroom settings. She never saw test scores, but she understands how the intervention changed 
the classroom’s learning culture better than anyone else.  
In this scenario, I propose that Jen should incorporate Lisa’s expertise into her statistical 
analysis. Ignoring such expertise needlessly impoverishes inferences. The experimental data are 
one piece of evidence; Lisa’s expert judgment another. Estimates of intervention effects should 
be based on all the evidence. The purpose of this dissertation is to shed some light on the 
possibility of drawing on qualitative knowledge to improve quantitative analysis.  
2 
 
Some Preliminaries 
I hate it when an author begins making distinctions before the discussion gets underway. 
Why not explain everything along the way? With one exception, that is what I plan to do. This 
section, however, is the exception. It discusses an issue central in the philosophy of statistics 
which if explained first helps everything else go much more smoothly.  
On my preferred account, statistical inferences are formal inductions. A young child 
encounters several white swans swimming in a lake. She induces all swans in the world are 
white. Thereafter she sees more white swans, so she now holds her induction more firmly. But 
inductions are risky. In this case, her induction is dead wrong – black swans exist in New 
Zealand. Cogent inductions, despite our every effort, sometimes go astray.  
Statisticians invoke probability to make the risk of error mathematically precise (Hand, 
2008). Probability theory is now a respectable branch of modern mathematics; its theorems 
derivable from axioms (Kolmogorov, 1933/1956). The math itself, however, underdetermines 
probability’s nature: chance or credence (Hacking, 2001). Chance is an objective force of nature. 
The outcome of any chance setup, such as a coin toss, is random. But, in the limits, repeated flips 
of the same coin produce a certain proportion of heads and tails (Von Mises, 1936). This 
empirical convergence happens regardless of who is observing.  
Alternatively, probability is construable as a subjective entity. A group of young people 
bet on the World Series. One bets the Yankees will win; others think her confidence misplaced. 
We represent (not measure) degree of opinion using probabilities. We assign probabilities to 
each belief an agent holds. The young polymath, F.P. Ramsey (1926) showed adherence to the 
axioms of the formal probability calculus yields consistency among beliefs. Probability, then, is 
equally interpretable as objective chance or subjective credence.   
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Statement of the Problem 
 Education research, especially in the area of special education, underwent an astonishing 
qualitative revolution in the last couple of decades (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Pugach, 2001). 
Qualitative researchers borrow and adapt methods from the social sciences, fine arts, and 
humanities to study education (Hatch, 2002). This revolution has gone a long way towards 
building a desirable romantic science of special education – a science inclusive of qualitative 
knowledge (Smith, 2003). In the last couple of decades there has also been an appreciable rise in 
computational power (Lynch, 2007). New algorithms, like the Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
method, make it possible to derive otherwise intractable integrals (Muthen, 2013).  
 Building the special education knowledge base entails good stewardship of all our new 
assets (Odom, et al., 2005). The problem is figuring out how to wisely apply our growing 
qualitative knowledge and computational power to improve statistical inferences in education 
research. I wish, therefore, to investigate whether special education researchers should now 
boldly embrace tools established in mainstream statistics which are capable of harnessing both 
qualitative knowledge and computational power to make the most of small data sets. 
The Significance of the Problem 
The above problem matters to the field of special education. To see this, only consider 
the tug of war between clinical pedagogy and evidence-based pedagogy – a name obviously 
chosen for rhetorical effect (Hacking, 2006). Evidence-based pedagogy means randomized 
experiments, meta-analyses, and statistical regularities (Glass & Hopkins, 1996). Clinical 
pedagogy is about teachers basing their decisions on personal interactions with their students. 
Such decisions hold a distinct qualitative flavor defying entrapment in numbers.    
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Some in the United States champion evidence-based pedagogy in special education 
(Kauffman, 2011; Odom et al., 2005). This is the culmination of a long historical process 
(Lagemann, 2000). The evidence-based pedagogy platform is admittedly enticing for politicians 
hoping to garner public support. Evidence-based pedagogy is not a panacea, but somehow it 
seems consistent with our longings for neutral public education. We are alarmed at the thought of 
teachers imposing their own private values on students. Labaree (2011) explains our romance 
with statistical regularities in education research is a consequence of our cherished democratic 
aspirations rather than as a result of technical progress. 
I think the either-or dilemma of clinical pedagogy or evidence-based pedagogy is ill-
posed. Why not both? The mathematical apparatus and techniques needed to integrate them 
exist. All we need to do is apply them. Such integration can increase our power to detect 
treatment effects, estimate complex models, and capitalize on small data sets (Gill, 2002; 
Iversen, 1984; Kruschke, 2011). The incorporation of qualitative knowledge in our statistical 
analyses will allow us to ask new questions and answer old questions in new ways.  
The enlistment of informants with qualitative knowledge is most useful when researchers 
wish to (1) see how credible their hypothesis is after observing the data (which is not what the p-
value does), (2) calculate an interval containing a range of probable values for the invisible 
parameters (which is not what the confidence interval does), or (3) evaluate the evidence for and 
against statistical models in their model competition (Muthen, 2013). These three claims may 
seem extravagant to those only familiar with traditional p-values and confidence intervals, but 
there is nothing controversial about these promises per se - at least from a purely mathematical 
point of view, granting of course, that our informants are accurate (Duke Evidence Based 
Practice Center, 2009).  
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Theoretical Perspective 
Philosophy of inquiry, methodology, and methods are an interlinked chain in the research 
process (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Morgan, 2007; Crotty, 1998; Paul, 2005), yet a chain is only as 
strong as its weakest link (Krathwohl, 1998). Method only describes what scientists do while 
doing research. Methodology prescribes what scientist should do while researching. Philosophy 
of inquiry encompasses a constellation of problems, such as: (a) What is a science of education? 
(b) How closely, if at all, should it resemble the natural sciences? and (c) Are teleological 
explanations applicable in education research? These are questions requiring much philosophical 
investigation to answer. At the intersection of philosophy of inquiry, methodology, and methods 
then stands the problem of inputting qualitative knowledge into statistical analysis in education 
research. 
The relationship between philosophy of inquiry, methodology, and methods is depicted in 
Figure 1. A philosophy of educational inquiry is needed to intelligibly make the seemingly 
reckless move from qualitative expertise to statistical inference. We also need a methodology 
showing how and when to make such bold moves. Practical demonstrations of such methods are 
also needed to bring such a method into the reach of special education researchers. 
 
Figure 1.  Relationship between philosophy of inquiry, methodology, and methods 
The World of 
Inquiry 
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As a historical observation, the interdependence between philosophy of inquiry and 
methods is appreciated among qualitative researchers more so than quantitative researchers (Yu, 
2006). But when it comes to the issue of inputting qualitative information into statistical analysis 
the intersection of philosophy and statistics becomes visible. I am not claiming that the methods 
evaluated in my dissertation are only for philosophers. Knowledge of the philosophy of statistics 
and educational inquiry is helpful, but not essential. To put the same point another way, one does 
not need to know that one knows in order to know something (Plantinga, 1993).  
To see why the above statement is true, pretend a naive researcher conducts an 
experiment. Now imagine she learns her intervention works. She does not understand the 
methodology or philosophy behind experimental methods. She used randomized assignment, but 
does not know why. She drew causal inferences, but has no theory of causation. In this scenario, 
our researcher, despite unfortunate gaps in her philosophy and methodology, knows her 
intervention works. She knows this without knowing why she knows it.  
Some philosophical and methodological obligations, of course, must be met before 
researchers can input qualitative knowledge into their statistical analyses. To appraise the value 
of incorporating qualitative expertise into statistical analysis, researchers need a sensible 
philosophy of educational inquiry (Phillips, 1987). But researchers can outsource here. They can 
let philosophers who investigate such problems articulate passable theories on their behalf. 
Researchers can also outsource to methodologists. Methodologists are better positioned to 
address technical questions than researchers who may lack specialist training. So long as 
philosophical and methodological obligations are competently fulfilled on behalf of researchers, 
they can trust the research process. This division of labor is essential to building up the education 
knowledge base, if not all of science (Williams, 2001). 
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Overview of the Literature 
Scientific Realism 
Educational processes resemble natural lotteries, their outcomes probability distributions. 
Only think about how IQ scores follow a normal distribution for an example. Equations – i.e., 
statistical models – capture the laws of probability controlling such distributions. Researchers try 
to induce such models from samples. Statistical models are useful for prediction. But scientific 
realists insist models can give us clues about the nature of reality too.    
Realism is not a precise thesis, but a vague picture. In this depiction, the world is outside 
us, and the purpose of theorizing – or a significant segment of it - is to describe its ontology 
(theory of things) in its own terms (Sider, 2011). To borrow a metaphor from Plato’s writings, 
we want theories to carve up the world at the joints. We realists think successful theories are 
likely true, but we also think their ontological-ideology likely fits reality’s structure. The 
epistemology (theory of knowledge) of such a privileged ontology is murky, yet Quine’s (1969) 
advice seems sensible: Believe in the ontology of your best scientific theories. 
Many realists make space for both credence-type and chance-type probability in their 
metaphysics. David Lewis connected theses probabilities together in his formulation of the 
principal principle. Roughly speaking, suppose we know the chance that event A will occur at 
some future time t is x, then – regardless of other admissible evidence we examine before time t 
– our credence in an hypothesis, H, stating A will occur at time t, should be x too, briefly: 
|, 	 =   
Where  is any reasonable credence function,  is any real number in the unit interval, E is any 
other admissible evidence, and H is the hypothesis A occurs at time t. Note, credence functions 
assign probabilities to judgments about the credibility of propositions. 
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To illustrate, Lewis asks us to consider the proposition a fair coin tossed at noon falls 
heads. Lewis’ rule clearly states we should be 50% confident it will fall heads at the appointed 
time. Suppose, however, we become privy to additional information, such as we observed this 
fair coin land tails rather than heads approximately 90% of the time in past experiments. No 
matter. So long as we know this coin is really fair (and its fairness is key), Lewis counsels us, to 
be 50% confident it will fall heads. Our uncertainty about whether the coin lands heads at noon 
tomorrow, thus, partly depends on our certainty the coin is really fair. So formulated, this 
principle provides ample justification for statistical modeling in education.  
In real-life, however, we never know with certainty whether a coin is fair or not. 
Likewise, in education research, we never know if our favorite statistical models are true or not. 
We are wise then to lavishly buttress models with as much evidence as possible before accepting 
them or even acting on them (Phillips & Burbules, 2000). But how to do so is a matter of no 
small debate. Some influential methodologists, however, resort to Bayesian epistemology to 
select and assess models (Gelman & Shalizi, 2013). 
Bayesian Epistemology 
Let S denote a sample and  a statistical model of interest. In the chance scheme, we 
can imagine S is a sample drawn randomly from some population. This population is depicted by 
. Consequently, |	 becomes a palatable notion, but |	 none-sense on stilts. There 
is no chance about  being true or false given the sample; it is or it is not. Its truth value is not a 
matter of chance. But Bayesian statisticians can make sense of |	. To them, it is a matter 
of credence-type probability – not chance-type probability. It represents their subjective credence 
towards  given S.  
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Some Bayesian statisticians are dogmatic. They reject all talk of chance-type probability 
as myth, but Bayesian statisticians need not be so exclusivist. They can co-opt chance-type 
probabilities. They can, for example, think chance-type probability is a physical reality, and 
|	 can be understood within a chance-type probability scheme when S is a random sample. 
The world is a magical place, and quantum mechanics seems to warrant the reality of chance-
type probability. 
All Bayesians, regardless of their metaphysical outlook, warn us it is an instance of the 
gambler’s fallacy to equate inverse probabilities, such as |	 and |	. Generally 
speaking, |	 ≠ |	. For example, the probability that someone playing a game of 
cards is dealt a queen given she is dealt a heart is not the same as the probability she gets a heart 
given she gets dealt a queen. But Bayesian statisticians know a fancy trick for transforming 
|	 into |	. They, thus, can admire the ways statisticians reach a consensus about 
|	 using chance. But, unlike them, they will go on to transform it into |	. 
A one-line theorem from the probability calculus about the relationship between inverse 
probabilities stands at the core of the Bayesian paradigm; briefly: 
|	 ∝ |		 
where this equation is read as the “posterior” probability of the  statistical model given sample  
S is proportional to the product of the likelihood of S given the  model and “prior” probability 
of the  model 	. The likelihood function |	 represents how probable S is given . 
The prior 	 represents our initial credence towards some  before examining the sample 
data. This theorem was first discovered by the eponymous English Puritan, Thomas Bayes 
(1701-1761), to solve some esoteric problem in probability theory. But it has since become the 
foundational formula of Bayesian epistemology. 
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The engine of Bayesian inference is the prior probability, 	. But formal mechanisms 
underdetermine our choice of prior density in specific applications. One Bayesian might select a 
prior representing a skeptical stance. A more trusting Bayesian, however, might select a prior 
representing a credulous stance. This is not a mathematical mistake, but a mere difference of 
opinion. Outside of the extreme cases, what constitutes the best possible prior in any particular 
circumstance is always a matter of qualitative judgment (i.e. judgment informed by good sense 
rather than a mechanical formula). This subjectivity makes many squeamish, but selecting an -
level for the familiar p-value (ex., .1, .05, .01) is likewise subjective.  
To critics, however, prior probabilities introduce an unacceptable degree of subjectivity 
into the selection and assessment of models. But the sensational track record of Bayesian 
statistics reversed this verdict (Silver, 2012). In her book, “The theory that would not die: How 
Bayes’ rule cracked the enigma code, hunted down Russian submarines, and emerged triumphant 
from two centuries of controversy,” McGrayne (2012) retells how one Bayesian triumph after 
another, finally forced the majority of people to acknowledge the positive role priors can play in 
even rigorous scientific investigation.    
Applications of Bayesian statistics, albeit established in mainstream statistics, continue to 
lag behind in special education research (Hicks & Knollman, 2014). Statistical analysis without 
priors dominates quantitative research in special education. It is impossible to be sure, but this 
state of affairs may change in the future as interest in Bayesian applications seems to be on the 
ascendency among researchers. But there are far too many contingencies to make any bold 
predictions about the future with much certainty. It is also difficult to envision how a popular 
version of Bayesian statistics will soon materialize in education research, even if we guess it 
eventually will gain a foothold.  
11 
 
Methodologists who subscribe to some version of Bayesian epistemology are very far 
from being a unified lot of folks. They have their fair share of disputes, like any other family. 
Some argue statistical inferences are fancy decisions. They argue we will never know if our best 
models are true, but we can know if they are useful. They prefer models that balance the dangers 
of Type I and Type II errors. But, of course, as Bayesians they do this within a comprehensive 
Bayesian decision framework. They, consequently, try determine how probable each model is 
given the sample evidence, and then evaluate the risks and rewards of acting on any one of the 
models should they really be true or false (the choice not to act is also a decision).  
Other Bayesians, in contrast, claim statistical inferences are inductions - not decisions. 
They then assess whether a model viewed in relative isolation is plausible or not given the data. 
This model is usually considered to be the null model. It represents a model, which if true, is so 
dull it entails nothing of substantive interest to researchers. Researchers, thus, hope to show that 
this model is probably false. To accomplish this masterstroke, these Bayesians can compute the 
posterior probability of the null model (Kruschke, 2011). If this posterior probability is too low, 
then they deem the data significant (otherwise, insignificant). Significance here only entails this 
area of research is probably capable of repaying future efforts (Mohr, 1990).  
Subjective Priors in Bayesian Inference  
There are two types of priors, objective and subjective. Objective priors are set using 
formulas. They are objective because everyone using the formula reaches the same prior. But 
there is no consensus about which objective prior among all the possibilities, if any, is obligatory 
in any situation. Subjective priors, in contrast, encapsulate agents’ background knowledge. They 
are agent-relative: Different agents, different priors. Again, it takes qualitative judgment rather 
than a fancy formula to set up a cogent subjective prior.    
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A teacher claims she can tell whether a full moon occurred last night by tallying up 
student misbehaviors. A drunken man boasts he can predict the outcome of a fair coin toss. 
Highly esteemed testing experts predict any 1st grader who passes their scholastic aptitude test 
above a certain threshold will go on to pass the 1st grade state reading test too. Skeptical, we put 
each claim to the test. In ten out of ten trials, each one accomplished their boasted feat.  
A classical (non-Bayesian) significance test would assess the null hypothesis () that 
 = .5 (i.e., the claimant is only guessing). In all three situations this hypothesis is rejected at the 
.05 significance level as classical tests omit priors altogether, but reaching the same conclusion 
in each case seems counter-intuitive. Bayesian epistemology shows why thing went wrong: We 
forgot about the priors.  
The prior probability of each claim differs. We are open-minded to the claims of a trusted 
expert. The evidence then only strengthens our initial conviction. But, regardless of the evidence, 
most of us will remain skeptical towards the drunken man’s claim. It goes against everything we 
know about the effect of high concentrations of alcohol on the brain. In regards to the teachers 
claim about full moons, it is not quite clear what to think. Some teachers swear full moons 
influence student behavior. Others surmise it is superstitious nonsense. In this case reasonable 
people will find the evidence inconclusive because of their personal priors.   
In special education research settings, we can inform subjective prior distributions with 
clinical knowledge. This knowledge is distributed among practitioners, experts, and other key 
stakeholders. The qualitative revolution in special education research has shown that there is an 
abundance of such knowledge at our disposal. Using qualitative methodology, it may be possible 
to elicit such knowledge from key informants. This knowledge, albeit perhaps gathered through 
qualitative methodology, can itself later be quantified by Bayesians.  
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The statistical literature on eliciting priors from experts is scanty, but as a general rule 
researchers can use their favorite methods for doing qualitative research to understand their 
informants’ background knowledge. Quantifying this knowledge afterwards, however, is 
challenging, albeit, not impossible (Christensen, Johnson, Branscum, & Hanson, 2011). Several 
methods can assist Bayesian analysts in the process of constructing representative priors of 
prevailing expert opinion (Buckley, 2004). Again, the goal is only to imperfectly represent – not 
precisely measure – their judgment about the probability of some proposition.  
There are three steps to quantifying knowledge elicited from informants. Bayesian 
analysts should: (1) specify a distributions family for the prior density (ex. normal-shape, t-
shape, uniform-shape, etc), (2) identify parameter values (ex. mean, standard deviations, etc) for 
the prior, and then (3) cross-validate their final choice of prior. The last step involves double-
checking with the informant to make sure the final prior density fairly and defensibly represents 
her judgment on the matter (Gill & Walker, 2005).   
To illustrate, imagine classroom teachers possess valuable background knowledge about 
the youth they teach on a regular basis. They anticipate how their students will respond under 
intervention and control conditions. But they, of course, are not infallible informants. Their best 
clinical intuitions sometimes go astray. So, we need to counter-balance their judgments with 
empirical data. To do this, we setup a little experiment in the classroom.   
In the experiment, we randomly assign youth to intervention and control conditions and 
observe what happens. To analyze the data, we use a Bayesian independent means t-test to assess 
whether these youth differ on average on some dependent variable of interest. To set appropriate 
subjective priors for this analysis, we will just use our favorite qualitative methods to understand 
the clinical judgments of these students’ teacher.   
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Nothing hinges on what qualitative method researchers use to understand their informants 
perspective so long as gain enough understanding of their partial beliefs about all the hypotheses 
of interest to fairly represent them. We can then quantify beliefs with a probability distribution 
using steps 1-3: We may for instance specify a normal-shape for the prior density, identify a 
certain mean and variance for it, and then cross-validate it with the teacher.  Using this subjective 
prior, Bayesians can then “conditionalize” on the objective sample evidence to compute the 
requisite posterior probability distribution. Conditionalize is Bayesian-talk for transforming prior 
probabilities into posterior probabilities using Bayes’ formula.   
All of the above steps for quantifying an expert’s qualitative knowledge can be done in 
brief, one-on-one interviews between Bayesian analysts and informants. In situations where there 
are multiple experts at hand, Bayesian analysts may need to get more sophisticated in how they 
elicit priors. A skeptical audience may be more impressed with a prior set by a panel of experts 
than a prior set by a rouge expert. So, despite the added costs in complexity of constructing a 
single prior representative of the opinion of multiple experts, these costs are compensated by the 
added credibility with readers.  
There are different ways one might approach the problem of inputting several expert 
opinions into one representative prior. One option is to apply steps (1)-(3) with the panel of 
experts in a focus group setting. This procedure is risky as it depends on expert collaboration and 
consensus. But the Bayesian analysts can facilitate the discussion to keep conversation on topic. 
When consensus cannot be reached then this uncertainty can be modeled with second-order 
priors over first-order priors. The other option is to apply steps (1)-(3) individually. Then one can 
take expert responses and apply regression analysis to aggregate responses to get a representative 
prior of the collective opinion (Gill & Walker, 2005). 
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Assessing Subjective Prior Densities  
The subjective prior is the engine of Bayesian inference (Gill & Walker, 2005). Fisher’s 
famous effort to formally constrain the subjectivity in the prior proved intractable. Given that 
statistics tends to draw the formally inclined this has been one reason why the use of priors has 
often felt to classically-minded statisticians like subjectivity run amok (Sider, 2011). But 
Bayesian statisticians figured out some ways of ruling out garbage priors. These methods are 
informal and not foolproof, but they do help. These methods include transparency, triangulation 
of multiple priors, and posterior predictive checks.  
Full disclosure of how priors were set offers an important constraint on prior choice. 
Bayesians seeking to publish in peer-reviewed journals must persuade critical reviewers who are 
often skeptical of their findings that their priors are indeed sensible. This means that analysts 
must formulate some explicit, written rationale for their choice of priors. These justifications 
empower readers to reach their own conclusions about the reasonableness of the choice of prior. 
Kruschke (2011) argues that this transparency in setting priors actually makes applications of 
priors in Bayesian statistics less prone to abuse than the alternative “canned” -levels researchers 
routinely invoke using non-Bayesian methods.  
Triangulation of multiple priors for comparative purposes offers yet another way of 
constraining priors (Pollard, 1986). Convergences in the posteriors of Bayesian analyses done 
with skeptical priors, neutral priors, and advocacy priors toward some hypothesis shows that 
choice of prior had only minimal influence on the posterior. This often happens in situations 
where large samples are at our disposal (Kruschke, 2011). If convergence fails to obtain, 
however, and choice of prior matters then readers can pick the prior that best represents their 
own stance on the issue.  
16 
 
The posterior predictive check is actually a method for testing the overall goodness-of-fit 
of the posterior distribution rather than for constraining prior choice (Lynch, 2004). But we can 
use this method as a backwards check on our choice of prior after the analysis is over. Imagine 
we used Bayesian statistical analysis to get a posterior distribution of a population mean. We can 
then simulate drawing random samples from our posterior distribution to determine the chances 
(yes, chances) of getting our obtained sample mean. This is a posterior predictive check. If this 
chance is high we have corroborated our statistical model, else, we produced evidence against it. 
Again a bad fit only entails that the choice of prior might possibly have been the culprit. Other 
culprits such as a fluke random sample may instead be to blame.  
But there is one more informal way of constraining the choice of prior yet to be 
discussed: Ask experts for help in setting up priors (Buckley, 2004). Expert opinion represents 
prevailing opinion on hypotheses, before taking into account the sample information. Besides 
experts, we could use previous quantitative studies, common sense, or “theoretical” knowledge 
to inform our choice of priors. Incidentally, basing priors on known statistical regularities is fully 
compatible with the Bayesian spirit (Lewis, 1987). But, in their absence, special education 
researchers might try the route of content experts. It seems only natural to make priors represent 
expert opinion (Christensen, et al., 2011). 
Buckley (2004) proposes Bayesian analysts exploit the knowledge of qualitative 
researchers to set defensible priors (see also Gill & Walker, 2006). Some qualitative researchers 
are choice informants in this regard because they are aware how human agency and social 
institutions may moderate the chance that an event occurs. In instances where past quantitative 
studies have been done, it may make sense to even blend this past quantitative information with 
qualitative expertise when setting priors.  
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Dissertation Objectives and Organization  
My priority in this dissertation is to test my hunch that qualitative knowledge can 
improve how we analyze quantitative data sets in special education. Based on the linkage of 
philosophy of inquiry, methodology, and practice in research, three objectives guide this 
dissertation research: (1) philosophically speaking, I will build an argument that, despite its risks, 
Bayesian inference can cope better than classical inference with the hazards of doing education 
research (ex. frequent inability to use random assignment). (2) Methodologically speaking, I will 
test my hunch qualitative knowledge can improve statistical analysis. Using the performance of 
classical t-tests as a baseline, I will evaluate the Type I and Type II error rates of Bayesian t-tests 
under different conditions, such as tiny sample sizes. (3) Practically speaking, I will demonstrate 
how I envision using Bayesian methods in special education science. Specifically, showing how 
Bayesian analysis can sometimes produce results more informative and helpful than traditional 
classical analysis.  
The three chapters comprising the body of my dissertation each addresses one objective. 
Table 1 offers a summary of fit between article and objective. These articles form a cumulative 
case for fostering a romantic science of special education using Bayesian inference. Moreover, I 
think Bayesian inference will still satisfy those researchers among us who demand technical 
rigor in statistical analysis at all times. This is because it provides a kind of logic of quantitative 
analysis that is formal yet comfortable with qualitative knowledge.  
Table 1. Objectives and Methods 
Objectives Description of Objectives Chapters 
#1 Build an argument that, despite risks, special 
education should befriend Bayesian inference 
Philosophy Piece  
#2 Determine whether even limited qualitative 
knowledge can improve statistical analysis 
Methodology Piece 
#3 Show how to apply Bayesian statistics in special 
education to solve otherwise intractable problems 
Pedagogical Piece  
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In chapter 2, I will cautiously venture into the depths of statistical philosophy. Using John 
Rawl’s method of reflective equilibrium, I marshal an argument for the thesis that Bayesian 
inference is generally more applicable than classical inference in education research. This is 
because classical inference needs probability samples or random assignment to keep its promise 
of delivering objective inferences grounded in chance-type probability. I argue that this is true 
whether we are inducing population characteristics or causation. Bayesian inference, in contrast, 
delivers a different version of objectivity to its user, and it does not need probability samples or 
random assignment to keep its promises. The upshot, Bayesian and classical inference are 
different versions of statistical inference. One is not better than the other, but Bayesian inference 
is more generally applicable in education research.    
In chapter 3, I report the results of a Monte Carlo experiment comparing several methods 
for setting convenience priors when doing Bayesian t-test analysis. Convenience priors are 
respectable default settings for priors in Bayesian analysis. The purpose of this simulation study 
was to help guide researchers in selecting reasonable convenience priors in research contexts 
involving tiny samples. I begin this chapter surveying the problem of setting up priors in 
pioneering research. Setting up priors is an art rather than an exact science. One idea is to setup 
priors that remain invariant under re-parameterization. This is Jeffrey’s prior, and it is objective 
because it is based on a math formula. But I wish to propose another method of convenience 
prior setting: select a mixture of subjective priors representing the different possible options (ex. 
no practical effect, small practical effect, medium practical effect, large practical effect). Then let 
the sample data “select” which prior in the mix is most appropriate. Using classical analysis as a 
baseline, I used simulation methods to assess the performance of Bayesian t-test with different 
priors. The results show mixed priors worked well in significance testing.  
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In chapter 4, I provide a practical demonstration of the usefulness of Bayesian analysis in 
special education. I sought to quantify the effect of different grouping methods on annual reading 
outcomes. Specifically, I tested whether enacting inclusion in 5th grade elementary classrooms 
using a natural proportioning method rather than a clustering one yielded a difference in annual 
reading gain scores. But, I only had a tiny judgment sample at my disposal and my groups were 
balanced with propensity score matching. To preserve the logic then of my statistical inferences, 
I resorted to Bayesian methods.   
But, even if the requisite sampling conditions had been met for classical analysis, I still 
might have preferred Bayesian. Given tiny sample sizes it is extraordinarily difficult to definitely 
eliminate the null hypotheses using classical p-values. Refuting the null hypothesis is just too 
lofty a goal in such cases. Instead, a more realistic goal is assessing how probable it is given the 
sample. We may discover it is less probable than other hypotheses, even if we cannot eliminate it 
altogether from our hypothesis competition. This later feat, however, is naturally accomplished 
using Bayesian analysis.  
 In chapter 5, I summarize the findings of all three chapters. I return to my opening 
question: Is it ever advisable to let experts influence our statistical analysis? The purpose of this 
dissertation was to investigate this possibility in more depth. I argue in this chapter that my 
findings substantiate my original hunch, but more work still needs to be done in this area. As 
enticing as undergoing a Bayesian revolution in special education might be to me, I acknowledge 
it is also a risky proposition. One troublesome worry is that it makes the knowledge base reliant 
on the “good sense” of researchers who setup priors. To address this concern, I argue that all 
researchers, including classically-minded ones, must rely on their “good sense” too in statistical 
analysis – it is an inescapable problem.  
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Definition of Key Terms 
Bayesian Statistical paradigm: In essence, statistical inferences modify prevailing 
credence-type probabilities given objective sample information as Bayes’ rule prescribes. 
Methodologists who subscribe to this system usually reference the pioneering statistical 
work of Frank Ramsey, Harold Jeffreys, and Bruno de Finetti when developing their own 
statistical methods (Hacking, 2001; Howson & Urbach, 2006).  
 
Classical Statistical paradigm: In essence, statistical inference should preserve the 
objectivity of chance-type probability. Methodologists who subscribe to this system 
usually reference the pioneering statistical work of figures such as Karl Pearson, R.A. 
Fisher, and Jerzy Neyman when developing their own statistical methods (Hacking, 
2001; Lehmann, 2011). 
 
Methodology: Normative account of the protocols researchers should use when carrying 
out research in theory (Paul, 2005).    
 
Methods: Descriptive account of protocols researchers do use when carrying out 
research in actual practice (Paul, 2005).  
 
Monte Carlo Simulation Techniques: Finding the chance-type probability of some 
event by observing the outcome of many probability experiments (Ware, Ferron, & 
Miller, 2013).    
 
Qualitative Knowledge: In the usual statistical parlance, it is knowledge about qualities 
rather than quantities. Qualities are all about essences (types, categories) of things and 
their degrees of excellences (virtues, traits) (Bhaskar, 1979).   
 
Philosophy of Inquiry: The philosophical investigation into a constellation of problems 
surrounding research methodology (Yu, 2006). 
   
Pragmatism in Educational Research: The claim that “truth” is not a viable criterion 
for theory selection in educational research. Consequently, we use methods or procedures 
of research to “settle,” “fix,” or “stabilize” our beliefs about education to improve human 
happiness, democracy, or some other useful goal (Danforth, 2006).   
Realism in Educational Research: The claim that a legitimate aim of educational 
research is to understand causal mechanisms operating in the world that influence 
education. Moreover, educational research is (or can be) successful at identifying true 
causal mechanisms, even if the “perfect” theory is beyond grasp (House, 1991).    
Romantic Science: The bold thesis teleological explanations belong in science, and 
scientists cannot reduce key qualities to quantities without impoverishing their own 
disciplines (Plantinga, 1993; Nagel, 2012; Sider, 2011).    
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
TWO VERSIONS OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE 
There is no universal theory of statistical inference (Hacking, 2001), diverse paradigms 
underlay our statistical imaginations. The term paradigm is much overused today. But, stripped 
of the excesses of Kuhn’s (1962) grandiose theory of science, paradigm becomes an apt choice 
of word. Before Kuhn, paradigms were heuristic exemplars. When learning Latin by rote, a 
person first learns to conjugate amare (to love) as amo, amas, amat… and then follows this 
familiar pattern, called the paradigm, to conjugate unfamiliar verbs of the same class.  Likewise, 
renowned applications of statistics are held up as paradigms by subsequent analysts.  
There are two key paradigms for statistical inference in education research, classical and 
Bayesian. Each offers its own version of inference. Those all too familiar p-values belong to the 
classical paradigm, but not Bayesian. Classical inferences require that studies include a chance 
setup somewhere in their design – ex., a subset of the population selected using some physical 
randomization device. A chance setup is a physically occurring probability experiment, such as 
the roll of a die. The Bayesian paradigm, in contrast, does not mandate chance setups.  
Probability samples are often infeasible in education. Youth are vulnerable and school 
districts protective. Youth are also often scattered across countless locations. To compensate for 
this extra complexity, probability sampling has evolved into different species, including “simple 
random sampling,” “stratified random sampling,” and “cluster random sampling.” This plurality 
helps researchers a little bit but bureaucratic headaches, prohibitive costs, and logistic nightmares 
still prevent probability sampling from becoming routine in education science.  
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To illustrate, consider the case of a survey researcher who wants to investigate whether 
caretakers sending their kids to a certain school perceive themselves as “insiders” or “outsiders” 
to its school community. She develops a fancy questionnaire to accomplish this feat. But she has 
no power to force caretakers, randomly selected off some master list, to complete it. Instead, she 
recruits volunteers. Suppose her advertisement campaign pays off, and she recruits a sizable 
sample. Even so, she does not have a true probability sample.  
In light of the rarity of true chance setups in study designs in education research, I find it 
a bit odd classical inference is so prevalent in education research and Bayesian inference so rare. 
The purpose of this paper is to argue for reversing this. When chance setups are available, there 
is warrant for using classical inference. Outside these special cases, however, its logic is mostly 
inadmissible. Bayesian inference, in contrast, proceeds without hiccup.  
A secondary purpose of this paper is to familiarize education researchers with some of 
the important philosophical contrasts between classical and Bayesian statistical inference. I 
suspect unfamiliarity among education researchers with this difference partly explains why 
Bayesian inference is underutilized in education research (Muthen, 2013). The debate between 
Bayesian and classical statisticians, after all, is philosophical in its nature (They actually agree on 
all the mathematics).  
The structure of this paper is divided into three parts. In Part I, I provide a synopsis of 
classical and Bayesian versions of inference. In Part II, I critically compare their approaches to 
extrapolating from samples to populations. In Part III, I go on to consider inferences to causation. 
In all these cases, I find the logic of Bayesian induction is more generally applicable in education 
research than its classical counterpart because of the absence of chance setups in study designs. 
In my closing remarks, I discuss the implications of this for education science. 
23 
 
Part 1 
Two Flavors of Objectivity  
 Humans have the extraordinary capacity to think objectively about reality. Objectivity is 
unbiased subjectivity, and there are multiple ways of establishing it. Methodologists argue about 
how best to accomplish this feat in science. Roughly speaking, methodologists are Bayesian or 
classical in their statistical philosophy. I elaborate on these two philosophies below.     
The Classical Philosophy of Statistical Inference 
Objectivity is prized among scientists, and naturally they want their statistical inferences 
to exhibit this virtue too. Politicians also value objectivity. They have a much easier time, after 
all, selling their campaign platform when objective research supports it. Politicians need this 
perception of objectivity to sound democratic, and non-elitist. Classical statisticians use chance-
type probability to make their statistical inferences objective.  
Recall, chance-type probability is about relative frequencies in the long run; credence-
type probability, quantified uncertainty. Chance is highly objective. Two people flip a fair coin 
countless times. In the limits, they each observe a balanced proportion of heads and tails. To 
inject this type of objectivity into inductions, however, classical statisticians need probability 
samples (i.e. every member in a population must have some non-zero chance of selection) or a 
sample closely approximating a probability sample.  
With a little metaphysical imagination, envision using a physical randomization devise, 
such as a spinner, to repeatedly select samples from the same population. Then record all results 
in a data set. In the limits, this data set will become the sampling density. Sampling densities, 
like random samples, are then all about objective chance – the chances scientists will observe 
this or that random sample in a given study.  
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Statistics computed from probability samples have sampling distributions too. Using the 
central limit theorem, for example, statisticians can easily prove means 	 computed from 
random samples of a certain size (N) have normal sampling distributions with a mean equal to 
the population mean and a variance proportional to the population variance. Armed with this 
knowledge, classical statisticians can then proceed to make all kinds of substantive inferences 
about unknown population means from known sample means. This is an impressive triumph, but 
it is not the only version of statistical inference around.  
The Bayesian Philosophy of Statistical Inference 
Bayesians inspect posterior probabilities – not sampling distributions – to draw their 
inferences about statistical hypotheses of interest. They assign posterior probabilities in fact to all 
hypotheses in the competition. Researchers, for example, may conjecture all sorts of possibilities 
for a population mean . Some guesses will be more probable than others given sample data. 
Bayesians can represent (not measure) such judgments with a normal posterior density 
~ , !"	. If so, the hypothesis with most density (i.e., ) represents the most credible 
value to scientists given the sample. The variance !" of the posterior represents their uncertainty: 
larger variances, greater uncertainties.   
Credence-type probabilities are subjective, and posteriors consist of nothing but credence. 
To compute a posterior probability for a hypothesis, Bayesians must specify a prior probability 
for it. Prior probabilities represent scientists’ (informed) judgments about hypotheses probability 
before they even have an opportunity to examine the sample evidence. But scientists may differ 
in their judgments about which hypotheses are probable, and by how much. Reasonable people, 
after all, sometimes disagree. Bayesians, thus, must think carefully about what prior to use in 
their analysis: Garbage in, garbage out. 
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Classical statisticians worry priors might smuggle bias into inferences. Bayesians might 
settle on priors slanted towards their favorite hypotheses, and thus contaminate their posteriors. 
Without the constraints of samples, Bayesians must setup priors that seem sensible to them. But 
instead of sensible priors Bayesian might be selecting priors that reinforce their own prejudices 
about reality, and no one would ever know it.  
The possible effect of an ill-chosen prior is concerning, but Bayesians are risk-takers. 
They risk some bias to gain the rewards of using priors. Bayesians find the risk acceptable since 
they can eventually filter out such bias from their posterior probabilities. Bayes rule specifies 
how to modify prior probabilities in light of objective sample evidence. Using it, Bayesians will, 
under normal conditions at any rate, eliminate bias in posteriors.  
To illustrate this process, imagine two open-minded researchers hold contrasting 
opinions. One thinks it highly probable phonics instruction is better than whole language. The 
other thinks this claim is improbable. Notwithstanding the sizable gap in their priors, if each 
researcher uses Bayes Theorem to update their priors with sample evidence, they will eventually 
settle on the same posterior given a growing body of evidence. Mathematical proofs guarantee 
convergence in the limits, and mathematical proofs are pretty objective.   
There are now two density-types to keep track of when considering inferences. All 
Bayesian inference depends on posterior densities; classical inferences on sampling densities. 
Sampling densities consist of constant parameters and varying data possibilities. They are all 
about objective chance.  Posterior densities, by way of contrast, consist of constant data and 
varying parameter possibilities. They are all about subjective credence. Classical statisticians 
eschew credence-type probability. Bayesian thinkers, however, freely invoke both probability 
types as they see fit. This is a philosophical rather than mathematical argument. 
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Part II 
Scientific Inferences to Populations 
 In part II, I move on to consider applications of classical and Bayesian inference in 
education research. Researchers often must extrapolate from samples to populations. Both 
paradigms promise objectivity to their users, but in this section we see classical inference only 
delivers on its promise in cases involving true probability samples. Bayesian inference, in 
contrast, can keep its promise with or without probability samples.  
The Power of Probability Sampling 
Imagine education researchers, for the sake of illustration, are interested in inducing the 
population mean  from a sample. Classical statisticians usually want their inferences about  
to carry the objectivity of chance-type probability – i.e., researchers in the same circumstances 
always draw the same inferences. This is a high standard for objectivity, but classical statisticians 
found a way to make this bold dream obtainable.   
To facilitate the whole induction process, classical statisticians use point estimates, 
interval estimates, and hypothesis tests. When studying a population with an unknown mean , 
they may produce a point estimate of . A point estimate (̂	 is a single guess at the unknown 
parameter. An interval estimate, in contrast, gives an upper and lower-bound for ,. Hypothesis 
tests, finally, help determine whether a value, such as  = 50, is tenable or not.   
In the 1930s, the classical statistician, R.A. Fisher, neatly cast point estimates, interval 
estimates, and hypothesis tests alike within the chance-type probability mold. To accomplish this 
feat, he first used a physical randomization devise, such as a table of random numbers, to select 
samples from populations. He then capitalized on this chance setup in the design to compute all 
three types of inferences within the classical system.  
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Classical statisticians, like Fisher, evaluate possible point estimation methods, in the final 
analysis, using chance-type probabilities. There are multiple classical estimators (maximum 
likelihood estimation, method of moments, ordinary least squares), and they do not always 
produce the same estimate. Consistent with their philosophy, classical statisticians thus choose 
estimators based on their frequency properties, such as being “unbiased” in the limits. But 
chance-type probability presumes random samples and sampling distributions.  
Two classical statisticians using the same methods in parallel research projects will reach 
the same point estimates – granting, of course, they observed identical samples. But probability 
samples gathered from the same population using the same protocols are expected to vary from 
one another. Differences accrue because of sampling error. Fisher figured out how to turn even 
this oddity into an asset in the classical system.  
Researchers often carry out investigations hoping to find something worthwhile to report. 
“Worthwhile” may be, and in education research often is, just a new line of inquiry to explore. 
Fisher suggested using p-values to determine if samples were indeed significant or not 
(Significant data only entails this area of research is probably capable of repaying our efforts). 
To compute a p-value, one must first setup a null hypothesis (). The null hypothesis expresses 
a situation where there is nothing of substantive value in this area of inquiry.  
We might know, for example, youth on average score a 50 on some test of interest. There 
is nothing for researchers to explain then if a subgroup of this population also averages 50. But 
researchers would have something to query if a subgroup of interest did significantly better or 
worse than the overall population. They would need to explain, for example, why this subgroup 
differs from everyone else. Given this setup, our null hypothesis should be the subgroup average 
matches the overall population average, :  = 50. 
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After successfully setting up the null, Fisher next computes the sampling density for the 
test statistic given the null. He carves up the sampling density into significant and insignificant 
regions. Conventionally, he demarcated these regions so that the selected 5% region of sampling 
density is furthest away from the most likely data possibility under the null. In the case of the 
study involving the population mean, if we grant a population variance !" = 10 and a sample 
size n=10, we designate any  between 51.96 and 48.04 insignificant (otherwise, significant). 
This is because only s falling outside of this region produce p-values small enough to make 
them significant. If we find  = 60 in our study, then we simply compute the probability of 
getting  = 60 (or a weirder sample mean) given :  = 50 to find the p-value. 
Interestingly, Fisher never gave a rationale for picking the 5% region furthest away from 
the highest density of the sampling density. Technically, using 5% of any part of this density 
should keep the significance level at 5%. It seemed only too obvious to Fisher, however, that it 
made much more sense to settle on the region furthest away. Fortunately, Neyman and Pearson 
later supplied Fisher’s intuitions with a justification using the likelihood ratio principle - a 
principle fully compatible with classical philosophy.  
Fisher considered the customary 5% significance level to be convention; a matter of 
clinical judgment not an objective formula. This surprising intellectual move seems more 
appropriate for Bayesians. Again, Neyman and Pearson came to the rescue. They placed 
statistical inference into a decision framework, and sought to pick significance levels in such a 
way so as to balance Type I () and Type II ()) error rates. For his part, Fisher never accepted 
their “solution” as he claimed inferences from samples to population are about inductions rather 
than decisions – but this family feud among classical statisticians need not detain us.  
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Neyman also invented confidence intervals. Using knowledge of the sampling density, 
Neyman figured out how to produce a 100%(1-) confidence interval. Given researchers 
computed  = 60 from a random sample (n=10) and !" = 10, researchers can say using 
Neyman’s method they are 95% confident the true parameter is anywhere between 58.4 and 
61.96. Their confidence here rests on the grounds that the procedure captures the true population 
mean 95% of the time in repeated applications.  
The (mistaken) claim that there is a .95 chance-type probability the true population 
parameter is between 58.4 and 61.96 is a common misinterpretation of the confidence interval. It 
betrays the classical insistence on frequency in the long run. The true parameter either is or is not 
in the interval, this is not a matter of chance. Classical statisticians make no claims then about 
the chances the parameter is in this or that interval. Their .95 confidence rests on the procedure’s 
.95 coverage rate in repeated applications in the limits.   
 The masterstroke behind all classical inference from samples to populations is random 
selection. When they use a physical randomization devise to select samples from populations 
they can invoke chance-type probability. Everything hinges on this. Classical statisticians often 
compute sampling densities with fancy analytics. Using the central limit theorem, for example, 
they proved the sampling distribution of s is normal.  
Sometimes, however, it is not possible to analytically compute sampling distributions for 
statistics of interests, such as medians (m). Simulation methods, such as bootstrapping, provide 
classical statisticians with an empirical way of finding the right sampling distributions in these 
special cases. Simulation methods are computer-intensive, but they are lifesavers. Statisticians 
can use them to construct sampling distributions for any statistic of interest provided they know 
what probability sampling technique to simulate when ‘drawing’ samples.  
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The Scope and Limits of Classical Inference 
 Within its natural boundaries, the logic of classical inference survives all critical scrutiny. 
Its version of objectivity surpasses the Bayesian version in protecting inferences from bias. But 
outside its proper boundaries, it loses its entire luster. Without probability samples, its inferences 
fail to deliver on their promises of objectivity. They become wholly arbitrary, and so unfit for a 
science of education. 
 Someone might object, however, that I am being too rash. They might counter me by 
saying something like classical statisticians can treat non-probability samples as if they were 
random. They could then compute p-values, and conclude, ‘Hypothetically speaking, these data 
are significant at the 5% level.’ This information might function as a measure of practical effect, 
and so inform the knowledge base. And all classical statisticians would need to do is alert the 
reader to their “pretense” in the limitation sections.    
 I am not satisfied, however, with the above reasoning. Without probability sampling, the 
choice of sampling distribution is too underdetermined to be an adequate measure of practical 
effect. One classical statistician might come along and impute one sampling distribution for the 
sample and then another classical statistician might come along and impute a different one. They 
will then reach different effect sizes, but there would be no matter of fact about which imputation 
choice was correct. The math works equally well in both cases.    
 To illustrate, consider the case of a drunken man who claims to his friend he can usually 
predict the outcome of the toss of a fair coin. The friend sets up an experiment to test his claim. 
In 9 out of 12 trials, the drunk succeeded in predicting whether it would land heads or tails. The 
friend then asks two statisticians to independently determine if the data are significant or not, but 
she forgot to specify why she halted the experiment after 12 trials.  
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 The stopping rule matters. Without this information, statisticians wishing to conduct 
classical analysis must guess it to select an appropriate sampling distribution. The first 
statistician, therefore, guessed the experimenter planned from the outset to stop after 12 trials. 
She, therefore, selects the binomial sampling distribution. The second statistician instead guesses 
the experimenter planned from the outset to stop after observing 9 correct predictions. It just 
happened to take 12 trials to reach 9 correct predictions. She, thus, selects the negative binomial 
sampling distribution rather than the binomial. 
 Each classical statisticians setup the same null hypothesis, :  = .5. This represents the 
case where the drunk is randomly guessing. Using the binomial sampling distribution, the first 
statistician computes a one-tailed p-value of .075. She declares the data to be insignificant at the 
5% level, and recommends no further investigation. Using the negative binomial sampling 
distribution, the second statistician computes a one-tailed p-value of .035. She declares the data 
to be significant at the 5% level, and recommends future investigation.  
The friend is confused. But, unless she supplies the true reason she stopped at 12 trials, 
both analyses stand on equal mathematical footing. But suppose she clarifies that she stopped at 
12 trials because the drunk passed out on the 13th trial, and she was forced to stop. Technically, 
both imputations were wrong. If the experiment was repeated again the drunk might pass out 
earlier or later, and so this warrants a different sampling distribution altogether. 
 If we assume time to passing out randomly varies from experiment to experiment, then 
the classical statisticians might rethink their analysis plans. They might use bootstrapping to 
simulate the requisite sampling distribution. They will then have a rationale for why they used 
this sampling distribution in the analysis. They know it models what actually happened in the 
experiment. But this all entails a known element of chance in the sampling process.     
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The objectivity of classical inference, thus, hinges on knowledge of the stopping rule. 
Without it, classical inference is vulnerable to bias. The classical statistician who hates the idea 
of a drunk predicting the tosses of fair coin might select the binomial sampling distribution to 
reinforce their bias. The classical statistician who loves the idea might instead pick the negative 
binomial sampling distribution. Classical inference no longer safeguards against bias.  
One might try to salvage the situation by making up a new convention. Always treat a 
non-probability sample as if it were a certain type of probability sample. Perhaps, treat them as 
ones drawn with a fixed number in mind from the outset. This is in fact what is happening in a 
lot of education research. But this does not really solve the deeper problem: The whole point of 
doing classical inference was to prevent such subjectivity (Kruschke, 2011).     
Bayesian Inferences without Probability Samples 
All classical inferences are drawn from sampling distributions. Sampling distributions 
grant classical inference the objectivity of chance-type probability, but make them vulnerable to 
the so-called stopping rule problem. The stopping rule problem is overcome when we know what 
physical random mechanism produced the data. Otherwise, it is intractable. The stopping rule 
problem, thus, bounds classical inference to the realm of true probability samples.  
Bayesian inferences are drawn from posterior distributions – not sampling. The formula 
for sampling distributions requires stopping rules; the formula for posterior distributions does 
not. Bayesians only care about the visible data, and Bayesians will reach the same conclusion 
regardless of what stopping rule may or may not have been used to gather the sample. Thus, 
Bayesian inference is immune to the stopping rule problem. They will reach the same inference 
given the visible data, regardless of whether it was really a binomial or negative binomial 
sampling distribution.  
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Bayesians, however, can disagree with one another. They need to specify priors, and if 
they specify different priors they may compute posteriors entailing opposite conclusions. This is 
troublesome to classical statisticians, because bad priors might bias inferences. This, however, is 
not the Bayesian version of the stopping rule problem. The stopping rule problem without true 
random samples is intractable within the classical system. The problem of priors biasing 
inferences is solvable within the Bayesian system.    
Imagine the friend had instead asked two Bayesians to analyze her experimental data: 
nine successes, three failures. It is likely both Bayesians would be skeptical of the claim, and 
their priors would equally represent skeptical stances. Such a skeptical stance is consistent with 
background knowledge, and it seems unwise to exclude such background knowledge. The prior 
specifications need not be exactly identical to each other to produce a comparable posterior so 
long as both priors reasonably represent a skeptical opinion. In this case, both Bayesians should 
produce slightly different, but still very, skeptical posteriors.  
No formal mechanism in Bayesian analysis, of course, guarantees two Bayesians will in 
fact set priors encapsulating skeptical stances. One Bayesian might let her wishful thinking cloud 
her judgment, and so specify a credulous prior – i.e. a prior biased towards the drunken man’s 
claim. The other Bayesian may show more caution, and specify a more sensible (skeptical) prior. 
Each will then proceed with the analysis, but arrive at opposite conclusions.  
In this case, the friend might decide to collect more evidence to resolve the difference. 
She might redo the experiment, and share her findings again with both Bayesians. They will then 
update their opinions. They will use their old posteriors as their new priors, and compute a new 
posterior with the new evidence. Overtime, their two posteriors will converge as the influence of 
their priors is washed away by a growing body of evidence. 
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Judgment Samples 
In the case of samples, Bayesians have multiple options on the table. They can use 
probability or judgment samples. Classical statisticians are limited to probability samples. 
Probability samples are about chance-type probabilities. Judgment samples, in contrast, are about 
credence-type probability. We select samples that we (or experts) judge to represent the 
population of interest (Howson & Urbach, 2006). 
The stopping rule problem prevents classical statisticians from capitalizing on judgment 
samples. Bayesians, however, have no such restrictions. They can embrace any sample they 
deem to be representative of the population. All that matters are the visible data, and they do not 
care about how they were selected so long as they are representative. Judgment samples, within 
the Bayesian system, then are viable alternatives to probability samples.    
 The quota sample is a well-known instance of judgment sampling. It is the credence-type 
analog of stratified random sampling. This sampling technique involves giving interviewers 
quotas of people to interview. Quotas are deliberately picked to ensure the sample represents the 
population of interest in key ways. The interviewers are then instructed to fill up their quotas 
using their best judgment. It is already being utilized in marketing research to inform high-stakes 
decisions. 
Imagine researchers have access to a visible sample. It could be either a quota sample or 
a stratified random sample. Bayesians do not care. The relevant information to them is in the 
visible data themselves Classical statisticians, in contrast, need to know. They can proceed with 
objective inferences only if it was a stratified random sample. If it was a quota sample then they 
must either pretend like it was really a stratified random sample and engage in a bit of fiction or 
– given the stopping rule problem – forgo analysis altogether.   
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Summary 
The argument of this section is that the logic of classical induction is inadmissible in the 
realm of non-probability samples. The warrant for classical inferences comes from their high 
objectivity. To achieve this objectivity, however, classical statisticians are constrained to 
probability samples. Bayesian inference gets its objectivity from an epistemic rule, Bayes’ 
Theorem. The Bayesian version of objectivity lacks some of the luster of classical inference, but 
it imposes no constraints on sample type.  
Part III 
Scientific Inference to Causation 
Classical and Bayesian extrapolations from samples to populations are both valid. But 
Bayesian methods are more generally applicable in education than classical ones. I argue 
something similar happens in the case of inferences to causation. Such inference occurs in 
intervention studies, and for ill or good they hold a high status in education science.  
Intervention Studies 
All intervention studies involve a manipulable variable, but only those with adequate 
controls count as experimental. Otherwise, they are quasi-experimental. The prefix “quasi” here 
intimates an epistemic status of second best. Researchers settle for them, wishing for more. But 
what constitutes “adequate” controls? 
Sometimes experimental units function as their own controls. In single case design, for 
example, researchers observe the same individual under both control and intervention conditions, 
and draw comparisons. They monitor rates of misbehavior among students to establish baselines. 
They then introduce behavior modification technology into the environment and observe changes 
in behaviors. This design establishes adequate control. 
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It is not always possible, of course, to use experimental units as their own controls. To 
compare the effect of two math curriculums on children, for example, researchers cannot simply 
make children take both curriculums consecutively. They want to know what happens if children 
are given either this or that curriculum, not both. They have no choice then but to use two 
different groups of students.  
But groups had better be comparable on extraneous variables to warrant inferences to 
causation. Researchers, however, are never certain they controlled for all extraneous variables. 
Perhaps, they omitted an unknown one. But certainty is too high a standard, they can settle for 
probable (i.e. the groups are probably matched on all extraneous variables). This is as good as it 
gets in education science. We are satisfied then with a research design making the comparability 
of groups more probable than not. 
Selection and Assignment 
To probe the topic further, methodologists routinely distinguish between two types of 
procedures, selection and assignment. The selection-type entails sampling from a population. 
Take a list of the whole population, select a subset of it. Its function is to produce samples 
representative of the population of interest. The assignment-type, in contrast, divides existing 
sample members into subgroups. Its function is to produce balanced groups – or more precisely, 
groups probably matched on extraneous variables in the requisite way.  
 Classical statisticians need an assignment procedure compatible with their system. To 
accomplish this, they invoke random assignment – i.e., using a physical random devise, or 
computer simulation of one, to divide sample members into subgroups. But it is a misconception 
to think random selection is now moot. Cogent inferences to causation in classical analysis, I 
argue, usually need both random assignment and selection working together in concert. 
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The Logic of Classical Inference to Causation 
Random selection seems like it should be moot. Assignment, after all, is what makes 
groups balanced – not selection. But, as we shall see, this is not exactly so. Statisticians using 
parametric statistics, such as t-test, need both random assignment and selection in their designs to 
establish causation (Recall, parametric entails interest in invisible population parameters). This 
proviso for random selection may be unfamiliar, and so I explain why. 
To illustrate, suppose a novel reading intervention raises students’ test scores by a lot. To 
discover this effect, classical statisticians must consider two populations of test scores. One 
consists of scores of all students with the intervention (intervention population); the other scores 
of students without it (control population). If classical statisticians had physical access to these 
populations, they could draw a random sample from each, and test for mean difference. Perhaps, 
using the independent means t-test, for example, to establish causation.  
 Classical statisticians, however, never have physical access to both populations. Instead, 
they use random assignment to compensate. If they can physically draw a random sample from 
the control population – i.e. students without exposure to intervention - then they can randomly 
assign all members of this big sample into two smaller subgroups. These subgroups simulate two 
random samples drawn from the control population on distinct occasions. Each subgroup, 
therefore, probably resembles the control population.    
Classical statisticians can then physically transform one of these two groups into a 
random sample from the intervention population, by subjecting it to intervention conditions. 
Together random assignment and selection, thus, give researchers something akin to random 
samples drawn from both control and intervention populations. This circumstance is all 
statisticians need to classically induce causation.   
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 This procedure illustrates two admirable virtues of random assignment: it (a) controls 
known and unknown extraneous variables and (b) preserves the high objectivity of classical 
inference. But why does the classical parametric t-test need both random assignment and random 
selection in the design to deliver on its promise of objectivity? To answer this question, it is 
worthwhile to investigate the above two claims in a little bit more depth.  
Controlling All Extraneous Variables at Once 
Let us consider, therefore, the claim random assignment handles both types of extraneous 
variables, known and unknown. To understand why one must recall that randomly dividing one 
random sample into subgroups produces two smaller random samples. But there is a chance both 
samples will resemble their parent population, and this chance increases with sample size. There 
is, thus, a chance groups are comparable on all extraneous variables. We never know the exact 
chance, but we know this chance will increase as sample size rises. 
Without the special combination of random selection and assignment, however, chance 
calculations are inadmissible. Random assignment only takes advantage of operating chance. It 
cannot produce it. If one randomly divides a non-random sample into subgroups, there is no 
chance groups will resemble their parent population. They either do or do not. Chance does not 
enter into this picture in the requisite way.  
In real applications, classical statisticians can check group balance on visible extraneous 
variables to see if random assignment did its job. Perhaps, gender is an extraneous variable. Girls 
may have more natural aptitude than boys for example. Statisticians can then use a logistic 
regression to determine if groups are significantly imbalanced. If they are indeed so imbalanced, 
they can (a) redo randomization till groups become balanced, (b) physically control for it, or (c) 
statistically control for it.  
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Preserving the Logic of Classical Inference 
The need to do significance testing to check group balance then brings us to the second 
claim made in support of random assignment – i.e. it underpins the logic of significance testing. 
It is by far, the strongest reason for classical statisticians to use it. But, obviously, it holds no 
weight among Bayesians who have a different inference scheme. Let us move on, therefore, to 
consider the claim that random assignment keeps classical systems intact.  
Without random selection in experimental designs the physical operation of chance-type 
probability in parametric versions of statistical inference becomes a fiction. Classical statisticians 
can only conduct a parametric independent means group t-test to evaluate null hypothesis by 
treating each group like a random sample drawn from the same population. Without random 
selection, however, this premise is not defensible – i.e., the two groups do not really behave like 
random samples from populations.  
Random assignment alone – at least, in parametric t-test contexts – undermines the choice 
of sampling density. This is because of the stopping rule problem mentioned in the previous 
section. Recall, the formula for the p-value depends on the sampling density, and different 
specifications of it can shift the final p-value in incompatible directions. Classical statisticians, 
thus, need guidance from a physical random selection mechanism to construct the requisite 
sampling densities for control and intervention groups.   
The above criticism, of course, only applies to “parametric” versions of classical statistics 
(ex. t-tests, ANOVAs, etc). One can instead use “non-parametric” statistics to infer causation 
with just random assignment (Edgington & Onghena, 2007). But there is a catch: one must then 
delimit conversation about causation to samples – and only samplea. But random assignment, 
even divorced from probability sampling, is still frequently infeasible in education.   
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Bayesian Analysis and Propensity Score Matching 
Random assignment is difficult to implement in education research. We cannot usually, 
for example, randomly assign one group of youth to college and forbid another group from going 
to college only to measure the effect of college on life satisfaction. This is unethical, and it 
would never pass muster with an IRB board. But the classical proviso for random assignment 
and random selection to induce causation in populations makes the task epic.  
Education researchers, therefore, often resort to propensity score matching (hereafter, 
PSM) to make observed groups comparable. PSM involves credence-type probability – not 
chance-type. This is because researchers must exercise their own judgment about what covariates 
are probably (credence-type) important, and so ought to be included in the match up process. But 
PSM nicely safeguards against researcher introducing selection-bias into studies.  
Consider this skeptical hypothesis: imbalance between groups on an extraneous variable 
really explains experimental findings – not intervention effects. Bayesians can assure us that as 
the prior for this skeptical hypothesis shrinks the posterior for the causation hypothesis rises. The 
Bayesian, consequently, use PMS to shrink the prior for the skeptical hypothesis and raise the 
posterior for the causation hypothesis, and this is their rationale for PSM. Methodologists often 
refer to this as using historical controls rather than random controls.  
Classical statisticians deploying PSM to balance groups, like Bayesians, inadvertently 
rely on credence-type probability. They find this arrangement suboptimal, however, demoting it 
to a non-experimental status. On the other hand, Bayesians are not embarrassed by credence-type 
probability at all, and can adopt a more welcoming posture. They may award an experimental 
status to observational studies using adequate historical controls (Howson & Urbach, 2006). 
Bayesians, of course, decide what counts as ‘adequate’ on a case-by-case basis.  
41 
 
Conclusion 
 I do not fault classical inference because it is not Bayesian any more than I fault Bayesian 
inference because it is not classical. They are apples and oranges. But they have different logics, 
and we are wise to respect their natural differences. I claim we can use whatever version of 
statistical inference we prefer, so long as we remain faithful to its inner logic.  
 There is elegance in classical inferences. Their objectivity prevents (or else minimizes) a 
certain type of bias. But the price it pays for this objectivity is some inflexibility. It is only 
applicable in study designs involving chance setups. Bayesian inference does not have the 
objectivity of classical inference. But it does have another version of objectivity, and we need to 
settle for it when chance setups in designs are not available.  
 The conclusion then is not that Bayesian inference is superior to classical inference. The 
conclusion here is much more modest and defensible than that. My conclusion is that Bayesian 
inference is generally more applicable in education research than classical inference. But we can 
still do classical inference in education whenever the requisite sampling conditions prevail.       
Discussion  
 But what should we do with all the education research out there that used classical 
analysis on judgment samples to inform their conclusions? One possibility is to re-evaluate the p-
values as measures of practical effect. And, as a measure of practical effect, it would be given a 
pragmatic justification rather than underwritten by a logical principle. But reporting p-values as 
effect sizes is bound to create confusion. Notwithstanding, it hardly seems like a viable solution 
to just throw away education research with non-probability samples merely because it reports p-
values. That is too drastic a step. I, consequently, argue that a much more sensible solution to 
this problem is to charitably impute Bayesian logic onto these studies.  
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 To make this translation, all we need to do is note that the difference between classical 
confidence intervals and Bayesian credible intervals is probability type. But one of the biggest 
problems in applying Bayesian inference in education research is setting up appropriate priors. It 
is easy to setup priors when there is an abundance of background knowledge. But in contexts of 
pioneering research there is only minimal background knowledge.  
  One recommendation for setting up priors with minimal background knowledge is to 
setup objective priors. Certain kinds of objective priors produce posteriors with inferences for 
parameters of interest with classical frequency properties. We can then compute Bayesian 
intervals with both a chance-type and credence-type probability interpretation. So, we can 
interpret a classical 95% confidence interval the way we would interpret a 95% Bayesian 
credible interval – i.e., we are 95% sure the true parameter is in this interval given the sample 
and our prior probabilities. We can, thus, interpret education research using classical parametric 
analysis on non-probability samples as if they had used really used Bayesian analysis with 
objective priors.  
 This is a sensible policy. It matches up existing practice and sound philosophy. As things 
stand now, much statistical practice in education research is out of accordance with its exposed 
classical philosophy. But classical philosophy is not the only game in town. The Bayesian system 
provides a worthy alternative, and I think that as more education researchers become familiar 
and comfortable with it, they will start explicitly espousing it too. But I certainly do not claim to 
know the future, and I can only guess.     
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
CONVENIENCE PRIORS FOR BAYESIAN T-TESTS 
Scientists love experiments. In education science, it is their wont to compare the average 
outcome of control and experimental groups on some outcome of interest. If it is a continuous 
variable, they invoke the celebrated independent means t-test to substantiate causation. This test 
formally decides whether group means significantly differ or not. Significance entails causation 
is a plausible conjecture (i.e., the null hypothesis is untenable).  
There are two versions of the independent means t-test, classical and Bayesian. The inner 
logic of the classical version of this parametric test requires both random assignment and random 
selection (Chapter Two). Randomization for Bayesians, however, is not even held up as the 
Golden Standard (Howson & Urbach, 2006). This flexibility in study design makes Bayesian t-
tests more generally applicable in social science. But Bayesian t-tests carry their own fair share 
of risks, and care needs to be taken when using them.  
The centerpiece of all Bayesian statistics is a one-line theorem of the probability calculus, 
Bayes rule. To Bayesian epistemologists, it provides an elegant framework for induction; briefly: 
|*	 ∝ PH	PD|H	 
The posterior density of hypothesis H given data D is proportional to the product of the prior 
density of H and the likelihood of the data given the hypothesis.  This can also be expressed: 
./012/2 31405	 ∝  .2/2 31405	 × 787ℎ//3	 
The posterior density represents how credible the hypothesis is to us after adjusting our initial 
beliefs towards the hypothesis in light of sample information.   
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The success of the whole Bayesian enterprise depends on posteriors. Some posteriors are 
sensible, others absurd. Likelihood functions dominate posteriors as sample size rises, and this is 
reassuring to researchers. It means sample data influences posteriors more than their personal 
priors. But priors take on a prominent role in posterior construction as sample size shrinks. This 
makes priors critical in cases involving small samples.  
Subjective priors represent judgments about credibility (Gill & Walker, 2005), and they 
are usually informed with background knowledge. We do not need perfect priors, but we do need 
sensible ones. And what counts as sensible is a matter of qualitative judgment. The rewards of 
subjective priors can be great, but so too their dangers (Baldwin & Fellingham, 2013). When 
consensus prevails, the prior’s sensibility is obvious. But it is not always so.   
Pioneering scientists cannot appeal to consensus to defend their prior. No such consensus 
exists. This raises the frightening specter of rogue scientists using their select “sensible” priors as 
they see fit. Priors, thus, become vehicles for injecting unwarranted bias into inference. This fear 
of abusing priors is perhaps the oldest criticism of Bayesian statistics (Fisher, 1930).  
To prevent such abuses, Bayesians resort to convenience priors – i.e. priors customarily 
chosen as defaults in initial analyses (Christensen et al., 2011). Bayesians invented objective 
priors to function as defaults. Objective priors are determinable by formal rules and logical 
principals, such as the principal of entropy (Jaynes, 1968). But, even after much technical work, 
we have yet to arrive at a single route for picking objective priors (Kass & Wasserman, 1996). I, 
therefore, want to buck the general pull towards objective priors. Instead, I propose we 
investigate the possibility of using subjective priors as convenience priors. To this end, I 
conducted a Monte Carlo study to evaluate the performance of a Bayesian t-test with a subjective 
prior under different conditions with small sample sizes. 
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Theoretical Background 
To facilitate the rest of our discussion it is helpful to differentiate among models, 
estimation theories, and computational algorithms (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Models are 
equations specifying parameters – or constants of substantive interest – needing to be estimated 
from sample information. Estimation theories define the estimation process. Computational 
algorithms implement our favorite estimation theories. They are mechanical rules for getting 
output given input.  
The Model 
Social processes resemble natural lotteries, their outcomes probability densities. Normal 
densities are often useful for modeling continuous outcomes in education science, briefly:  
:~ , !"	 
Where the outcome of the variable Y on the ith participant is stochastically determined according 
to a normal density with mean and variance –i.e.,  and !", respectively. Such variables often 
take on the normal-shape because the central limit theorem states any random variable that arises 
as the sum of a large number of independent, small effects will be normal.  
Suppose we conduct a clinical trial to infer causation. We compare control group means, 
and discover the intervention group’s mean is superior to the control’s, ; > =. This finding is 
interesting, but it only pertains to the sample. What we usually care about is whether there is a 
similiar difference in the population, ; > =. Using statistical modeling techniques, such as 
regression, we draw probabilistic conclusions about true population mean difference given the 
sample information. Ideally, we want valid point estimate, probability intervals, and hypothesis 
tests. Classical and Bayesian inference offer alternative pathways to get all these types of 
inference procedures (Hacking, 2001).   
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Classical Estimation Theory 
All classical inferences are based on sampling densities (Mohr, 1990). Sampling densities 
contain the chances of any sample possibility given a parent population (or lottery). To build a 
sampling density, we randomly sample from the same population again and again using the same 
protocol. The frequency each data possibility is observed and recorded in a data set. This data set 
becomes the sampling density in the limits.   
In the classical scheme, the computed statistic, ; − =, is the best point estimate for the 
true parameter quantity, ; − =. It has the best chances of matching this parameter value in the 
sampling density. To assess whether this point estimate is statistically significant or not, it is 
conventional practice among scientists, when population variances are unknown quantities, to 
compute the t-statistic – i.e., the ratio of the observed difference to the standard error (i.e. the 
standard deviation of a sampling density):  
0?@, ?A	 = BC@ − AD − @ − A	E CFGHDI  
Where 0?; , ?=	 is the t-statistic and CJGKD is the standard error estimate. In practice, we use 
this ratio to rule-out sampling error as the cause of sample mean difference.  
The requisite sampling density for the t-statistic is a t-density with certain degrees of 
freedom. If the null hypothesis is true we expect 0?; , ?=	 = 0. So, we check to see if the 
computed t-statistic value is close to this expectation. For mathematical precision, we use p-
values to accomplish this feat – i.e. the chances of obtaining our actual t-statistic value or one 
weirder given the truth of the null hypothesis. If this p-value is too improbable given a stipulated 
cut-off criterion, such as  = .05, we decide the null hypothesis is false (5% chance our decision 
errs given all our model assumptions). 
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Classical statisticians build chance-type probability intervals for the true population 
mean-difference with any -level desired: 
C@ − AD ± 0" MN (CFGHD) 
here t is a critical value with certain degrees of freedom. Any possible interval of values either 
contains the true parameter or it does not. There is no chance about it. So, we interpret a 95% 
chance-type probability interval as an interval generated by a mechanism known to produce 
intervals covering the parameter 95% of the time in the limits. 
Classical Computational Algorithms. There are two principal computational algorithms 
for the t-statistic ratio, the pooled standard deviation and Satterthwaite method. Each has its 
unique advantages and disadvantages making them both indispensable tools in the classical 
statisticians’ full armament.  
Pooled Variance Method. When !; = !=, we pool information across sample groups to 
get an overall estimate of their singular quantity. The algorithm for implementing the pooled 
standard deviation method is: 
O = 4P 4@ + 4A	N 	@ + 
4A 4@ + 4A	N 	@ 
Where O is the pooled standard deviation and 4;  and 4=  are respective group sample sizes. 
Then we compute the requisite standard error for the t-test by using an inverse relationship 
between it and the ratio of sample group sizes and their parent populations’ standard deviations:  
CFGHD = OR1 4@N + 1 4AN  
Setting 4; + 4= − 2 as the degrees of freedom, we select the needed t-shape for the sampling 
density. The pooled method produces a t-test more powerful than its sister Satterthwaite method 
(discussed next) at any of -level desired (Ware, Ferron, & Miller, 2013). 
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Satterthwaite Method. When !P ≠ !", we experience a loss of Type I control using the 
pooled method. To keep control of Type I error rate, therefore, we must use ; and = as distinct 
estimates of their parent population. The t-density shape depends on the ratio of population 
standard deviations so it is now no longer straightforward what the degrees of freedom should be 
for t-testing purposes. In such cases, Satterthwaite recommends adjusting our degrees of freedom 
to build a robust t-test: 
@" 4@⁄ + A" 4A⁄
 @P 4@⁄ 	4@ + 1	 +
A" 4A⁄ 	4A + 1
 
Satterthwaite corrections then account for heterogeneity between population variances. The 
pooled variances offer a more powerful test of mean difference, the Satterthwaite a more robust 
one. Both methods, however, equally preserve the inner logic of the classical t-test: Interpret all 
probability-statements in inferential statistics as being about the frequency of outcomes in the 
limits – not qualitative judgments of the credibility of hypotheses.   
Bayesian Estimation Theory 
Bayesian t-tests, in contrast to classical t-tests, are all about posterior densities. Posterior 
densities show how credible all distinct parameter possibilities are given sample data: 
:;P, :;" … :;VW~ ; , !;"	       :=P, :=" … :=VX~ = , !="	        @ − A 
Bayesian analysis, unlike classical t-tests, focus on the posterior density of ; − = to evaluate 
population mean difference. Using this density-type, they draw point estimates, probability 
intervals, and hypothesis tests. In the Bayesian approach, we need not invoke t-test statistics and 
we rarely even resort to t-shaped densities. But since this procedure plays an analogous function 
in the Bayesian economy, we nonetheless will refer to it as a Bayesian t-test.  
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Classical statisticians choose ; − = as their point estimate of ; − =. But given the 
posterior probability for all possible ; − = values, Bayesians instead pick the single value they 
find most credible given the objective sample and their personal priors. Probability intervals, 
drawn from posterior densities, also have nothing to do with coverage rates in the long run. 
There is a .95 credence-type probability that the true parameter is contained in a 95% credible 
interval, and they make no commitments whatsoever about its coverage in the limits. Likewise, 
the user of classical version of the t-test has to begin with the supposition the null hypothesis is 
true, ; − ==0, in order to refute it later on, but the user of Bayesian t-tests can simply compute 
how probable rational agents will judge the null hypothesis to be given the objective sample and 
their personal priors (Kruschke, 2011).  
Bayesian Computational Algorithms. Finding posterior densities posed serious problems 
for doing Bayesian analysis in the past as posterior integrals were often intractable. This partially 
explains why many applied researchers never learned about Bayesian analysis in their training. 
All this changed when statistical software packages, such as SAS, gave us Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) simulation methods for finding complex integrals. MCMC algorithms sample 
from posterior distributions, and compute quantities of interest.  
In this simulation study, I used PROC MCMC (SAS 9.4) to derive posterior distributions. 
This procedure uses a Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm, and I used all the standard default settings 
in SAS to make replication of my study easier. I uniformly used a burn-in of 10,000 to cope with 
autocorrelation, sampled 100,000 cases, and thinned my posterior samples by a magnitude of 10 
to reduce any autocorrelation. This left a total posterior sample size of 10,000. To set the initial 
values of chains for model parameters, I always started at the mode of its prior distribution. This 
procedure yielded reasonable results based on fit statistics in a pilot run.   
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Motivating Example. Imagine a researcher is conducting a Bayesian t-test on the outcome 
variable Y, wanting to detect traces of causation in a tiny data set. The studied control population 
has been researched in the past on multiple occasions, and it is known that :~ 50, 10"	 under 
control conditions. But next to nothing is known about what typically will happen to Y under 
intervention conditions. She is doing ground-breaking research. The researcher, thus, had better 
setup defensible priors to proceed with Bayesian analysis to estimate the effect. Below I 
elaborate on a three possible default priors she could use in this case.  
Bayesian t-tests with Objective Priors. Jeffreys prior is the most celebrated convenience 
prior for Bayesian t-tests. To see why consider this: A choice on how to parameterize the normal 
density confronts Bayesian analysts:   
:~ , !"	    :~ , !	          :~ , Y	 
Where  is the mean, !" is the variance, ! is the standard deviation, and Y is the precision. These 
three parameterizations have the same location, but different (albeit, legal) ways to parameterize 
the scale, !", !, and Y. We can translate between these schemes using one-to-one functions. The 
invariance-principle then states parameterization should not change conclusions.  
Jeffreys priors produce posterior distributions that satisfy the invariance-principle. Using 
them, for example, we can draw conclusions about variances from standard deviation posteriors. 
Jeffreys prior is obtained as the square root of the determinant of the Fisher Information Matrix:  
	 ∝ Z310[	 
Specific to t-testing, Jeffreys prior densities become: 
~\/40]40            !"~ − 7/^!"	 
These prior densities choices make logical sense because they obey the invariance-principle, but, 
like classical procedures, they are vulnerable to the stopping rule problem (Chapter 2). 
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Bayesian t-tests with Both Subjective and Objective Priors. In the above motivating 
example, our background knowledge only underdetermines subjective priors for the intervention 
parameters. She actually had a lot of information about the parameters belonging to the control 
population. It is obvious then what counts as appropriate subjective prior for those parameters. 
Naturally, when subjective priors encapsulate background knowledge they are called “informed,” 
and even Fisher thought there was nothing controversial about using such subjective priors to 
‘inform’ research so long as they were really obvious (Hacking, 2001).   
In this case, she may specify subjective priors for both control population parameters as 
follows: _=	~ 50, 1"	 and _!="	 = [` = 19, ) = 2000	, where N is the normal density 
and IG is the inverse-gamma. These priors are both conjugate priors, and so can be conceptually 
interpreted as representing additional sample data about the unknown parameters.  She can then 
use Jeffreys priors for the remainder of the parameters in the model, ; and !;". 
Bayesian t-tests with a Mixture of Subjective Priors. Mixed priors represent an alternative 
to objective priors for ;. She cannot setup informed priors for it, of course, for no one knows 
what will happen under intervention conditions. But she usually she is not clueless about ;. 
Using a measure of effect size, such as Cohen’s  Δ, she may know how to evaluate it; briefly: 
Cohen′s Δ = ; − =	 !hN  
There is a harmful or no effect −∞ > Δ > .3	, small positive effect [.3 > Δ >
.5), medium effect [.5 > Δ > .8) or large effect if [.8 > Δ > ∞). 
 
An effect size scale may not seem like much to go off on when trying to build default priors for 
;, but I wager it suffices. Researchers at the pilot stage of inquiry, after all, care little about 
whether the true Δ is in fact .31 or .3102. What they really want to know is whether a future 
follow up study into this topic would be worthwhile or not.  
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Sometimes posteriors resemble neither the prior or the likelihood, and this is troublesome 
to most researchers. Inferences drawn from such posteriors, after all, are inconsistent with both 
background knowledge and the sample. To solve this problem, Bayesians can mix subjective and 
objective priors together to ensure posteriors resemble either the prior or likelihood (Bolstad, 
2007). Mixed default in the analysis to whatever prior in the mix best fits the data. Mixed priors, 
thus, ensure the posterior resembles either the prior or likelihood.  
Usually one mixes subjective priors with objective priors, but I propose another kind of 
mixed prior for ;: A mixture of all the priors encapsulating effect size possibilities of interest 
(i.e. none, small, medium, large). Bayes’ postulate bids us to equally weight these priors in the 
mix. Actually, it demands we assign equal prior probabilities whenever in doubt, but this practice 
fulfills the spirit of this timeless maximum. In this case, set _;	~ ′ = 50,53,56,59; !"′ =
.333	. This represents a mix of four normal priors with different locations, but same scale. One 
can then use Jeffreys prior on the other intervention parameter, !;", and the same informed priors 
as above on the control parameters (= , !=" ).  
Purpose of the Present Study 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate Bayesian t-tests using convenience priors. They, 
unlike their classical cousins, are not - as a general rule - justified on the basis of their frequency 
properties (albeit, it is interesting to know whether they can really beat classical t-tests at their 
own game). But it does make sense to justify ones using convenience priors on such grounds. 
After all, the usual justification for Bayesian inference – posteriors represent how rational agents 
will judge a statistical hypothesis’ credibility given samples and their personal priors – do not 
really apply here. Contrary to popular claims, convenience priors do not encapsulate ignorance, 
and so it is natural to appraise them using classical criterion instead. 
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Method 
I simulated scientists using Bayesian independent means t-test to detect intervention 
effects with only small samples at their disposal. Sections below are organized as follows: 
simulation design, model specifications, data generation, and analysis plan. 
Simulation Design 
The design included five factors: (a) group ratio ([1 control: 1 intervention],[1 control: 2 
intervention], [2 control: 1 intervention], [1 control: 3 intervention],[3 control: 1 intervention]), 
(b) total sample size (12,24,36,48,60), (d) population effect size (Δ = 0, .2, .5, .8), (e) normal-like 
shapes with varying skewness (mP) and kurtosis (m") (i.e. [mP = 0, m" = 0], [mP = 1 and m" = 3], 
[mP = 1.5 and m" = 5], [mP = 2 and m" = 6],[ mP = 0 and m" = 25]) and finally (e) variance ratio 
between parent populations ([1:1],[1:1.5],[1:2],[1:3]). This cross factorial design 5X5X4X5X4 
provided a total of 2000 conditions for the simulation study.   
Model Specifications 
Three versions of the Bayesian t- test were setup, each had the same five parameters 
(;, =, !;", !=", and P − "), and the same likelihood functions (no) for the two sample groups:    
n;:;|; , !;"	 = p:;; ; , !;"	 for i=1,…4;   n=:=|= , !="	 = p:= ; = , !="	 for i=1,…4= 
The prior specification schemes differentiated these three versions of the Bayesian t-test, and 
Table 2 summarizes the details. 
Table 2. Specifications for Prior Distributions in Simulation Study 
Convenience Prior Type Location Parameters () Scale Parameters (!") 
Objective Priors  
 
Jeffreys prior: _;	~1 
Jeffreys prior: _=	~1 
Jeffreys prior: _!;"	~1/!;" 
Jeffreys prior: _!="	~1/!=" 
Objective & Subjective Priors 
(; has an objective prior) 
Jeffreys prior: _;	~1 
Informed prior: _=	~ 50, 1"	 
Jeffreys prior: _!;"	~1/!;" 
Subjective prior _!="	~[`19, 2000	 
 Objective & Subjective Priors 
(; has a subjective prior) 
Mixture prior: _;	 ~ ∗ = 50,53,56,59, !" = .333	 
Informed prior: _=	~ 50, 1"	 
Jeffreys prior: _!;"	~1/!;" 
Subjective prior _!="	~[`19, 2000	 
*mixture of four normal distributions (N) with equal weights.  
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Data Generation 
All data for this study was generated through Monte Carlo simulation methods. I 
employed a random number generator using the RAND function in SAS statistical software 
(SAS institute Inc., 2013). For each condition in the simulation, I generated 5,000 samples. The 
use of 5,000 replications provides a standard error of .003 when coverage is .95.  I used PROC 
MCMC and PROC TTEST to perform Bayesian and classical t-tests, respectively.  
Analysis Plans 
This study analyzed findings using a Factorial ANOVA. I examined the frequency 
properties of Bayesian estimators’ point estimates, probability intervals, and hypothesis tests. I 
used this classical metric because Bayesian estimators with convenience priors can be justifiable 
on the grounds of their frequency properties, even though they retain credence-type probability 
interpretations. This metric also made it possible to use the frequency properties of the classical 
t-test as an informative baseline.  
I examined bias in point estimates, ̂ − . In the context of Bayesian t-testing, it makes 
little difference which of the three measure of central tendency is chosen as the posterior density 
will be normal. But I used the median value. To test which estimator usually got us closer to the 
truth, I considered both the mean bias and the root mean squared error (RMSE). I examined the 
design factors related to their variability by conducting s" analysis.  
I examined these estimators’ probability intervals too, using the same s" analysis scheme. 
I evaluated precision and coverage rate. I did not expect a 95% credence-type probability interval 
to have a 95% coverage rate. But good (≥ 95) coverage rate can warrant intervals produced from 
Bayesian estimators with convenience priors. Again, the classical .95 criterion for 95% intervals 
only provided a baseline for evaluating the performance of the Bayesian intervals.   
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Finally, I examined Type I and Type II error rates, using the same s" analysis procedure. 
I evaluated the classical estimators Type I error rates on the basis of the liberal criterion for 
robustness suggested by Bradley (1978). When  = .05, a classical estimator is considered 
robust when the Type I error rate falls between .025 (=.5*.05) and .075 (=1.5*.05). But this 
criterion was not applied to Bayesian estimators given they deliver inferences with the force of 
credence-type probability – not chance-type. Notwithstanding, good ( ≥ .05) Type I error 
control can warrant Bayesian t-tests with convenience priors.   
Results 
Results are divided into three subsections: (a) point estimates, (b) probability intervals, 
and (c) hypothesis tests. In favorable experimental conditions (i.e. balanced groups, and normal 
populations with equal variances), I selected the classical t-test with pooled variance as the 
appropriate baseline. In unfavorable experimental conditions, I selected the classical t-test with 
Satterthwaite corrections as the baseline.  
Point Estimates 
Favorable Conditions. Figure 2 depicts the frequency properties of estimators’ point 
estimates under favorable conditions. The classical estimator, ; − =, produced unbiased 
estimates of ; − =. This feat was replicated by Bayesian estimator with Jeffreys priors for all 
parameters (hereafter, Jeffreys Estimator). The Bayesian estimator that had Jeffreys priors for 
intervention parameters and informed priors for control parameters also produced unbiased 
estimates in the limits (hereafter, Partial Estimator). The Bayesian estimator with a mixed prior 
for the parameter ; (hereafter, Mixed Estimator), however, provided biased estimates in every 
condition. The bias had a positive linear relationship with effect size. Interestingly, when its bias 
was averaged across all favorable conditions it dropped to zero.  
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Point Estimates Bias Point Estimates RMSE 
  
 
Figure 2. Frequency Properties of Point Estimates across Favorable Conditions 
Note: The Classical Estimator used the Pooled Variance Method.  
 
The RMSEs of the estimators’ point estimates were abysmal, under favorable conditions, 
even for unbiased ones. It varied with sample size: smaller samples, larger RMSEs. Nonetheless, 
the Mixed estimator yielded point estimates with the smallest RMSE of the bunch. This pattern is 
consistent with the known behavior of Bayesian estimators with subjective priors. The Partial 
estimator also managed to outperform the classical estimator, but not to the same degree as the 
Mixed. Jeffreys estimator, however, only tied the classical estimator in its RMSE. Such dreadful 
point estimates can be expected when samples are kept tiny.   
Point Estimate Bias Point estimate RMSE 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Frequency Properties of Point Estimates across All Conditions 
Note: The Classical Estimator used Satterthwaite corrections.  
Jeffreys          Mixed          Partial     Classical Jeffreys          Mixed          Partial     Classical 
Jeffreys          Mixed          Partial     Classical Jeffreys          Mixed          Partial     Classical 
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All conditions. Moving on to consider unfavorable conditions too, the same pattern as 
above was again replicated here. Figure 3 summarizes these findings. The classical estimator’s 
point estimates are unbiased, but they have awful RMSEs. This was also the case for the Jeffreys 
and Partial estimators. Point estimates from the Mixed estimator, again, proved to be even more 
biased than before, but had the lowest RMSEs. This averaged bias across conditions, however, 
this time did not drop to zero. Based on s" analysis, the pattern in RMSE among point estimates 
depended on heterogeneity, population effect, and balance (see Figure 4).  
In summary, the properties of point estimates from the Jeffreys estimator resembled the 
point estimates of the classical estimator in both their bias and RMSE. The point estimates from 
the Partial estimator, however, behaved a little bit differently than the classical estimator. Its 
point estimates were unbiased, but they had much lower RMSEs. The point estimates of the 
Mixed estimator were biased, but with significantly lower RMSEs. Bias/RMSE trade-offs often 
happens when comparing Bayesians and classical procedures. 
Group Imbalanced Towards Control Group Imbalanced Towards Treatment 
Variance Homogeneity 
Variance Heterogeneity 
Figure 4: Interaction between Heterogeneity and Effect Size on RMSE 
Note: Jeffreys and Classical Estimators produced same results under these conditions. 
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Interval Estimates 
Favorable conditions. Figure 5 summarizes the frequency properties of estimators’ 
interval estimates. They all produced imprecise intervals, even under favorable conditions, and 
based on s" analysis, the imprecision was a function of samples: smaller sizes, less precision. 
The Classical estimator (using pooled method) gave us 95% probability interval for ; − = 
with coverage rates just slightly below their nominal-level, but always with abysmal precision. 
With a sample size of 12 and a medium population effect, for example, it produced on average 
confidence interval width of 24.6633 and a coverage rate of .9320. Such a width is too imprecise 
to be useful, but coverage rate adequately approximates 95% (Bradley, 1978).   
The Partial estimator, in comparison to its classical cousin, usually improved precision at 
the expense of coverage. In the same case as above, for example, it produced intervals with an 
average width of 19.4481 and a coverage rate 0.9164. This makes perfect sense, of course, for a 
.95 credence-type probability interval to have less than or more than a .95 coverage rate, but 
nonetheless a 95% coverage rate (or greater) would be a desirable trait for Bayesian estimators 
using convenience priors.    
Interval Coverage Interval Precision 
  
 
 
Figure 5. Frequency Properties of Interval Estimates across Favorable Conditions 
Note: The Classical Estimator used the Pooled Variance Method.  
Jeffreys          Mixed          Partial     Classical Jeffreys          Mixed          Partial     Classical 
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The Jeffreys estimator, in comparison to the classical estimator, improved coverage but 
only at the expense of precision. This is the reverse of what happened with the Partial estimator. 
In the aforementioned example – the one involving a medium effect and sample size of 12 – it 
produced intervals with an average width of 28.2861 and coverage of 0.9596. Its coverage, thus, 
matched the classical nominal-level of .95, but its precision was abysmal. This case exemplifies 
well the general pattern across favorable conditions. Trading off a bit of coverage to gain extra 
precision sometimes is a necessary evil, but the Mixed estimator did not make such a sacrifice 
necessary. It usually improved precision and coverage simultaneously.  
The Mixed version usually preserved good coverage and precision compared to the 
classical estimator. But as sample sizes become tiny (ex. 12) the intervals become unstable in 
their coverage: sometimes worse, sometimes better than classical intervals. In the illustrative 
case so far considered, it produced interval widths of only 9.8754 and a coverage rate of .9540. 
There is still a lot of imprecision lurking in such intervals, of course, but this is by far the best 
precision in the bunch. Gaining this precision also did not require any loss of coverage. This 
pattern occurred across favorable conditions if sample sizes were kept above 24.   
Unfavorable Conditions. The story of interval estimates again unfolds along the familiar 
lines as before, except in the case of the Partial estimator (see Figure 6 and 7). The Partial 
estimator’s intervals were more precise on average than classical intervals (produced with 
Satterthwaite corrections), but they had lower coverage rates. The noteworthy exception to this 
general trend is when sample sizes got bigger than 24 and groups became imbalanced with more 
people in the intervention conditions. Under these conditions, the Partial estimator usually 
always managed to outperform the classical estimator in terms of both its precision and coverage 
rate.  
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Precision Coverage 
Under Variance Homogeneity Condition 
Under Most Variance Heterogeneity Condition  
Figure 6: Analysis of Interactions between Estimator and Balance (N=24)   
Note: Read “2C:1T” represent group ratios, and read as “2 control units to 1 intervention unit.”  
 
Precision Coverage 
Under Variance Homogeneity Condition (N=60) 
Under Most Variance Heterogeneity Condition (N=60)  
Figure 7: Analysis of Interactions between Estimator and Balance (N=60)   
Note: Again, “C:T” represents group ratios. 
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Jeffreys estimator outperformed the classical estimator (using Satterthwaite method) in 
sticking to a 95% coverage rate (or better), but again only at the expensive of some precision. To 
preserve a desirable coverage rate, for example, it made intervals more imprecise to account for 
the extra uncertainty of unfavorable conditions. The Mixed estimator, in contrast, consistently 
yielded much more precise intervals for ; − = than all the other estimators while usually 
sustaining a greater or comparable coverage rate to the classical estimator. Its accuracy rate, 
however, had more variability, but it stabilized above 95% as sample size rose (N≥ 36). Figure 8 
provides a visual representation of these findings. 
Interval Coverage Interval Precision 
 
 
Figure 8. Frequency properties of Interval Estimates across All Conditions 
 
Hypothesis Tests 
In favorable conditions, classical estimators are known to maintain adequate Type I error 
control. In the classical scheme, probabilities are only about relative frequencies in the limiting 
cases. With this strict interpretation, Classical statisticians cannot make sense of a test with a 
specified nominal 5% Type I error rate ( = .05) and an actual  ≠ .05 on repeated applications 
of the test in identical situations. Bayesians, in contrast, have no qualms about such mismatches. 
They cite credence-type probability rather than frequency-type. I, therefore, permitted actual 
Type I error rates to be lower than the nominal in the case of Bayesian estimators.      
Jeffreys          Mixed          Partial     Classical Jeffreys          Mixed          Partial     Classical 
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Type I Error Rate Power Analysis 
  
Power Analysis Power Analysis 
  
Figure 9. Analysis of Type I Error Rate and Power across Favorable Conditions 
Note: Sample size (N=12) excluded from power analysis, because of inadequate control of Type I error.  
 
Figure 9 reports Type I and Power findings for each estimator in favorable conditions. 
Again, all the tests had a nominal  = .05, and my simulation results for the smallest sample size 
(N=12) condition proved to be problematic as they conflict with the known sampling density of 
the t-test statistic provided by exact mathematical results. This discrepancy is most likely due to 
simulation error, and I, therefore, discarded this condition from power analysis to play it safe. In 
terms of my power analyses, the Jeffreys estimator is slightly inferior to its classical cousin. It 
traded off a bit of power to gain the edge on Type I error control. Mixed and Partial estimators, 
at least under favorable conditions, consistently outperformed the classical estimator in terms of 
power, with the Mixed estimator’s power prevailing overall.  
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Unfavorable conditions. When unfavorable conditions were thrown into the mix, I used 
Bradley’s (1978) liberal criterion of robustness to examine the classical estimator’s Type I error 
rates. This criterion is not quite consistent with frequency-type probability, but it is justified on 
grounds of practical equivalence – i.e. classical statisticians can consider tests with  = .05 to be 
robust to violations of assumptions within tolerance, 025 u  ≥ .075 . Again, Bayesians do not 
need to invoke liberal criterions. But to make the comparison fair, I adjusted my criterion for 
evaluating them to,  u .075. Figure 10 shows the results of Type I error analysis.  
Bigger Intervention Group (3:1) Bigger Control Group (1:3) 
  
Figure 10. Analysis of Type I Error Rate given Most Imbalanced Group Condition 
The Mixed prior again stole the show. Figure 10 depicts the interaction between group 
balance and sample size in the analysis of Type I error control. There were two ways, of course, 
groups could be imbalanced: bigger (a) control group or (b) intervention group. The Mixed 
estimator seemed most robust to the problem of imbalanced group. Figure 11 shows power 
analyses for all conditions wherein Type I error was adequately controlled. Naturally, the power 
of all estimators dropped to pathetic levels as population variances become more and more 
unequal and sample sizes shrink. Those depressing results are now shown here. 
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Bigger Intervention Group (3:1) Bigger Control Group (1:3) 
  
  
  
Figure 11. Analysis of Power Given Most Imbalanced Group Condition 
Note: Only includes conditions where Type I error controlled and variances homogenous.   
       
 This power analysis shows Jeffreys estimator underperformed compared to the classical 
estimator. The Partial estimator’s power increased when group size became imbalanced in favor 
of the intervention group, but had no similar increase in power when control group size was 
larger. The Mixed estimator, however, had the most power in the group.   
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Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether mixed priors could plausibly function 
as convenience priors in Bayesian t-tests of experiments involving tiny groups using frequency 
criterion. The risks of using small samples are well known, but scientists often must resort to 
them – at least, in the beginning of their research projects. Large scale-studies are expensive, and 
funding agencies usually want solid evidence their substantial fiscal investments into such 
experiments will likely be worthwhile. To supply the needed evidence, scientists resort to small-
scale pilot studies. 
Based on small pilot study findings, it is not wise to be dogmatic about point and interval 
estimates. All the point estimates in this simulation study, for example, had abysmal RMSEs. We 
can interpret this as entailing that we expect on any given occasion the point estimates to be far 
away from the truth of the matter. And this expectation holds under favorable and unfavorable 
conditions alike. In the limits, point estimates of Jeffreys estimator and the Partial estimator, like 
their classical cousin, were unbiased. “But in the limits,” Bayesians like to say, “we will all be 
dead” so this is little comfort. These findings about point estimates, therefore, support the well 
known advice to cautiously interpret point estimates when sample sizes are small. 
The same caution applies to probability intervals. All the Bayesian estimators had good 
coverage properties, under the best of conditions, but the imprecision in them made them useless. 
It is off little help to know the interval accuracy rate is good, for example, if the interval does not 
eliminate any parameters of interest. This is the peril of working with small samples, and not 
even the Mixed estimator can compensate for this hazard. It did give the most precise intervals of 
the bunch, but even so they were still far too imprecise to be of much use. Experimenters using t-
tests should keep their expectations low for interval estimates.  
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Fortunately, scientists do not need the information supplied by point estimates and 
confidence intervals to convince funders their research is worthwhile. Hypothesis tests suffice 
for this. At the minimum, significant data findings can justify funding for a slightly larger pilot 
study to get a more exact fix on the unknown effect size. The results of this simulation study 
suggest the Mixed estimator has certain key advantageous over the others – at least, when it 
comes to Bayesian t-tests. Given favorable conditions, these tests had both adequate control of 
Type I error and substantial power. It, in fact, they outperformed all the other contestants in the 
competition. 
The only time it stumbled was when total sample sizes shrunk and variance heterogeneity 
rose in excess. But, in fairness, all the estimators stumbled in such cases. There is just too much 
uncertainty when this happens to rule out the null hypothesis. Some statisticians, in fact, argue 
that in these circumstances it no longer makes sense to focus on means (Bolstad, 2007; Hoff, 
2009). Instead, the focus should be on population variances. Therefore, the best advice may be to 
come up with a new statistical test altogether in cases of excessive heterogeneity.      
 Outside of those special circumstances, however, it makes sense to keep the focus on the 
population locations. Point estimates and interval estimators are interesting, but the true purpose 
of the Bayesian t-test is hypothesis testing. It is in this area that the Mixed estimator boasts ample 
power and adequate Type I error control.   
Its success here evidences that one does not need extensive background knowledge or 
even an objective formula to safeguard Bayesian inferences against bias. So long as one does not 
expect too much, the Mixed version of the Bayesian t-test works well. It is simply amazing how 
far knowledge of what constitutes an effect size of practical significance can carry a Bayesian t-
test, and this minimal amount of background knowledge is usually obtainable.   
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The danger of all Bayesian inference, of course, is bias. But Bayesian epistemologists 
argue that Bayesian statistics has a filter built into it that is capable of eliminating bias. Each time 
a new sample is drawn, for example, Bayesians can use their previous posterior probabilities as 
the new prior probabilities. Over the long haul, as the body evidence grows, any bias in the initial 
priors will be overwhelmed by the objective sample evidence.  
Limitations 
This study had several limitations worth considering. One limitation was that I had to fix 
the true population size at certain values, and then setup informed priors for them. This felt like 
cheating. In real-life, statisticians rarely have the level of certainty I had when setting up priors. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that researchers using Partial Estimators can produce unbiased estimates. 
I only pulled off this feat because my informed priors were unbiased. Fortunately, no substantive 
conclusions in this study hung on whether or not point estimates were unbiased. All the studied 
estimators produced untrustworthy point estimates in this simulation.   
Another limitation of this study is that I did not examine what happens when the practical 
significance of a true effect size is fuzzy. For example, suppose the true population effect size 
rests on the border between a small and medium effect sizes. This might then wreck havoc on the 
success of the Mixed estimator as the samples will sometimes appear small or medium because 
of sampling error. If so, the mixed estimator may too bounce back and forth between the small 
and medium effect size hypothesis. This is because it defaults to one of its component priors in 
the analysis based on what the sample suggests. Additionally, future studies may want to 
investigate the Mixed estimator’s performance in more complex sampling situations. Education 
researchers, for example, often have nested data, and it would be interesting to see how well the 
Mixed Estimator fares in a multilevel version of the t-test.  
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Final Remarks 
Some argue that the Bayesian t-test supersedes the classical t-test. Personally, I am 
eclectic in my statistical philosophy.  I do not fault the classical t-test because it is not the 
Bayesian t-test (or vice versa). There is place for both versions of the test in the researcher’s 
toolkit. But this study is useful because the Bayesian t-test is more generally applicable in 
education research (see Chapter 2).     
In education research, for example, it is often unethical or infeasible to gather a 
probability sample and use random assignment in a small-scale pilot study. But the logic of 
classical t-tests is inadmissible without these design features. The logic of the Bayesian t-test, 
however, is not so constrained. All Bayesians need, to proceed with the t-test, is a representative 
sample of the population, and such samples can be selected using good judgment rather than a 
randomization devise.  
The general applicability of Bayesian t-test in education science makes the present 
investigation into convenience priors necessary. Researchers can use it to make better informed 
decision about their choice of prior when they proceed with Bayesian t-tests in their pilot studies 
involving small, non-probability samples – an all too common reality in education research. 
Researchers conducting such small-scale tests, as is well known, should stay away from point 
and interval estimates. But hypothesis tests were made to function in these environments. If data 
are significant based on a hypothesis test then there is evidence a follow up study using a bigger 
sample may find something interesting and get a closer fix on the true effect size, and that is 
often all we want to know in education research (Mohr, 1990). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
QUANTIFYING EFFECTS OF GROUPING METHODS ON READING OUTCOMES 
 In the highly litigated field of special education, placement decisions matter (Yell, 2006). 
The decisive verdict of the U.S. Supreme Court (Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central 
School Dist. v. Rowley, 1982), for example, shows school districts are accountable to the public 
for such decisions. They may not conveniently place students with disabilities in basements, and 
hope for the best. Instead, under IDEA (2004), they must place students in special education in 
their Least Restrictive Environment (LRE), as specified by an IEP team. This clause eventuates 
in the need for a hierarchical continuum of placement options for students in special education, 
ranging from the most inclusionary to the most segregated classrooms. Inclusionary settings, 
unlike their segregated counterparts, are designed to amply educate students with and without 
disabilities alike in the same physical locale (Gilhool, 1989). 
 In the last few decades, inclusionary placements eclipsed segregated placements as the 
norm in the U.S. school system. In 2011, 13% of students in the U.S. school system were eligible 
for special education services. The overwhelming majority of these students (95%) were placed 
in regular schools. Likewise, the practice of placing them in general education classrooms for 
more than 80% of the school day steadily increased from 31.7% in the fall of 1989 to 61.1% in 
the fall of 2011, an almost 200% increase (U.S. Department of Education, 2013). Trends of this 
kind have led some scholars to the make the slightly exaggerated claim full inclusion with co-
teaching is becoming the default model of service delivery (Zigmond, Kloo, & Volonino, 2009). 
The momentum for inclusion is also not likely to wane anytime soon (Jorgensen, 2005).  
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Different Grouping Methods for Enacting the Vision of Inclusion  
 When inclusionary placements become the majority, districts must adapt to fit this new 
actuality. They should place students in special education at neighborhood elementary schools 
(Burrello, Sailor, & Kleinhammer-Tramill, 2013; Toson, Burrello, & Knollman, 2012; Marks, 
2011). This policy naturally promotes a resemblance between district and school ratios. To 
illustrate, if 13% of students in special education hold inclusionary placements in a district, then 
approximately 13% of the students at each schools should also be in special education. Natural 
proportioning at the district-level, thus, ensures schools have neither too many nor too few 
students in special education to enact inclusion (McLeskey & Waldron, 2000). 
At the school-level, there are two prevailing grouping methods for enacting inclusion, 
natural proportioning and clustering. Natural proportioning ties classroom ratios to school ratios. 
For example, if the ratio of incoming 1st graders with disabilities to those without disabilities is 
1:9 within a certain school, then administrators should assign 1st graders with disabilities (n=12) 
to all classrooms (n=6) in ratios replicating the overall grade-level ratio to achieve the natural 
proportion. Perhaps, given class sizes of 18, they will place 2 students with disabilities in each 
classroom to achieve the requisite ratio.  
McLeskey and Waldron (2000) argue, in contrast, achieving natural proportioning at the 
school-level is not always best practice. Students and classrooms are not exchangeable goods. 
And, especially at the early phases of enacting inclusion at a school, some classrooms will have 
superior service-infrastructures to support students in special education, and clustering such 
students in these classrooms makes sense. Clustering, thus, maintains instructional quality at the 
school. Advocates of this method, of course, can still view natural proportioning as a regulative 
ideal, but they balance its desirability with the need to sustain instructional quality.  
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The Urgent Need to Improve Special Education Services for Reading 
In the area of reading, there is an urgent need to rethink how special education services 
are being utilized to improve reading in schoolchildren with disabilities in U.S. schools (Morgan, 
Frisco, Farkas, & Hibel, 2010; Sullivan & Field, 2013). On the basis of a secondary analysis of a 
large-scale, longitudinal, and nationally representative sample of elementary schoolchildren – 
namely, ECLS-K – Morgan, et al., (2010) concluded that children in special education in the 
spring of 2002, aggregated across classroom placements, had lower reading skills in the spring of 
2004 than closely matched peers in general education. Further analysis of this data set by 
Sullivan and Field (2013) found the receipt of services actually had a negative effect on reading 
skills among matched pairs of kindergarten children, (d = − .21).  
The above evidence raises the troublesome possibility that - at least, in terms of reading – 
the U.S. tax payer’s investment in extra special education services in the elementary years is not 
yielding good returns. The above studies suggested, general education is likely outperforming 
special education in producing higher rates of reading achievement among youth with disabilities 
(Sullivan & Fields, 2013). Indeed, children placed in special education classrooms sometimes 
even scored lower on post-test scores (Lane, Wehby, Little, & Cooley, 2005).  
Inclusionary classrooms celebrate ability-heterogeneity among students (Jones, Carr, & 
Fauske, 2011), and, unlike traditional general education classrooms (Anastasiou & Kauffman, 
2012), are equipped with a multi-tiered support system to help ensure higher quality instruction 
for students with disabilities (McLesky & Waldron, 2011). But inclusionary classrooms are not a 
panacea (Kauffman & Badar, 2014), and it would be worthwhile to investigate whether the 
different ways of enacting inclusion, such as using clustering rather than natural proportioning, 
can produce better reading outcomes for elementary schoolchildren.  
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The Bayesian Historical Control Trials in Special Education 
 Clinical trials are among the best ways to induce causation in science. To warrant such 
inductions, researchers usually require studied groups in the clinical trials to be comparable on 
extraneous variables. In education science, however, researchers cannot be certain their groups 
are optimally balanced. Instead, they settle for groups more likely balanced than not. But it is 
possible to increase the probability groups are balanced in clinical trials.   
In Randomized Controlled Trials (hereafter, RCT), researchers construct groups using a 
physical randomization device, such as die, to augment the probability their studied groups are 
adequately balanced (Fisher, 1926). Such devices invoke a certain type of probability, physical 
chance. Flip a fair coin countless times, and one observes a balanced proportion of heads and 
tails in the limits. The logic of significance tests based on classical p-values also depends on this 
type of physical probability (Chapter Two). 
Historical Controlled Trials (hereafter, HCTs) provide researchers with an alternative to 
RCTs. In HCTs, researchers select groups they deem comparable. They appeal then to yet 
another type of probability, credence. It is probable, given evidence, that Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon. This is credence-type probability, and it is a matter of judgment. Bayesian inference, 
thus, can proceed with causal inference without randomization in study designs.  
When experimental units belong to a protected population, like schoolchildren, it is often 
infeasible to use RCTs. Bayesian HCTs, in comparison, are well suited for education science. 
For example, researchers, using school records, can use HCTs to observe comparable groups of 
schoolchildren under different interventions (Howson & Urbach, 2006). Such groups can be 
constructed using propensity score matching techniques from school records (Schneider, Carnoy, 
Kilpatrick, Schmidt, & Shavelson, 2007).  
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HCTs are often preferable to RCTs on ethical grounds, and empirical investigation 
suggests they each can balance groups on extraneous variables (Benson & Hartz, 2000; Worrall, 
2007). HCTs are natural experiments. Harrison (2011) defines such experiments as occurring 
when history supplies researchers groups comparable on their extraneous variables: observed 
serendipity. The extra difficulty of doing special education research (Odom, et al., 2005), makes 
researchers in this field well positioned to take the lead on methodological innovation in the 
education field by implementing and evaluating the usefulness of new methods, like HCTs with 
Bayesian analysis (Kauffman, 2011).  
Study’s Purpose 
The purpose of my paper is to estimate the differential effects of enacting inclusion using 
the natural proportions and clustering methods on reading skills acquisition among elementary 
students, using Bayesian HCTs. Specifically, my objective is to assess the credibility of the null 
hypothesis stating that the typical effect of using clustering rather than natural proportioning in 
inclusionary settings is negligible for all practical purposes. To test this null, of course, I will 
utilize Bayesian analysis rather than classical analysis.    
Research Questions 
In this study, I address the following questions: 
1. Is the effect of the natural proportioning method on annual reading gains for children 
in general education different from the effect of clustering by a significant amount, as 
measured by official state reading tests?   
2. Is the effect of the natural proportioning method on annual reading gains for children 
in special education different from the effect of clustering by a significant amount, as 
measured by official state reading tests?   
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Research Design 
Study’s Context 
The studied schools belong to one of the largest metropolitan school districts in the U.S. 
In 2005, several policy and compliance issues prompted the district to embark on an aggressive 
campaign to reform its inclusionary policies and practices. A recent state report found the district 
to be “out-of-compliance” (Barton, Burrello, & Kleinhammer-Tramill, 2012).To remedy the 
situation, the district decided to increase the percentage of schoolchildren with disabilities in 
inclusionary settings in regular schools from 57% to 80%. The national average at that time was 
well above 90% (U.S. Department of Education, 2014).  
To achieve this task, they needed to improve the capacity of their schools to fully serve 
all students in general education classrooms. A reform initiative took root in subsequent years at 
both district- and school-levels, but the success of inclusion varied across schools and practices 
looked different - even in successful schools. In 2008, district leadership became particularly 
interested in how two high performing elementary schools enacted inclusion, Clark Elementary 
School and Shady Lake Elementary School (pseudonyms).  
In 2010, Hoppey, Black, and Mickelson (2015) conducted an external investigation into 
these schools using qualitative case-study methods. They observed classrooms in the schools and 
interviewed key stakeholders (ex. administrators, teachers, and parents). They discovered each 
school was committed to improving their inclusionary practices. Their quality of instruction also 
seemed comparable, as evidenced by schoolwide grades. But, in the midst of all the observed 
commonality between the schools, they suddenly realized that there was an important contrast. In 
essence, Clark had abandoned the clustering method in favor of natural proportioning. Shady 
Lakes, however, still advocated clustering, and strove to perfect it. 
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Ethical Considerations 
The school district de-identified all data to keep everything confidential, and a university 
IRB approved all study protocols. My utilization of historical controls in this study also protected 
the legal and moral rights of youth eligible for special education services as I did not disturb or 
interfere with the normal educational process to conduct the study. 
Study’s Data Set 
School district personnel provided me a judgment sample for my analysis. Judgment 
samples resemble populations by design rather than chance (Howson & Urbach, 2006). The data 
set consisted of two sample groups of 5th grade students (N=216) from Clark (n=121) and Shady 
Lake (n=95) in the same school year (08-09). The 5th grade cohorts were representative of both 
general and special education students placed in inclusionary classrooms at the schools. The 
school district collected and maintained the data set. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the 
data set, and I refer interested readers to Hoppey’s, et al. (2015), case study for information about 
these schools beyond what is supplied by this quantitative data set.  
Table 3. Statistics for Each Sample Group (2008-2009 School Year) 
 Clark Shady Lakes  Clark Shady Lakes 
Schoolchildren 95 (43.98%) 121 (56.02%) Migrant  0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Service Type   Female 38 (40%) 65 (53.72%) 
General: 58 (61.05%) 85 (70.25%) *FRL Eligible 68 (71.58%) 36 (29.75%) 
Special: 37 (38.95%) 36 (29.75%) 504 Plan 8 (8.42%) 4 (3.31%) 
Exceptionalities   Race   
Autism: 0 (0%) 2 (1.65) Asian: 1 (1.05%) 5 (4.13%) 
Behavioral: 0 (0%) 9 (7.44%) Black: 2 (2.11%) 7 (5.74%) 
Gifted: 22 (23.16%) 5 (4.13%) Hispanic: 10 (10.53%) 12 (9.92%) 
Language: 2 (2.11%) 0 (0%) Islander: 1 (1.05%) 0 (0%) 
Learning: 13 (13.68%) 11 (9.09%) Mixed: 5 (5.25%) 5 (4.13%) 
Other: 0 (0%) 1 (.83%) White: 76 (80%) 92 (76.03%) 
Speech: 0 (0%) 8 (6.61%) ESOL 
Eligible 
1 (1.16) 3 (2.97%) 
Reading      
*Annual Gains 87 (SD=182) 97 (SD=227)    
*FRL=Free/Reduce Lunch Eligible; I report Mean and Standard Deviation for reading score gains.              
.Note: Clark implemented Natural proportioning; Shady Lakes clustering. 
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Analytic Sample 
 To be included in the analysis, a schoolchild in a clustered classroom needed to be paired 
up with a schoolchild in a naturally proportioned classroom on selected covariates and needed to 
have values for the dependent variable. The constrained sample had 60 matched cases in total: 20 
cases were in general education; 10 cases in special education.    
Study’s Measures 
 I predicted the effects of clustering and natural proportioning methods on state test 
scores. Specifically, I tested whether I could predict annual gains in reading achievement among 
5th grade schoolchildren in the 2008-09 school year on the basis of their placement at either 
Clark (natural proportioning) or Shady Lakes (clustering). 
 Reading Achievement. I used gain scores on the State reading tests as proxies for annual 
reading achievement. Specifically, I used differences in scaled scores from the 07-08 and 08-09 
waves of the official state reading test, :wx − :yw. Gain scores increase the probability that 
any observed differences between pairs of matched students are not mere statistical artifices of 
initial learning. Methodologists consider utilizations of gains scores to be appropriate for studies 
estimating effects (Allison, 2005).   
Naturally Proportioning. For my study, I operationalized it as a placement at Clark 
Elementary School. Naturally proportioning, as a schoolwide policy rather than districtwide 
policy, enacts inclusion by assigning students to classrooms in ways designed to adequately 
preserve the grade-level ratio of students with and without disabilities at the school (McLeskey 
& Waldron, 2000). Within tolerable limits, school administrators trust natural proportioning to 
produce the conditions in classrooms friendly for highly effective instruction. The premise is that 
smaller proportions of schoolchildren in special education are usually manageable.  
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Table 4. Summary of Groups after Propensity Score Matching 
 Special Education (N=20) General Education (N=40) 
 Clark Shady Lakes Clark Shady Lakes 
Female 3 (30%) 4 (4%) 8 (40%) 6 (45.45%) 
FRL Eligible 6 (60%) 6 (6%) 8 (40%) 7 (36.36%) 
504 Plans 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (20%) 1 (4%) 
Race     
Asian: 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 
Black: 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (5%) 
Hispanic: 1 (10%) 1 (10%) 2 (10%) 2 (10%) 
White: 9 (90%) 9 (90%) 17 (85%) 17 (85%) 
Exceptionalities     
Gifted: 1 (10%) 1 (10%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Language: 2 (20%) 2 (20%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Learning: 7 (70%) 7 (70%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
4th Grade Reading State Test    
Failed 4 (40%) 4 (40%) 4 (20%) 2 (10%) 
 Passed 4 (40%) 3 (30%) 5 (25%) 6 (30%) 
Mastered 2 (20%) 3 (30%) 11 (55%) 12 (60%) 
4th Grade Math State Test   
Failed 6 (60%) 5 (50%) 4 (20%) 1 (5%) 
 Passed 1 (10%) 3 (30%) 10 (5%) 11 (55%) 
 Mastered 3 (30%) 2 (20%) 6 (30%) 8 (40%) 
  
Table 5.  Odds Ratio of Groups Before and After Propensity Score Matching (PMS) 
 Special Education (N=20) General Education (N=40) 
 Before PSM After PSM Before PSM After PSM 
Female 1.6852 .15556 2.6384 .6429 
FRL Eligible .2398 1 13.0659 .8077 
504 Plans .3122 1 3.3056 .4737 
Race     
Asian: -- -- 0 -- 
Black: .4667 -- .4198 -- 
Hispanic: .3 1 2.4427 1 
White: .3448 1 1.1556 1 
Exceptionalities     
Gifted: 9.0909 1 --  
Language: --  --  
Learning: 1.2158 1 --  
4th Grade Reading State Test   
 Failed 1.7858 1 1.2121 .4444 
 Passed .56 1.5556 1.7113 1.2857 
Mastered 2.375 1.7143 1.8281 .8148 
4th Grade Math State Test   
 Failed .535 1.5 1.208. .2105 
 Passed 4.6667 .2593 .8374 .8182 
 Mastered 5.2024 .5833 .6375 1.5556 
Note. Cohen’s odd ratios effect size: small = 1.50; medium = 2.50; large = 4.30. Read the 
odds ratio of “1.6852” as the odds of being female in the natural proportioning condition are 
1.6852 times the odds of being female in the clustering condition.    
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      Clustering. For my study, I operationalized it as a placement at Shady Lake Elementary 
School. Clustering, as a schoolwide policy, enacts inclusion without prioritizing classroom ratios 
representing natural proportions. School administrators, for example, may place students with 
disabilities into classrooms above or below their natural proportions. They will place reasonable 
clusters of students with disabilities in classrooms they judge to have superior service-
infrastructure in place to support students with disabilities. I considered a reasonable cluster size 
for an inclusionary classroom to be less than one 1/3 of the total class size.   
 Data-Analytic Plan 
Propensity Score Matching. I used a propensity scores matching technique to improve the 
internal validity of my study (Schneider, Carnoy, Kilpatrick, Schmidt, & Shavelson, 2007). 
Propensity scores can improve inferences to causation by increasing the visibility of the effect of 
the types of inclusionary settings of interest in this study. Such effects on reading gain scores 
among sampled schoolchildren are frequently hidden by extraneous variables. It is usually 
possible, however, to statistically balance naturally occurring groups on such variables using 
propensity score matching, if they are known and measured. But researchers must select the set 
of covariates using their best judgment rather than a formula.  
My process for propensity score matching had two stages. Stage 1 involved using logistic 
regression to calculate propensity scores. The propensity score .z	 is defined as follows:  
.z	 ≡ P(T=1|S)=E(T|S) 
where  .z	 is the propensity a child in my sample would be educated in a natural proportions 
inclusionary setting, T indicates a child did or did not receive a natural proportions inclusionary 
setting, and S represents a vector of covariates influencing whether a child did or did not receive 
a natural proportions inclusionary setting.   
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 In stage 2, I balanced groups with propensity scores. I used a 1:1 caliper strategy without 
replacement to match them. I specified a caliper of .1 (i.e. a caliper is the maximum allowable 
propensity score difference of paired up schoolchildren). As a quality control measure, I also 
randomly ordered schoolchildren before matching them. I used a SAS MACRO to implement 
this procedure (Lanehart, Rodriquez de Gil, Kim, Bellara, Kromrey, & Lee, 2012). 
The school district selected the covariates for analysis. After statistical balancing groups, 
I had 10 matched pairs in special education and 20 in general education. Tables 4 and 5 provide 
balance statistics on covariates before and after propensity score matching. The balanced groups 
were no longer representative of their respective school populations, but they were comparable 
enough to induce effects. In other words, I weakened the study’s external validity to improve its 
internal validity. I judged this trade off acceptable given the study’s purpose.  
Bayesian Methods. The Bayesian version of statistical inference offers education 
researchers an alternative to classical inference. Bayesians dispenses with classical p-values 
(Iversen, 1984), and uses posterior distributions instead. Posterior distributions are statistical 
distribution representing a scientist’s informed judgment about the credibility of hypotheses, 
under consideration, given sample evidence. All statistical inferences in this study were framed 
within the Bayesian rather than classical mold.  
Classical p-values are premised on chance setups in the study design – a proviso too often 
neglected. The logic of Bayesian posterior distributions, in contrast, encompasses study designs 
using judgment samples and propensity score matching. Randomization becomes an optional 
component in study designs for Bayesians (Howson & Urbach, 2006). I, thus, selected Bayesian 
inference because of its greater flexibility in study designs (see Chapter Two).  
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I used Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) to sample from posterior distributions, and 
compute quantities of interest. Specifically, I used PROC MCMC (SAS 9.4). This procedure 
uses a Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm, and I used all the standard default settings to make 
replication easier. I inspected available diagnostic information reported in SAS output, and visual 
analysis of trace plots and statistical tests, such as Geweke Diagnostics, and found no evidence 
my chain had not properly converged. I used a burn-in of 1,000, sampled 500,000 cases, and then 
thinned my posterior sample by a magnitude of 10 to reduce any autocorrelation. My posterior 
samples for effect sizes, under Jeffreys prior, were 47,690.9 and 50,000 for special education and 
general education, respectively.  
Simple Difference of Means. I used a Bayesian version of the dependent means t-test to 
evaluate the credibility of possible effect sizes given the sample. I used the following equation: 
5~ |, !|"	 
where 5 is the difference in reading gains of the  matched pair of schoolchildren, and values 
of Y are normally distributed with mean (|	 and variance (!|"). To estimate the model, I used a 
normal-shaped likelihood function for my analysis rather than a t-shaped one; briefly: 
}5||, !|"	 = p5; |, !|"	 for  = 1,2, … 35, ,36 
My choice of normal-shaped likelihood function was supported by descriptive statistics.  
In Bayesian analysis one must specify priors for parameters. Jeffreys priors produce 
posteriors invariant under transformations. I used such priors for my parameters, | and !|": 
_|	 ∝ 1                        _!|"	 ∝ 1 !|"N  
Jeffreys priors are objective. They are based on a math formula, and they represent an idealized 
scientist who entertains all possible effect size as equally credible before inspecting the sample. I 
used this impartial stance to draw substantive conclusions in this analysis.  
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To set up a null hypothesis test, I used Cohen’s (1988) measure of practical significance  
Cohen′s Δ = |	 !|N  
I decided to interpret values of Cohen’s Δ between -.2 and .2 as being practically akin to the null 
hypothesis, : | = 0, and so this became my Region of Practical Equivlence (ROPE). Using a 
posterior distribution for the paramter Cohen’s Δ and my ROPE, I could compute the probability 
this special null hypothesis is true given my sample (Kruschke, 2011).   
 Scientists are rarely impartial towards the null hypothesis. But they, of course, differ in 
their judgements about the crediblity of the null hypothesis, and so I ran the analysis several 
times using different priors. These priors represented different stances scientists might take 
towards the null hypothesis. 
 Cynical Scientists. They posited the null is likely. They conjectured there was likely no 
efffect or only trival effects (−.2 < Δ < .2). To them, the effects of natural proportioning and 
clustering on reading scores is neglitiable, and they zealously dismissed conjectures of even a 
small effect size as proposterous, _	~ 0, 40"	 and _	~ 0, 40"	. 
 Skeptical Scientists. They posited small effects (. 3 u Δ u .5) as likely. But they still fully 
entertained the null hypothesis too. Anything other than these, however, they regarded as wishful 
thinking, _	~ 120, 40"	 and _	~ 120, 40"	. 
 Optimistic Scientists. They championed modereate effects (. 5 u Δ u .8). But, of course, 
they also entertained small or large effect sizes too. They give no credence, whatsover, to the 
null, _|	~ 195, 40"	 and _|	~ 195, 40"	.  
Credulous Scientists. They barely tolerated the null hypothesis, and conjectured that a 
large effect size was the best guess, (. 8 u Δ). Indeed, they ranked bigger a effect size as always 
more probable than smaller effects, _	~ 310, 40"	 and _|	~ 390, 40"	. 
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Results 
Below, I present results from my main analysis. Difference scores in annual reading gains 
were computed using the following formula: 
: = := − : 
where : represents a difference score in the  group, := the student in a clustered classroom, 
and : students in a naturally proportioned classroom. Figure 12 depicts the distribution of gain 
score differences between matched schoolchildren in general education and special education, 
and both of these sets of scores approximate normalcy.  
The null hypothesis is that the effect of the studied student grouping models – namely, 
clustering and natural proportioning – on reading gain scores is negligible The difference scores 
(:=31.8,  = 309.9) among schoolchildren in general education ranged from a minimum 
value of -391 to a maximum of 1019. A visual inspection of Figure 12 seems to favor the null in 
the case of general education.  The difference scores (:=-156.5,  = 390.6	 among students 
in special education scores, however, seem less favorable to the null. In the next section, I use a 
Bayesian t-test to formalize these inductions with inferential statistics. 
General Education (N=20) Special Education (N=10) 
  
Figure 12: Description of Differences in Reading Gain Scores 
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What happens to Schoolchildren in General Education? 
 Bayesian scientists, at least ones using Jeffreys priors, induce the null is the most credible 
given the sample, and they judge posits of moderate or large effect sizes to be too incredible to 
be live options. They gave the null a posterior probability of .58, but still entertained the option 
of a small effect (p=.38). Figure 13 shows posterior distributions for  and Cohen’s Δ. Table 6 
summarizes the posterior probabilities of a representative sample of Bayesian scientists. Despite 
the tiny sample (N=20), a comparison of their posteriors shows a (subtle) convergence towards a 
cynical stance. Credulous Bayesians, for example, would now posit moderate rather than large 
effects after studying this sample; optimistic Bayesians, small rather than moderate; and so on. 
This pattern in posterior distributions supports the null. The DIC statistic (smaller values are 
better) also suggested the data is most consistent with a cynical stance. 
  Cohen’s Δ 
  
Figure 13: Jeffreys Posterior Distributions for General Education Parameters 
Table 6: Different Posterior Distributions for Cohen’s  in General Education 
  
DIC 
                             Hypotheses   Probable Effect Size 
Analysis Method Probability  Mn (95% HDI) Null Alternate Small Medium  Large 
Jeffreys  Priors Prior  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 Posterior  289.155 .10 (-.34, .54) .58 .42 .38 .04 .00 
Cynical  Stance Prior  -- -- .88 .12 .12 0 0 
 Posterior  287.579 .02 (-.16, .21) .96 .04 .04 .00 .00 
Skeptical  Stance Prior  -- -- .09 .91 .71 .19 .01 
    Posterior 288.495 .31 (.09, 54) .17 .83 .78 .05 .00 
Optimistic Stance  Prior  -- -- .00 1 .24 .62 .14 
 Posterior 290.666 .47 (.24, .70) .01 .99 .60 .38 .01 
Credulous Stance  Prior -- -- .00 1 .00 .18 .82 
 Posterior 296.229 .67 (.44, .92) .00 1 .08 .77 .15 
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What happens to Schoolchildren in Special Education? 
In this case of school children in special education, Bayesian scientists, at least those ones 
using Jeffreys priors, induce the alternative hypothesis to be 4 times more probable than null 
given the sample, and they judge smaller effect size posits to be more credible than larger. Figure 
14 provides a visual depiction of their judgments. But, of course, they still entertain the null as a 
live option. They need larger samples to fully eliminate it. Table 7 (like Table 6) summarizes the 
posterior probabilities of the different groups of Bayesian scientists of interest, and, despite much 
uncertainty and disagreement among groups, a convergence towards the alternative is evident. 
All scientists, for example, downgraded the credibility of both of the extreme hypotheses, null 
and large effect size. This provides inductive support for the conclusion natural proportioning 
had a bigger effect than clustering.  
 Cohen’s Δ 
  
Figure 14: Jeffreys Posterior Distributions for Special Education Parameters 
Table 7: Different Posterior Distributions for Cohen’s Δ in Special Education 
  
DIC 
                             Hypotheses   Probable Effect Size 
Analysis Method Probability  Mn (95% HDI) Null Alternate Small Medium  Large 
Jeffreys  Priors Prior  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 Posterior  150.536 -.39 (-1.03, .53) .25 .75 .39 .26 .10 
Cynical  Stance Prior  -- -- .95 .05 .05 0 0 
 Posterior  149.984 -.03 .-24, .14) .94 .06 .06 .00 .00 
Skeptical  Stance Prior  -- -- .24 .76 .70 .06 .00 
    Posterior 148.783 -.32 (-.57, -09) .17 .83 .75 .08 .00 
Optimistic Stance  Prior  -- -- .00 1 .25 .58 .17 
 Posterior 149.214 -.49 (-.78, -.21) .00 1 .24 .62 .14 
Credulous Stance  Prior -- -- .00 1 .02 ..25 .73 
 Posterior 149.962 -.72 (-1.07, .-.38) .00 1 .03 .40 .56 
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Posterior Predictive Checks 
Before moving into the discussion section, I briefly turn to the subject of model fit. I used 
a posterior predictive checking procedure to assess my models (Lynch, 2004). To check the 
quality of my joint posteriors, I sampled parameters 500,000 times and then simulated samples 
from models specified with the sampled parameters. I kept track of the frequency of the 
occurrence of minimum (min), maximum (max), mean (mean), and standard deviation (sd) in the 
simulated data sets. Finally, I computed Bayesian p-values to formally determine how well my 
simulated samples matched up with the real one. Bayesian p-values, unlike classical ones, should 
be near .5 and high or low values are troublesome. Figures 15 and 16 depict the results.  
 
Figure 15: Posterior Predictive Distributions for General Education Model 
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Figure 16: Posterior Predictive Distributions for Special Education  
Bayesians avoid the classical “reject/fail to reject” algorithm for interpreting p-values, but 
for the sake of tradition I wanted to see Bayesian p-values between .95 and .05. I focused on the 
minimum and maximum values rather than mean and standard deviations as replicating them is a 
tough task. I was pleased then with the overall fit of my model for schoolchildren in special 
education. But the small p-values for some sample statistics for the obtained posterior 
distributions in the case in general education was a bit alarming. It is unclear, however, why they 
appeared inconsistent with data. It is most likely a problem with my model specifications. The 
implication: my model for students in special education nicely fits the data; my model for 
general education lacks such a desirable fit: its fit is uncomfortably tolerable.      
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Discussion 
Effects of Student Grouping Methods in General Education 
The results of my analysis suggest it is more probable than not that nothing of interest 
happened to studied youth in general education – at least, in regards to reading outcomes, as 
measured by annual gain scores on state reading tests. The null hypothesis is the most credible 
one given my choice of prior and sample evidence. It states that the differential effect of the two 
grouping methods on annual reading gains is negligible for all practical purposes. But a posterior 
predictive check found the model was not quite consistent with the data, and this suggests further 
elaborations on the model are needed to be certain.   
My conclusions about the high probability of the null, of course, rest on a small sample. 
The large widths of the posteriors and Bayesian 95% HDIs show all conclusions are uncertain. 
Researchers who wish to gain more certainty, however, can use this study to improve their future 
parameter estimates. They can use the posterior quantities reported in this study to set new priors 
and gather a new sample, then they can compute a new posterior yielding more certain estimates. 
Given a steady flow of incoming data, the math guarantees Bayesian posterior distributions will 
generally converge. This is one of the bonuses of using Bayesian inference.  
As expected, prior choice matters. Sample sizes were too tiny to overwhelm the prior’s 
influence on the posterior. Instead, the posteriors represented a balance of sample information 
and prior judgments. Credulous scientists, for example, will not be persuaded from the data the 
null is true. Arguably, this analysis simulates the behavior of real scientists. When the evidence 
is pithy, scientists do not reach consensus. Nonetheless, it was reassuring to see convergence in 
posteriors towards the null. Jeffreys prior can be interpreted as the group’s ‘impartial’ scientist, 
and its results would best approximate classical analysis.     
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Effects of Student Grouping Methods in Special Education 
It is more probable than not, given this analysis, that something of substantive interest 
happened to reading gain scores in special education. Scientists, using Jeffreys prior, induce 
natural proportioning probably outperformed clustering. One cannot, of course, generalize 
inferences outside of the study, but so what? One of the main purposes behind intervention 
research is to detect effects, and prompt further research into the matter. If we can isolate the 
mechanism producing the effect then we may be able to amplify their effects (House, 1991). The 
implication: more research is needed to clarify and understand why natural proportioning may 
have produced higher results than clustering.  
It is difficult to reliably compute parameter estimates from small samples with certainty. 
Bayesians can sometimes do this if they have a lot of background knowledge at their disposal to 
inform their priors. But such was not the case here. Notwithstanding my analysis did yield some 
interesting results. I induced, for example, natural proportions probably worked better than 
clustering. Moreover, even if the requisite sampling conditions had been met for the standard 
classical analysis procedures (they were not), I still would have preferred Bayesian analysis 
because it supplied more information about unknown parameters.  
As expected, classical p-values did in fact find mean differences to be insignificant, even 
for schoolchildren in special education. There was too much uncertainty, given such tiny sample, 
to eliminate the null hypothesis, even if there really was a small effect. Yet, by using Bayesian 
analysis, I refined my judgment about the credibility of the null hypothesis. In this case, I found 
it to be very unlikely while still being a live option. But, again, in this study I was stuck with 
Bayesian analysis for good or worse. The logic of classical inference was inadmissible here 
because I used judgment samples and propensity score matching (see Chapter Two).  
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Interpretation of Findings 
If you know one child with Autism, then you know one child with Autism (Hacking, 
2009). One cannot presume, for example, that if this inclusionary classroom placement worked 
well for a cohort of students with Autism in the past then the same will be true this year. It 
probably will be, of course, but only trial and error can demonstrate it for sure. And sometimes 
too many contingencies are thrown into the mix to make any confident predictions about the ‘fit’ 
between schoolchild and classroom, and the amount of unanticipated interaction effects probably 
accrues when more and more students are clustered into the same place.  
Recall, McLeskey and Waldron’s (2000) main argument for clustering depended on the 
supposition school administrators (or their informants) could predict – or, at least, forecast - 
which classroom had superior support systems. Otherwise, there is no reason to cluster students 
in such classrooms. But, given the chaos-effect, such forecasting may prove perilous despite 
much planning and oversight. Success here is always partially a matter of luck. Some people, of 
course, will be better at anticipating future events than others. I conjecture McLeskey and 
Waldron had ‘the gift,’ and this then explains why I could not replicate their success with the 
clustering method (McLeskey & Waldron, 2000).  
One advantage of the above interpretation of my study findings is that it makes testable 
predictions. My interpretation entails, among other things, that there should be more variability 
in learning outcomes across schools using clustering rather than natural proportioning. Its effect 
will sometimes be greater than natural proportioning, sometimes lesser: it all depends on the 
accuracy of the forecast. To refute this conjecture, researchers could use a more elaborate HCT 
design involving multiple schools, and a multilevel analog of a Bayesian t-test to estimate overall 
variability between schools taking into account grouping method.   
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Limitations 
 This study has several limitations. One limitation was the utilization of a pre-existing data 
set. The data set had a relatively small sample size. It was, therefore, impossible to make precise 
point and interval estimates. I also could only glean information about students who took state 
reading tests. The data set also never specified what percentage of the day students with 
disabilities actually spent in inclusionary classrooms, and even more worrisome, from an analytic 
perspective, was I did not know how many students were clustered into the same classroom. If 
there was a massive amount of clustering, then the statistical model should have taken this into 
account. But, despite all these data set limitations, the sample did provide useful details about the 
null hypothesis’ plausibility, and functions as a nice first approximation.  
 A threat to my study’s interval validity is the omitted covariate. This is always a threat in 
education research, and nothing can infallibly shield against it. Even one omitted variable can 
shipwreck our best propensity score matching efforts.  The inclusion of good covariates, after all, 
makes this threat less and less probable. Readers then are urged to double-check my covariates, 
and draw their own conclusions about its adequacy for our purposes. In regards to my study’s 
external validity, one should not extrapolate effects beyond the 60 cases examined in this study. I 
traded off my external validity to gain higher internal validity.  
Yet another limitation of this study was the lack of a conventional fidelity check. A 
fidelity check would have ensured that studied schools really implemented the requisite student-
grouping method. In some ways, the credibility of my findings is interlinked with the credibility 
of Hoppey, Black, and Michelson’s (2015) findings. Their study substitutes as my ‘fidelity 
check’ as they visited the school sites, observed classrooms, and interviewed key participants. 
Perhaps, this is an example of the necessary ‘qual-quant dialogue’ among researchers.  
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Implications 
My study has implications for both practitioners and researchers. This study reinforces 
the conviction that placement decisions matter. One can enact inclusion using natural proportions 
or clustering methods, but natural proportioning outperformed clustering in the case of special 
education students – at least, in regards to reading skill acquisition. This suggests the natural 
proportions method should be the default method. In other words, use natural proportioning 
rather than clustering when both methods are options and the final decision makers have no 
strong rationale for using clustering rather than natural proportions. An adequate rationale in this 
case, for example, might be natural proportions did not work out well last year.   
    Scholars should generate theories explaining what difference natural ratios might make 
on learning outcomes. This study evidences it can indeed have a bigger effect than clustering. 
Theorists should then try to identify under what conditions this may or may not be true. It is 
conceivable, for example, a lower percentage of students in special education in a classroom 
makes it easier (less stressful) on inexperienced instructional faculty, and so under such 
conditions produces bigger effects.  
 This study then warrants future investigation. Future researchers may try to replicate my 
findings with other outcomes of interest, such as math or writing. Researchers should also 
entertain the possibility there may be important effects on non-academic outcomes of interest 
too. I wager it would be worthwhile to replicate this study at a secondary level as well, and 
investigate whether these findings hold across the different disability categories. Moreover, it 
might also be worthwhile to include students with disabilities on alternate diploma options. 
Finally, future studies can yield more certain estimates of effect sizes, assuming they used bigger 
samples or more Bayesian analysis on new samples of similar sizes.  
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Final Remarks 
Bayesian analysis provided a useful alternative to classical analysis in this study. 
Bayesian analysis lacks some of the luster of the objectivity of classical p-values. Everyone 
using a classical p-value, for example, will reach the same conclusion given the same sample. 
But Bayesian analysis compensates for this loss of objectivity with its own version of objectivity. 
It gives scientists with different priors a formal method for reaching consensus in their posteriors 
on matters of importance.  
Some methodologists are confident everyone will be doing Bayesian analysis in the 
foreseeable future (Kruschke, 2011). I am skeptical about this forecast, as they have been saying 
this forever. But with the availability of new software programs, like PROC MCMC (SAS 9.4), 
may make a lesser version of their predictions finally come true: Bayesian inference may join 
and come alongside classical inference, as a specialized tool in the researcher’s toolkit. This 
possibility is realizable for the first time ever as researchers without specialist training in 
statistics can now do Bayesian inference using computer programs, like SAS software. It is 
impossible then to say for sure, but there may be a coming surge of interest in Bayesian methods.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, I do my best to ‘tie’ everything in my dissertation together, and elaborate 
on why previous chapters, taken together, make a contribution to the knowledge base regarding 
the problem occupying this dissertation.  
Summary of Dissertation 
Two opinions prevail among statisticians about priors: they are assets, they are liabilities. 
Each opinion, of course, is correct. Some priors enlighten posteriors; others distort them. Either 
way, they will influence posteriors especially when sample sizes are small. Bayesians are risk-
takers, who must learn to trust their priors within set limits. 
My dissertation investigated why priors belong in a romantic science of education, and 
how we can maximize their rewards, minimize their risks. Classical statisticians play it safe, and 
omit priors. Classical inference is needier than Bayesian, however, and the sampling conditions it 
requires are scarce in education science. My argument in Chapter Two entailed, that Bayesian 
methods, compared to classical, were more adaptable to conditions in education.   
Bayesian methods offer alternatives to classical procedures. They use judgment samples 
and historical controls. They cope with probability samples and random assignment too. All that 
matters to Bayesians is the visible data. I am not at all suggesting by this that classical inferences 
are inferior to Bayesian ones. Instead, I am arguing that it is wiser to reserve classical inferences 
to studies with the appropriate sampling conditions to preserve their logic. Absent these 
conditions, Bayesian inference almost becomes a practical necessity in education research.  
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When Bayesian methods are applied in research, prior selection is usually controversial. 
Perhaps, the prior is obvious because of an established consensus, but not likely. I wager prior 
setting in education will usually require some hard thinking. Consequently, in Chapter Three, I 
queried about what methods researchers can do to set defensible priors in research. Specifically, 
when conducting t-tests to infer causation in small pilot studies.  
Imagine a researcher sets up a minuscule pilot study to test an intervention. She wishes to 
use statistically significant findings to persuade funders to sponsor a massive follow-up study. 
She is lucky, however, and has at her disposal a probability sample, and was able to randomly 
assign all sample members to control and intervention groups. She runs the experiment, and then 
decides to use a parametric independent means t-test to evaluate her findings. Classical inference 
is a live option, but her sample size is small and she anticipates statistical power will be an issue. 
One possibility to overcome this limitation is to go Bayesian instead. But she needs to select an 
appropriate convenience prior to conduct the Bayesian version of the t-test.  
 I then argued in Chapter Three it does not take much knowledge at all to set up a default 
prior for a Bayesian t-test. She can, for example, use only her knowledge of possible effect sizes 
to specify a prior. This single prior represents a balanced mix of distinct priors for each possible 
effect size of interest, and then it defaults to whatever prior in the mix is most consistent with the 
sample data in the analysis phase. This could be a respectable convenience prior.  
I used Monte Carlo simulation methods to assess the performance of the Bayesian 
version of the t-tests compared with the usual classical version under the same conditions. I 
discovered Bayesian t-tests had ample power. Moreover, they outperformed their classical 
cousins in regards to their control of Type I and Type II error. These findings suggest Bayesian t-
tests can be appropriate for significance testing in education.      
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 Convenience priors, like mixed priors, minimize the risk Bayesians will use mischievous 
priors to reach unwarranted (albeit, desirable) conclusions. They are, for example, free of any 
favoritism. Sensitivity analysis, moreover, can establish how dependent the posterior is on the 
selected prior. If multiple priors produced the same (or approximate) posterior, one can infer the 
posterior was not too dependent on the selected prior. This convergence, thus, reassures readers 
Bayesian analysis is not bias run amok.     
Finally, in Chapter Four, I illustrated some of the important mechanics of Bayesian 
inference with a true story. I was asked by school district personnel to evaluate whether a school 
district-level initiative really had a positive and significant impact on state test scores for a 
subpopulation of interest. They gave me a small sample of test scores from students placed either 
in control and intervention conditions – or, at least, placements somewhat approximating these 
condition-types. But it was not a probability sample, and I also had to use propensity score 
matching to try to balance groups on extraneous variables.  
 I decided to conduct a t-test. Given sampling conditions, I decided to use the Bayesian 
version of this statistical test to preserve the logical integrity of my statistical inferences. Even if 
requisite conditions for classical version of the t-test had been met, however, I still would have 
preferred the Bayesian version of it to improve my statistical power. Power was an issue in this 
evaluation study because of a limited small sample size.  
I felt comfortable setting priors. I had access to a team of qualitative researchers who had 
visited all the relevant school sites. They had visited the sites on several occasions, and had 
interviewed teachers and principals about the new initiative. They also used qualitative analysis 
techniques to enhance their judgments about the schools. This possibility made a Bayesian t-test 
an even more attractive option for me as I had informants with qualitative knowledge.  
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 Together all three chapters in this dissertation build a cumulative case for using Bayesian 
methods more frequently in special education. There is a wealth of clinical expertise in special 
education, and researchers can use their favorite qualitative method to elicit this information. The 
prior is the natural vehicle for utilizing this rich qualitative knowledge in quantitative analysis. 
Bayesian statistics is computer intensive, however, and this made it infeasible in the past. But 
today, as my dissertation demonstrates, we can use computers to solve the otherwise intractable 
posterior integrals and proceed in Special Education with Bayesian inference.  
Tying Up Loose Ends 
Before closing out this concluding chapter, I wish to make a couple of observations about 
important issues that never arose when considering the contents of each chapter individually. 
These issues include (a) Subjective and Objective Bayesian takes on posterior probabilities, and 
the nature of epistemic-type probability, (b) a plausible account of how assessing epistemic-type 
probability is possible for mere mortals, and (c) how I can build a future research agenda out of 
my dissertation findings. To facilitate the rest of my discussion in this chapter, I divided my 
comments into three distinct parts. Each part is devoted to one of the above issues.  
Part I 
Two Versions of Bayesian Statistical Inference 
Credence-type probability comes in two flavors, epistemic and psychological. Epistemic-
type probability is prescriptive. Given our scientific evidence, for example, general relativity 
theory is probable. This is an example of epistemic-type probability. It carries normative weight, 
and surely people err if they disagree with it. Psychological probability is descriptive. A fan says 
it is probable her sports team will win the game despite much counter-evidence. The type of 
probability is autobiographical, and no one else is obliged to adopt it. 
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Subjective Bayesians claim psychological-type probabilities should dominate priors and 
posteriors. The only constraints on psychology-type probability, of course, are the axioms of the 
probability calculus. Outside of these minimal constraints, they will permit researchers to set up 
priors as they see fit. The only caveat is they recommend researchers avoid prior probabilities of 
1s or 0s. These prior probabilities, after all, cannot be modified by evidence.  
Objective Bayesians, in contrast, are maximalists. They hold probabilities fit for science 
are all about epistemic-type probability – not psychological-type. This implies priors should, in 
addition to their compliance to the probability axioms, carry some normative force. They want 
their priors, in other words, to represent the opinions of the wise rather than fools. But since it is 
impossible to operationally define epistemic probability, they must try to discern its presence in 
their priors by using their best judgment.  
I confess my dissertation silently adopted the Objective Bayesian stance. Throughout my 
dissertation, for example, I took it for granted posteriors and priors could be reasonable or not, 
and I engaged in the search for adequate convenience priors. Subjective Bayesians, on the other 
hand, would wonder why I was being so fussy. They think we should just pick a prior and move 
on. All they care about is whether one’s prior is existentially true to oneself.   
Objective Bayesians, like me, however, want more than ‘authenticity’ from our priors. 
We want epistemic-type probability too. Specifically, we want our posteriors to model – and we 
do concede they only model – judgments of an ideal rational agent about the epistemic-type 
probability of propositions given samples. All models, of course, are imperfect. But they can still 
inform us about what ideal rational agents might or might not induce in similar circumstances. 
Priors then are fancy model components (Gelman & Shalizi, 2013), and we should care about 
them because they help us to gain posteriors ‘modeling’ the opinions of ‘the wise.’    
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Without operational definitions of epistemic probability, of course, Objective Bayesians 
cannot guarantee their posteriors encapsulate wisdom. In any given application, posteriors, for all 
they can prove, may contain only prejudice. Without operational definitions, they must trust their 
own cognitive faculties to evaluate its presence in posteriors. But classical statisticians must do 
the same. They, as I argue below, must evaluate the epistemic probability of their sampling 
distributions. The following thought experiment supports this bold claim.  
Thought Experiment 
Imagine a statistician wishes to induce causation within the classical system, and only has 
access to a small convenience sample (N=6). Without getting lost in the details, she sets up an 
elementary version of the null hypothesis: there is no intervention effect. This null, obviously, is 
non-parametric. It, unlike the more familiar parametric version of the null hypothesis, refers to 
no invisible parameters. To test this austere null, it suffices to randomly assign the 6 participants 
into two subgroups of 3 (i.e., control and intervention), run the experiment, and then evaluate a 
test-statistic of interest. Perhaps, in this case, the absolute mean difference between control and 
intervention group can suffice as her test-statistic.  
The logic of the classical significance test in this case is elegant. There are 20 possible 
grouping arrangements, and she randomly selected one of these before running the experiment. If 
the null is really true, however, it should not matter, even after the experiment is over, which 
grouping arrangement she actually used to compute the test-statistic. All participants should, 
according to the null, be interchangeable. To test whether this is the case, she can compute the 
test statistic under each possible grouping arrangement, and count up what proportion yielded 
test statistics weirder than the obtained one. If it is only 5% (or whatever significance level she 
picked before observing the results) she can reject the null.     
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On the surface, it seems the requisite sampling distribution here is fully determinable by 
the math. The experimenter placed 3 out of 6 people (A,B,C,D,E,F) into the intervention group. 
If she listed these possible combinations out one-by-one (such as ABC, ABE, and so on) she will 
eventually count up with 20 such combinations in total,  CD = 20. This is a truth of math, and it 
is why she carved up the sampling distribution space into 20 possibilities. Notwithstanding, she 
needs more then this math to justify her final sampling distribution selection. 
The math underdetermines the requisite sampling distribution. Other people could reduce 
the total count of 20 possibilities to 19, for example, by replacing two of her possibilities with 
one singular possibility. Example, we may replace both her “ABC” and “DEF” events with the 
single event “ABC or DEF.” This new sampling distribution then has only 19 events in it in total. 
But, of course, there is no reason to stop gerrymandering at 19. Someone can keep on doing this 
until they obtain sampling distribution producing a likable p-value.  
We judge people partitioning the sampling distribution into anything other than 20 events 
as making a cognitive mistake. But they surely are not erring in their math. The math is neutral in 
regards to the issue of gerrymandering events. We must instead appeal to epistemic-probability 
to counter these illicit moves. We need to say, in other words, that the wise person will carve up 
sampling distribution spaces this way rather than that, and to do otherwise is foolish. This 
argument is similar to what Objective Bayesians must argue in the case of priors.  
Classical statisticians then, like their Objective Bayesian colleagues, must make appeals 
to epistemic-type probability. But what warrant do any of us mortals have to even try to assess 
epistemic-type probability? It is an entity beyond the comfortable realm of operation definitions. 
But the statistical enterprise seems to presume we can validly assess it, even if only imperfectly. 
The success of inferential statistics shows this presumption is plausible. 
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Summary 
 The Bayesian family encompasses both Subjective and Objective Bayesians. Subjective 
Bayesians make sense of posteriors with psychological-type probabilities; Objective Bayesians 
with epistemic-type probability. Subjective Bayesians are minimalist, and they do not expect too 
much from their posteriors. Objective Bayesians, in contrast, want their posteriors to encapsulate 
epistemic-type probability. But assessing posteriors resemblance to epistemic-type probabilities 
naturally presents a difficulty for Objective Bayesians as they are intangible.  
  Objective Bayesians, however, share this difficulty with classical statisticians. They too 
must assess epistemic probability. They need to sensibly carve up the sampling distribution space 
in ways overlapping with epistemic-type probability. It may be – and often is – an easier task to 
carve up a sampling distribution than a prior, but this difference is one of degree rather than kind. 
It is somewhat unfair then to single out priors, and treat them like bias magnets.  
The success of the inferential statistics enterprise, including the inferential victories of 
Objective Bayesians and classical statisticians, clearly show that we mortals do in fact have the 
astonishing capacity to assess epistemic-type probability. My dissertation is a demonstration of 
this. But without an account of how we are able to do it, the whole issue remains murky. Anyone 
who is distraught by this mystery, of course, can become a Subjective Bayesian, and no longer 
need to worry about it. But this is giving up, and it would be a bit hasty.     
In the next section of my dissertation, I will with much trepidation enter into the highly 
contested philosophical terrain of the problem of induction. This is because the problem of 
assessing epistemic-type probability is really at the core of the modern riddle of induction. I 
deem this adventure to be a necessary evil. It is a pathway to understanding why statisticians can 
indeed (albeit, fallibly) assess epistemic-type probability.    
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Part II 
Assessing Epistemic Normativity in Inductions 
Imagine a primordial group of hunters encounter a couple of mammoths for the first time. 
They are all soundly asleep. They entertain two possible hypotheses about them, ‘All mammoths 
in the world sleep’ and ‘These mammoths perpetually sleep until death.’ They all deem the latter 
posit absurd, the former plausible. They make such bold judgments notwithstanding the fact each 
is compatible with the evidence. How did they (and their living decedents) detect epistemic-type 
probability in inductions apart from evidence? This is a grand riddle. It took some extraordinary 
philosophical ingenuity on the part of some great philosophers, like David Hume, just to 
recognize the riddle existed at all.        
There are several ways of formulating the riddle of induction, each with its advantages 
and disadvantages. In his celebrated book, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Nelson Goodman 
(1955/1979) gave us the modern version of the problem of induction. The available evidence 
underdetermines the ‘natural’ induction for the occasion, yet despite this unavoidable ambiguity, 
we humans can usually select the winner in our ordinary daily life and science.  
On Goodman’s analysis, we do so because habit guides our inductive meta-cognition, not 
logic – a conclusion that, despite Goodman’s protests, imperils the status of induction as a 
rational tool of inference.  
The philosophical move I would like to make in response was anticipated in a short 
response to Goodman written by the philosopher Donald Davidson in the 1960s. In Emeroses by 
Another Name, Davidson (1966/2006) sets forth an intriguing counterexample to Goodman’s 
analysis showing, among other things, why habit cannot be the right answer. But I want to build 
on Davidson’s insights here too and offer a clue to the solution to this grand riddle.    
102 
 
The New Riddle of Induction 
 In Goodman’s nomenclature, projections (or inductions) are merely general descriptions 
posited as bridges for travelling from determined cases to undetermined cases. Projections are 
confirmed by their positive instances, disconfirmed by their negative instances, and neither 
confirmed nor disconfirmed by their underdetermined cases. Goodman identifies several 
preconditions for projectibility. A projection occurs when (a) negative instances are absent, (b) 
undetermined cases are present, and (c) positive instances are counted as lawlike instantiations. 
This last remark needs elaboration.  
 Regardless of a projection’s truth or scientific importance, Goodman (1979) argues 
positive instantiations of it should seem “lawlike” – i.e. capable of sustaining counterfactuals and 
subjunctives. To illustrate his point, consider a hypothesis stating everyone now in a given room 
has three sisters. Suppose we talk to a woman in this room and find out she has three sisters. She 
is a positive instance of the sibling hypothesis, but - absent a hunch this should continue to be so 
- we still have no reason to think the next person we encounter in the room will have three sisters 
too. Karl Hempel’s notable Black Raven Paradox results when this “lawlike” quality of virtuous 
projections is left out of our reckonings (see Goodman 1979, p. 73).  
 Goodman contends Hume’s analysis of induction survives all critical scrutiny. As a good 
Humean, Goodman thinks our meta-inductive device detects the epistemic normativity of cogent 
inductions by sorting observed positive instances of general statements into “lawlike” and “non-
lawlike.” It does this without help from Reason. Hume (1739/1999) aptly puts it, “That the sun 
will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, 
than the affirmation, that it will rise” (p. 108). Our assessments of epistemic-type probability, 
likewise, are not (and cannot be) products of Reason.  
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Goodman’s skepticism towards induction is a little bit deeper than Hume’s, if that is 
possible. Hume concedes we humans anticipate what will happen in a collision of billiard balls. 
He presumes we passively learned to “see” such necessary connections in the regularities of 
experience. In contrast, Goodman conceives of us as active learners. We do not sit idle until 
external prompts cause us to induce. Our minds are too proactive for that. Trying to make sense 
out of regularities in experience, we wildly project necessary connections everywhere in nature 
and then try to sort them out afterwards. Goodman only wonders why we feel only a certain class 
of possible inductions fitting the evidence hold epistemic normativity.  
His proposal to this riddle: We fixate on only projections couched in customary terms. To 
make his case, Goodman begins with the premise ontology is relative to some descriptions of 
things. Different descriptions of things offer incommensurate ontologies, and each such ontology 
implies different law-like connections. But, of course, it is natural for one description of things to 
become dominate in a community of speakers. Projections framed in speech too far outside of 
these customary ontological molds then seem funny sounding (i.e. they appear to lack any 
epistemic warrant to these speakers).  
In Goodman’s analysis, what counts as a passable induction today is only a matter of 
contingency. Inductions dressed in unfamiliar terms sound strange to us. But nothing prescribes 
in advance what will sound strange to speakers. Languages are relatively stable, but languages 
evolve over the long haul. Moreover, humans may be psychologically “hard-wired” to think and 
talk conservatively about things, but this was not an inevitable outcome of evolution. Perhaps, 
given a different evolutionary history, humans would be more liberal in their linguistic habits. 
So, Goodman’s conclusion about our meta-inductive palate radically alters the “official” story 
about induction as the logic of discovery in science (Bacon, 1620/1961).  
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Goodman’s Argument 
To test whether people really do show a conservative bias when judging statements to be 
lawlike (and so suitable for projection) Goodman devises a clever thought experiment. He starts 
with a general statement fit for projection because its positive instances could be lawlike: 
 P   All emeralds are green. 
He then exchanges this statement’s familiar color predicate with an unfamiliar one in order to 
study what happens to the lawlike status of its positive instances. He substitutes into Pthe color 
predicate ‘grue’ (Grue means ‘green’ before time t, otherwise ‘blue’); briefly:  
                "  All emeralds are grue. 
The statement, ‘All emeralds are grue,’ is not a manifest contradiction. Nonetheless, Goodman 
(correctly) notes people will (correctly) reject it as unfit for induction.  
But a close inspections of P and " shows their positive instances come from the same 
stock of evidence – namely, green emeralds before time t. Reason only tells people that P and 
" cannot both be simultaneously affirmed. Nonetheless, given a green emerald before time t, 
people will say that only P is supportable by the evidence. They make such a bold meta-
inductive judgment because they think emerald-observations can be lawlike instantiations of P, 
but not ". If, contrary to all expectations, all the green-looking emeralds suddenly did ‘change’ 
color after time t (i.e. they were grue colored) people would attribute this to a fluke or a 
spontaneous miracle – not a result of something lawlike, like grue coloration.    
But if neither evidence nor Reason explains why people surmise positive instances of P 
but not " to be lawlike then what is informing people’s meta-inductive judgments in this 
matter? Goodman concludes people do not like ‘grue’ because it is unfamiliar to them. As 
Goodman explains: 
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Plainly ‘green,’ a veteran of earlier and many more projections than “grue,” has 
the more impressive biography. The predicate ‘green’ is much better entrenched 
than the predicate “grue” (p. 94). 
 
In other words, Goodman thinks the tossup between ‘green’ and ‘grue’ is ultimately decided 
upon grounds of green’s ‘entrenchment,’ or its repeated usage in color descriptions in familiar 
discourse about emeralds. The unfamiliarity of ‘grue,’ therefore, makes people distrust it over 
green.  
To see why Goodman thinks people rely upon custom to inform their meta-inductive 
judgments, suppose a familiar predicate is substituted back into "; briefly:   
                  All emeralds are red. 
The substitution of ‘grue’ with ‘red’ creates a hypothesis with a different empirical significance 
than P, but people still will judge positive instances to be – in a meta-inductive sense – lawlike. 
I mean that in the absence of counterexamples, people would take statements to the effect that 
this emerald is red to be confirming instances of . This seems to lend credence to Goodman’s 
analysis that ‘grue’ is unsuitable for lawlike statements because it is an unfamiliar term.    
Ultimately, Goodman’s test depends upon the assumption that Reason is indifferent to the 
choice of ‘green’ and ‘grue.’ But many may wonder if Reason really is so indifferent. Perhaps, 
‘green’ is more suitable than “grue” because of Ockham’s razor - I think not. Inspection of P 
and " indicates they have the same simplicity. My fictional objector who appeals to Ockham’s 
razor against the ‘grue’ predicate fails to see this because she gives too much attention to the way 
it has been defined in the argument. But the same argument can be presented differently to 
speakers whose native language employs grue rather than green. Briefly:  
Green means grue if examined before time t, otherwise bleen - where ‘bleen’ 
means blue after time t, otherwise grue. 
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Thus, it is only a bug in the English presentation of the argument that made hypotheses using 
‘green’ or ‘red’ appear simple whereas the hypothesis using ‘grue’ complex. But, aside from 
accidents of language, hypotheses using ‘grue’ are as qualitatively simple as hypotheses using 
‘green’ – at least, as far as Reason discerns. These facts also seem to add weight to Goodman’s 
contention that the only germane difference between the two hypotheses is the familiarity of their 
color predicates to English speakers.  
Consequences of Goodman’s Analysis 
 To recap, Goodman (correctly) posits people can usually assess if an induction lacks 
epistemic-type force regardless of its compatibility with evidence (If people were not good at it, 
evolution would have eliminated the human species a long time ago). He also (again correctly) 
posits that only lawlike statements are capable of projection. He then uses these two insights to 
conduct a thought experiment designed to show custom rather than Reason guides our meta-
inductive judgments. On the basis of this experiment, he argues we deem ‘grue’ unsuitable for 
projection only because it is less familiar than ‘green.’  
 If Goodman’s conclusions are warranted then important implications follow for our 
understanding of induction and related topics. For example, it would shed light on the elusive 
criterion for laws. It also completes Hume’s project of dethroning Reason and putting custom in 
its place. As Goodman elegantly expresses: “If I am at all correct, then, the roots of inductive 
validity are to be found in our use of language” and when Reason conceives of a limitless 
number of hypotheses for the same data “the line between valid and invalid predictions (or 
inductions or projections) is drawn” in the linguistic sands of how the world “has been described 
and anticipated in words” (p. 121). Again, these conclusions, despite Goodman’s best protests to 
the contrary, imperil the use of induction as fit for the scientific enterprise. 
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Davidson’s Masterstroke 
 Previously, I consider Goodman’s new riddle of induction and his own analysis of its 
skeptical implications towards induction. But Davidson offers us a way to salvage induction 
from such skepticism and, thus, restore induction’s status as a rational tool of discovery in 
science. One recalls from the first section Goodman’s thought experiment pivots on the 
unsuitability of unfamiliar terms for lawlike statements. Davidson, however, gives a 
counterexample to Goodman’s general claim. I reproduce, explain, and defend it from possible 
rejoinders below.    
Davidson responds to Goodman’s claim with a counterexample (see Davidson, 2006, p. 
120): Consider the following hypothesis:  
                  All emeroses are gred  
The predicate ‘gred’ is akin to the predicate ‘grue,’ except it states the color turns red rather than 
blue at time t. The object emerose is a little bit like these odd color predicates. It is any object 
that is an emerald, if examined before time t, otherwise a rose. The non-existence of emeroses in 
this world is entirely beside the point. 
This hypothesis surely qualifies as a little peculiar. It is a much odder hypothesis than 
‘All emeralds are grue.’ It is stranger because it contains not one but two foreign predicates – one 
for the antecedent the other for the consequent. It should be, thus, doomed for two reasons rather 
than one – at least, if Goodman’s analysis of the situation is at all correct here. Notwithstanding, 
Davidson claims people intuit gred is projectable over emeroses. If true, one must conclude, 
contra Goodman, something else besides customary word choice informs people’s meta-
inductive judgments. The point of Davidson’s counterexample then is to expose a fatal flaw in 
Goodman’s analysis.  
108 
 
Of course, Goodman could try to get around Davidson’s counterexample by saying  
should be judged not lawlike (In fact, this is exactly how Goodman does try to get around 
Davidson’s counterexample in his writings, see Goodman 1979, p. 106). But Davidson 
anticipates such a dodge and blocks it. Here is Davidson’s argument in his own words: 
Recently Goodman has claimed that [] is not [lawlike]. Here I consider whether 
he is right. Let us pretend the following are true and lawlike: 
 [P ] All emeralds are green 
 [ ] All roses are red 
Then [] is true, and we have good reason to believe it (p. 120). 
 
Davidson’s masterstroke is terse and dense. Perhaps the best way to elucidate his writing here is 
to suspend all disbelief for sake of argument and posit emeroses actually exist. 
 Emeroses are green emeralds that seem to us, English speakers, to magically ‘transform’ 
into red roses at time t. Naturally, the color of these entities changes from green into red at time t. 
But this description matches the definition of the color gred. So, by definition, emeroses are 
gred. Moreover, when we grant P and  we rightly concede the color green is projectable over 
emeralds and red is likewise projectable over roses. So, consistency demands, the projectability 
of gred over emeroses before time t since they really are green emeralds at this time and red 
roses afterwards. If this does not qualify them as gred nothing else will.  
The flaw in Goodman’s test is the assumption that the unit of empirical significance is 
isolated bits of language, called, “predicates.” Davidson explains, “Goodman’s test for deciding 
whether a statement is lawlike depends primarily on how well behaved its predicates are, taken 
one by one” (p. 120). In other words, Goodman thinks he is testing the behavior of predicates, 
controlling for everything else. This assumption entitles him to make conclusions about which 
predicates are suitable for lawlike statements. The problem with his procedure is it ignores the 
effects of semantic holism. 
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The Hermeneutical Circle  
Logical empiricists once fondly dreamed that an unbridgeable chasm between speculative 
metaphysics and the natural sciences existed. To them, science was a methodology rather than a 
knowledge base. Their trademark thesis was that metaphysical statements were worse than false 
– they were literal non-sense. They defended it with the so-called analytic-synthetic distinction – 
sometimes called “Hume’s fork” in honor of its greatest defender among history’s intellectual 
elite.  
Hume’s fork stated that the meaning of all intelligible statements comes from a synergy 
between their logical and factual components. If a sentence’s truth value depended only on its 
logical components, however, it was analytic (otherwise, synthetic). They also thrust foreword 
their famous verification principle of meaning as a test for determining whether a passable 
sentence was analytic or synthetic (Ayers, 1937/1952). If a sentence could be confirmed under 
all circumstances it was found to be analytic; if it could be confirmed in only some, synthetic. 
Thus, the analytic-synthetic distinction, supplemented with the verification criterion of meaning, 
was science’s bulwark against metaphysical intrusion.   
In his classic article, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine forever blurs the lines between 
science and metaphysics. To achieve his objective, Quine destabilized the ill-founded doctrine of 
the analytic-synthetic distinction and its corollaries. He replaced them with his robust doctrine of 
semantic holism. Quine’s sanitized empiricism entails, among other things, that it is impossible 
to draw a principled line between analytic and synthetic statements. Quine boldly claims, “It is 
folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, 
and analytic statements, which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come what 
may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system” (p. 43).  
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Quine (1951) compares the totality of human knowledge to a field of force; it’s boundary 
condition being experience. Conflicts with experience occasion change in truth evaluations of 
statements. But there are multiple ways to redistribute truth values across all the statements in the 
system to accommodate recalcitrant experience, and so preserve our favorite claim’s credibility. 
This latitude entails, among other things, that in principle one has the freedom to preserve any 
claim about reality in our science. In a memorable quote, Quine (1951) even suggests the ancient 
posits of Greco-Roman style gods change weather patterns can be made compatible with all the 
modern empirical evidence if we make enough changes to our system of science. The warrant for 
atom-posits in meteorology instead of god-posits is pragmatic – not empiricist. Atom-posits can 
forecast the weather patterns better. In a bolder move, Quine dubiously declares all beliefs, 
including laws of logic, revisable.  
Quine then explains our ability to assess epistemic-normativity in inductions as a by-
product of pragmatism. We eliminate inductions from the competition when they conflict with 
accepted evidence, of course, but we also eliminate them not because we logically must but 
because their acceptance would irritate us too much. Interconnections among beliefs in the web 
cause any change near the interior to cascade throughout the web, and naturally this upsets us. 
We far prefer to preserve our system of beliefs than change it. It is one thing to make minor 
tweaks in our cognitive schema, and it is another thing all together to replace one cognitive 
scheme with another: one is a pleasant experience, the other painful. We, thus, desire to modify 
statements near the periphery and keep the interior intact. This natural desire to minimize pain 
and maximize pleasures explains why we sometimes discard conflicting evidence as moot and 
other times accept it, and so modify beliefs accordingly.  
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The problem with ‘grue’ on Quine’s analysis is not that it is unfamiliar to us, but that it 
does not belong in emerald discourse. Quine posits humans reject ‘grue emeralds’ because of a 
naturally strong inclination to make as little revision in their systems of beliefs as possible. As 
Quine puts it, “A recalcitrant experience can, I have urged, be accommodated by a variety of 
reevaluations in various quarters of the total system; but… our natural tendency is to disturb the 
system as little as possible…” (p. 43). Quine’s language of ‘natural tendency’ is a little vague, 
but it is a tendency born out of pragmatism rather than logical realities. We humans behave this 
way to minimize cognitive dissonance – not because logic demands it.  
I do not accept Quine’s account, but I think it provides the vital clue about what is wrong 
with Goodman’s analysis of his own thought experiment. Goodman thought he was testing how 
well-behaved predicates are when substituted into single statements encapsulating atomic 
empirical significance. He mistakenly thought his test involved simply replacing one color 
predicate, green, with another, grue, in a sentence, and drew a mistaken inference from this 
premise – i.e., familiarity of terms mattered. But in reality, he was actually testing how well 
predicates behaved when substituted into new domains of discourse.  
This fatal oversight on Goodman’s part is what, I think, actually invalidates Goodman’s 
interpretation of his experimental findings. And Davidson figured this out first. His suspicion 
that semantic holism rather than our unfamiliarity with grue was the true culprit behind our 
rejection of ‘All emeralds are grue” led Davidson to invent his clever counterexample, “All 
emeroses are gred.” This is because people have an aversion to making massive changes in their 
web of beliefs so they would not be comfortable with the hypothesis all emeralds are grue. But 
given a less sacred domain of discourse for ‘grue’-talk, such as emeroses, people should have no 
problem with the funny color predicate. 
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The effect of semantic holism on our meta-inductive judgments is a special instance of 
the Hermeneutical Circle. The Platonic Socrates pointed out to Meno long ago that scientists 
cannot undergo inquiry without background knowledge. Otherwise, they will not know what 
they are looking for or when they found it. But, of course, background knowledge does not make 
inquiry redundant - inquiry improves background knowledge. So, there is a virtuous rather than 
vicious circle: inquiry without background knowledge is empty; inquiry without background 
knowledge is blind. Induction, like inquiry in general, is a hermeneutical exercise.   
Davidson’s Quinian criticism shows the problem in Goodman’s analysis, but it does not 
move us one inch beyond pragmatism. This is desirable state of affair for pragmatists, and they 
can be perfectly contented with it. But the Quinian account of induction leaves something to be 
desired for realists, like me. Realists want the sense of epistemic-type probability to come from 
something more substantive than brute pragmatism. I think it is possible, however, to improve 
upon Quine’s account of induction with virtue epistemology (Aristotle, 1985).  
Virtue epistemology has no established definition, but I take it to mean something similar 
to Plantinga’s (1993) bold thesis that knowledge (i.e. warranted belief) depends on external 
favors (i.e. factors beyond the mere content of beliefs). Specifically, knowledge production for 
mortals entails our cognitive faculties are, among other things, (a) functioning properly, (b) 
situated in a suitable epistemic environment, and (b) built with a competent design plan aimed at 
reliably outputting true beliefs. Virtue epistemologist then adds to this thesis the proviso that 
knowledge production requires the acquisition of certain moral and intellectual virtues, such as a 
desire for the truth. And, so, Quine’s ‘natural instinct’ becomes an intellectual virtue rather than 
a ‘pragmatic calculus.’ This theory, thus, preserves induction’s epistemic normativity. But, alas, 
a full exposition of my proposal takes us beyond the scope of this dissertation.   
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Summary 
 Objective Bayesians hold their priors to encapsulate epistemic-type probability. But the 
formal math fails to distinguish psychological-type from epistemic-type probability, and this 
makes selecting appropriate priors with epistemic-type probability difficult. But this problem 
manifests itself when classical statisticians carve up their sampling distributions, and it is really a 
special instance of the more general problem of the new riddle of induction.  
Much more philosophical investigation needs to be done into the problem of induction, of 
course, but I think we can discard Goodman’s proposal that the solution to this problem can be 
found with Humean-type appeals to custom, and Davidson’s counterexample of gred emeroses 
show why the argument for Goodman’s analysis collapses. It fails to properly take into account 
the effect of semantic holism. Semantic holism, however, ruins Goodman’s analysis, but not 
pragmatism. It can take on a pragmatic or realist flavor. It all depends on whether we attribute 
our desire to preserve the web of beliefs to pragmatism (Quine, Davidson) or to confidence in the 
general accuracy of beliefs produced by our cognitive faculties (virtue epistemology). But I will 
save the debate between pragmatism and realism in education science for another day. 
  The operation of a hermeneutic circle between background knowledge of emeralds and 
samples of emeralds then has ample explanatory power to explain the grue problem. Experience 
of emeralds then is much richer than positivist usually to think. As McDowell (1979) writes:   
But the notion of the world, or how things are, which is appropriate in this context 
is a metaphysical notion, not a scientific one: world views richer than that of 
science are not scientific, but not on that account unscientific (a term of 
opprobrium for answers other than those of science to science's questions) (p. 19). 
 
If McDowell and others are right, there is more cognitive capital in experiences of emeralds than 
Goodman credits. Hence, there is nothing – except undefended metaphysical scruples – that 
could cause one to delimit the guide of induction to the realm of custom.  
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Part III 
My Future Research Agenda 
 I began this dissertation with several hunches. These included (a) education researchers 
are wise to use priors in special education inquiry, (b) they can elicit priors from content experts, 
and (c) qualitative researchers, construed as content experts with qualitative knowledge rather 
than methodologists, may make good informants. My dissertation findings support these three 
hunches, and so support a future research agenda I elaborate on below. 
Implication for Philosophers 
 
 It is an unfortunate legacy of the past dominance of behaviorism over special education 
science that most researchers now associate statistics with positivism. The truth is much more 
interesting than that. Positivism is actually at odds with much of what passes for parametric 
inferential statistics in special education. Inferential statistics can also be parceled into several 
philosophies of inquiry. All equally opposed to positivism.  
 The Bayesian version of statistical inference is consistent with a romantic (and so non-
positivistic) science of special education. What that means exactly is a job for philosophers to 
figure out, but at minimum it suggests that education researchers need teleological explanations. 
I even wager it is impossible to fully account for human disability without invoking teleology 
somewhere in the science. This makes qualitative knowledge indispensible.  
 Qualitative knowledge about special education is spread out across multiple stakeholders: 
teachers, principles, educational leaders, students, parents, and so on. Bayesians can use their 
favorite qualitative methods to mine their informants for qualitative knowledge. They can then 
fuel their statistical inferences with these qualitative treasures. Bayesian procedures, of course, 
depend for their validity on Bayesian epistemology.  
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 The omission of Bayesian epistemology, and statistical philosophy in general, from texts 
on the philosophies of inquiry in education should be corrected in future texts. My study of the 
history of educational research has led me to believe that a great deal of educational research is 
conducted to demonstrate a method – doing things right - rather than to contribute to a complex 
area of scholarship. To curb this unfortunate tendency, researchers who plan to use Bayesian 
statistics should be given some exposure to Bayesian epistemology in their coursework. It would 
be a worthwhile project then to write a text on philosophies of inquiry encompassing statistical 
philosophy, including Bayesian epistemology.  
Implications for Methodologist  
 My dissertation has implications for methodologists in education too. Methodologists are 
not method-technicians, but method-inventors. Their mission encompasses two responsibilities. 
One is to prepare and equip the next generation of education scholars to build up the knowledge 
base with defensible research. The other responsibility is to offer criticism of established 
methods, and recommend improvements or innovations. I tailor my comments to methodologists 
then around these two responsibilities.   
 In regards to the first responsibility, my dissertation suggests there is a growing need for 
methodologists to prepare and equip graduate students in education to harness Bayesian methods 
and interpret Bayesian analysis. Many graduate students in education do not have strong math 
backgrounds, and traditional Bayesian textbooks and Bayesian software often assume users had 
previous exposure to, at minimum, probability theory, calculus, and linear algebra. One task of 
methodologists then is to translate Bayesian procedures into a consumable format for education 
researchers. This is most likely to be accomplished using statistical software programs, such as 
SAS 9.4 (Proc MCMC), to derive posterior integrals rather than calculus. 
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 In regards to the second responsibility, my dissertation suggests continued investigation 
into the possibility of using mixed priors to inform education research. The mixed prior, like 
empirical Bayes, is a little bit unorthodox in the Bayesian system. It violates the controversial 
likelihood principle, which stipulates the all sample information of interest should only come 
from the likelihood function. The mixed prior then cheats because it illicitly pulls sample data to 
inform both the likelihood function and the prior.  
The mixed prior worked in my simulation study, and I am not worried too much about its 
conflict with the likelihood principle. The philosophy inspiring that principle has already been 
duly criticized by prominent Bayesian methodologists (Gelman & Shalizi, 2013). Gelman and 
Shalizi argue that the prior is really best construed as a model component. Bayesians should then 
test their prior to see if it fits the data, as appropriate (i.e. prior predictive checking).   
 One possible avenue of future research then is to investigate using mixed priors to handle 
cases where multiple experts disagree. One could then elicit priors from each expert, and mix 
them into a single prior using some weighting scheme. The advantage of this is that data can sort 
out which of these expert elicited priors is most consistent with the data. I also suspect that the 
inclusion of multiple experts in the prior selection process increases the odds a reasonable prior 
will be produced in analysis.    
 To test this last claim, methodologists could set up some psychology-type experiments. 
They could simulate survey data about a factious school program with open-ended items, ask 
several people to examine them, and guess whether the program was effective or not. They could 
then examine how accurate informants are under different conditions, and estimate how well 
Bayesian t-tests with mixed priors representing their collective opinions would fare in terms of 
their classical frequency properties using simulation methods.  
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Implications for Researchers 
 
 Building on my dissertation findings, I want to investigate how best to use Bayesian and 
classical inference in concert to build the special education knowledge base. I make a distinction 
between research for other content experts and research for outsiders. Usually, it is easier to sell 
our choice of prior to fellow experts. In this case, there is an agreed upon knowledge base. But 
the omission of priors in research for outsiders makes sense. It does not force outsiders to try to 
evaluate the expert’s choice of prior. I see then a suitable division of labor for Bayesian and 
classical inference in a science of education.  
The labor of Bayesian inference would be to persuade insiders of the merits of one’s 
work. A pilot study is often conducted for the benefit of insiders for example. Bayesian analysis, 
thus, is a highly suitable choice in this circumstance. Other insiders can evaluate a researcher’s 
choice of priors in these cases, and they can determine whether the findings are significant or 
not. After all, funding agencies usually rely on inside experts they recruit to make decisions 
about which proposals to fund and reject.        
 The labor of classical inference would be to persuade outsiders. This is especially true in 
a democracy. People without command of content literature are often not competent evaluators 
of an expert’s choice of prior, and so the omission of priors in research intended to sway public 
policy makes sense. It seems to align with our democratic aspirations.  
 This division of labor, of course, is only for practical guidance. Exceptions to it are easy 
to imagine. The sampling conditions for classical inference may not be available for example. In 
these cases, researchers can proceed with Bayesian analysis at both the preliminary and final 
stages of investigation. I am confident Bayesian analysis could build consensus among experts in 
the long run. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Qualitative knowledge is about types of things, and their excellences. There are many 
ways we humans produce qualitative knowledge about the world, and much of it is derived from 
non-formal sources (e.g., narratives, clinical experiences, intuitions). The purpose of my 
dissertation was to investigate the possibility of improving quantitative analysis with qualitative 
knowledge in special education science using Bayesian statistics. Three publishable articles 
formed the substance of this dissertation. In the first article, I argued that Bayesian statistics is 
generally more applicable than classical statistics. Specifically, I argued that the necessary 
sampling conditions for classical inferences are much too rare in special education science to 
sustain the current popularity of classical analysis. In the second article, I investigated the 
frequency properties of Bayesian t-tests using mixture of subjective priors as a default. I 
discovered they had remarkable power and adequate Type I error control under conditions 
typically encountered in special education. In the last article, I offered a practical demonstration 
of how to overcome statistical challenges with Bayesian methods. Together these three articles 
explored new ways that researchers can marshal the qualitative knowledge of their informants 
and so build up a romantic science of special education.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
119 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Anastasiou, D., & Kauffman, J. M. (2012). Disability as cultural difference: Implications for 
special education. Remedial and Special Education, 33(3), 139-146. 
Aristotle. (1985). Nicomachean Ethics. (I. Terence, Trans.) Indianapolis: Hacket. 
Ayers, A. J. (1937/1952). Language, truth, and logic. New York, NY: Dover. 
Bacon, F. (1620/1961). Novum Organum. In W. Kaufmann, Philosophic classics: Bacon to Kant 
(pp. 9-25). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Baldwin, S. A., & Fellingham, G. W. (2013). Bayesian methods for the analysis of small sample 
multilevel data with a complex variance structure. Pyschological Methods, 18(2), 252-
264. 
Barton, J., Burrello, L., & Kleinhammer-Tramill, J. (2012, April). What does a district’s 
commitment to “inclusive practice” mean and what is it impact? Paper presented at the 
2012 Annual Conference of the American Education Research Association, Vancouver, 
BC.  
Benson, K., & Hartz, A. J. (2000). A comparison of observational studies and randomized 
controlled trails. New England Journal of Medicine, 342, 1878-1886. 
Bhaskar, R. (1979). The possibility of naturalism: A philosophical critique of the contemporary 
human sciences. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press Inc. 
Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley., 458 U.S. 176 (1982) 
Bolstad, W. M. (2007). Introduction to Bayesian statistics. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley. 
120 
 
Bradley, J. V. (1978). Robustness? British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 
31, 144-152. 
Buckley, J. (2004). Simple Bayesian Inference for Qualitative Political Research. Political 
Analysis, 12(4), 386-399. 
Burrello, L. C., Sailor, W., & Kleinhammer-Tramill, J. K. (2013). Unifying educational systems: 
leadership and Policy Perspectives. New York, NY: Routledge Press. 
Christensen, R., Johnson, W., Branscum, A., & Hanson, T. E. (2011). Bayesian ideas and data 
anlysis. New York, NY: CRC Press. 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. New York, NY: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Crotty, M.J. (1998). The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the 
Research Process.Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Danforth, S. (2006). From epistemology to democracy: Pragmatism and the reorientation of 
disability research. Remedial and Special Education, 27(6), p. 337-345. 
Davidson, D. (2006). Mental Events (Appendix: An Emerose by Another Name). In E. Lepore, 
& K. Ludwig (eds.), The Essential Davidson. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2008). Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (3rd ed.). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Duke Evidence Based Practice Center. (2009, September 18). Use of Bayesian Statistics in 
Randomized Clinical Trials: A CMS case study. Rockville, MD: author. 
Edgington, S. E. & Onghena, P. (2007). Randomization tests (4th ed.). New York, NY: Chapman 
& Hall. 
121 
 
Fisher, R. A. (1926). The arrangement of field experiments. Journal of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, 33, 503-513. 
Fisher, R. A. (1930). Inverse probability. Proceedings of Cambridge Philosophical Society, 26, 
528-535. 
Gelman, A., & Shalizi, C. R. (2013). Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics. British 
Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 66, 8-38. 
Gilhool, T. K. (1989). The right to an effective education: From Brown to PL 94-142 and 
beyond. In D. Lipsky, & A. Gartner, Beyond seperate education: Quality education for 
all (pp. 243-253). Baltimore, MD: Paul H. Brookes. 
Gill, J. (2002). Bayesian methods: A scoial and Behavioral sciences approach . Washington, 
DC: Chapman & Hall/CRC. 
Gill, J., & Walker, L. (2005). Elicited priors for Bayesian model specification in political science 
research. The Journal of Politics, 67, 841-872. 
Glass, G. V., & Hopkins, K. D. (1996). Statistical Methods in Education and Pyschology (3rd). 
Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon. 
Goodman, N. (1979). Fact, fiction, and forecast (4th ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In N. K. 
Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 105-117). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SageHacking, I. (2001). An introduction to probability and 
inductive logic. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
122 
 
Hacking, I. (2006). The emergence of probability: A philosophical study of early ideas about 
probability and induction and statistical inference (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hacking, I. (2009). How we have been learning to talk about autism: The role of stories. 
Metaphilosophy, 40(1-2), 499-516. 
Hand, D. J. (2008). Statistics. New York, BY: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc. 
Harrison, G. W. (2011). Randomization and its discontents. Journal of African Economies, 20, 
626-652. doi:10.1093/jae/ejr030 
Hatch, J. A. (2002). Doing qualitative research in education settings. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Hicks, T., & Knollman, G. (2014). Secondary analyses of National Longitudinal Transition 
Study-2: A statistical review. Career Development and Transition for Exceptional 
Individuals, doi: 10.1177/2165143414528240. 
Hoff, P. (2009). A first course in Bayesian statistical methods. New York: Springer. 
Hoppey, Black, and Mickelson. (2015.) The evolution of inclusive practice in two elementary 
schools: Developing teacher purpose, instructional capacity, and data informed practice. 
Manuscript submitted for publication. Tampa, FL: University of South Florida.  
House, E. (1991). Realism and Research. Educational Researcher, 20(6), 2-9. 
Howson, C., & Urbach, P. (2006). Scientific reasoning: The Bayesian approach (3rd ed.). 
Chicago, IL: Open Court. 
Hume, D. (1739/1999). An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. (T. L. Beauchamp, Ed.) 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2004) 
123 
 
Iversen, G. R. (1984). Bayesian Statistical Inference (Series: Quantiative Applications in the 
Social Sciences). Beverely Hills, CA: Sage University Paper. 
Jaynes, E. T. (1968). Prior Probabilities. IEEE Transactions of System Science and Cybernetics, 
3, 227-241. 
Jones, P., Carr, J. F., & Fauske, F. (2011). Leading for inclusion. New York, NY: Teachers 
College Press. 
Jorgensen, C. (2005). The least dangerous assumption: A challenge to create a new paradigm. 
Disability Solutions, 6(3), 1-15. 
Kass, R. E., & Wasserman, L. (1996). The selection of prior distributions by formal rules. 
Journal of American Statistical Association, 91, 1343-1370. 
Kauffman. (2011). Toward a science of education: The battle between rogue and real science. 
Verona, WI: Full Court Press. 
Kauffman, J. M., & Badar, J. (2014). Instruction, not Inclusion, should be the central issue in 
special education: An alternative view from the USA. Journal of international Special 
Needs Education, 17, 13-20. 
Kolmogorov, A. N. (1933/1956). Foundations of the Probability Theory. (N. Morrison, Trans.) 
New York, NY: Chelsea Publishing Company. 
Krathwohl, D. R. (1998). Methods of educational and social science research. New York, NY: 
Longman. 
Kruschke, J. K. (2011). Doing Bayesian data analysis a tutorial with R and BUGS. Amsterdam: 
Academic Press. 
Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd Edition ed.). Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press. 
124 
 
Labree, D. F. (2011). The lure of statistics for educational researchers. Theory of Education, 
61(6), 621-632. 
Lagemann, E. C. (2000). An elusive science: The troubling history of education research. 
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. 
Lane, K. L., Wehby, J. H., Little, M. A., & Cooley, C. (2005). Students educated in self-
contained classrooms and self-contained schools: Part II. How do they progress over 
time. behavior Disorders, 30, 363-374. 
Lanehart, R. E., Rodriguez de Gil, P., Kim, E. S., Bellara, A. P., Kromrey, J. D., & Reginald, S. 
L. (2012). Propensity score analysis and assessment of propensity score approaches using 
SAS procedures. SAS Global Forum 2012. SAS Institude, Inc. 
Lehmann, E. L. (2011). Fisher, Neyman, and the Creation of Classical Statistics. New York, 
NY: Springer. 
Lewis, D. (1980). A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance. In C. J. Richard, Studies in 
Inductive Logic and Probability (pp. 263-293). Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Lynch. (2004). Bayesian posterior predictive checks for complex models. Sociological Methods 
and Research, 32(3), 301-335. 
Lynch, S. M. (2007). Introduction to applied Bayesian statistics and estimation for social 
scientists. New York, NY: Springer. 
Marks, S. (2011). Special education: More about social justice, less about caring. Phi Delta 
Kappan, 93(1), 80. 
McDowell, J. (1978). Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives? Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 52(1), 13-29. 
125 
 
McGrayne, S. B. (2012). The theory that would not die: How Bayes' rule cracked the enigma 
code, hunted down russian submarines, & emerged trumphant from two centuries of 
controversy. CN: Yale University Press. 
McLeskey, J., & Waldron, N. L. (2000). Inclusive schools in action: Making differenes ordinary. 
Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. 
McLesky, J., & Waldron, N. L. (2011). Educational programs for elementary students with 
learning disabilities: Can they both be effective and inclusive? Learning Disabiliteis 
Research and Practice, 48-57. 
Mohr, L. B. (1990). Understanding significance testing. New York, NY: Sage. 
Morgan, D.L. (2007). Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained: Methodological implications of 
combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1 
48-76.  doi: 10.1177/2345678906292462 
Morgan, P., Frisco, M. L., Farkas, G., & Hibel, j. (2010). A propensity score matching analysis 
of the effects of special education services. The Journal of Special Education, 43(4), 236-
254. 
Muthen, B. (2013). BSEM measurement invariance analysis. Mplus Web Notes: No. 17. January 
11, 2013. Retrived at www.statmodel.com/BSEM.shtml. 
Nagel, T. (2012). Mind and cosmos: Why the materialist neo-Darwinian conceptio nof nature is 
almost certainly false. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Odom, S.L., Brantlinger, E., Gersten, R., Thompson, B., & Harris, K.R. (2005). Research in 
Special Education: Scientific Methods and Evidence-Based Practice. Exceptional 
Children. 71, 137-148.  
126 
 
Paul, J. L. (2005). Introduction to the Philosophies of Research and Criticism in Education and 
the Social Sciences. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. 
Phillips, D. (1987). Validity in qualitative research: Why the worry about warrant will not wane. 
Education and Urban Soceity, 20, p. 9-24. 
Phillips, D. C., & Burbules, N. (2000). Postpositivism and educational research. Lanhan, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
Plantinga, A. (1993). Warramt and Proper Function. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Pollard, W. E. (1986). Bayesian statistics for evaluation research: An introduction. Beverly 
Hills, CA: SAGE. 
Pugach, M. (2001). The stories we choose to tell: Fulfilling the promise of qualitative research in 
special education. Exceptional Children, 67(4), 439-453. 
Quine, W. (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press. 
Ramsey, F. P. (1926). Truth and Probability. In Rmasey, 1931, The Foundations of Mathematics 
and Other Logical Essays. Ch. VII, p. 156-198, edited by R.B. Braithwaite, London: 
Kegan, Trubner & Co.  
Raudenbush, S. W., & Bryk, A. S. (2002). Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and data 
analysis methods (2nd). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Schneider, B., Carnoy, M., Kilpatrick, J., Schmidt, W. H., & Shavelson, R. J. (2007). Estimating 
causal effects: Using experimental and observational designs. Washington, D.C.: 
American Educational Research Association. 
Sider, T. (2011). Writing the Boook of the World. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
127 
 
Silver, N. (2012). THe signal and the noise: Why so many predictiosn fail - but some don't. New 
York: The Penguine Press. 
Smith, D. J. (2003). In search of better angels. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press, Inc. 
Sullivan, A. L., & Field, S. (2013). Do preschool special education services make a difference in 
kindergarten reading and mathematics skills? A propensity score weighting analysis. 
Journal of School Psychology, 51(2), 243-260. 
Toson, A., Burrello, L. C., & Knollman, G. (2012). Justice for all: The capability approach and 
inclusive leadership. London: International Journal of Inclusive Education. 
U.S. Department of Education, N. C. (2014). Digest of Education Statistics, 2013. Washington, 
D.C.: NCES. 
Von Mises, R. (1936). Warsheinlichkeit, Statistik und Wahrheit. Vienna: Springer-Verlag. 
Ware, W. B., Ferron, J. M., & Miller, B. M. (2013). Introductory statistics: A conceptual 
approach using R. New York: Routledge. 
Williams, M. (2001). Problems of Knowledge: A critical introduction to epistemology. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Worrall, J. (2007). Why there's no cause to randomize. British Journal of the Philosophy of 
Science, 58, 451-488. 
Yell, M. L. (2006). The law and special education (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NY: Pearson. 
Yu, C. H. (2006). Philosophical Foundations of Quantiative Research Methodology. Lanham, 
MD: American University Press. 
Zigmond, N., Kloo, A., & Volonino, V. (2009). What, where, how? Special education in the 
climate of full inclusion. Exceptionality, 17, 189-204. 
 
128 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
SAS PROGRAMMING CODE FOR SIMULATION STUDY 
 
ptions ps = 500 ls = 160;  
filename junk dummy; *Make sure HTML is Turned Off; 
proc printto log=junk print=junk; 
 run; 
*+--------------------------------------+ 
  STEP 1: DEFINE SIMULATION CONDITIONS 
 +--------------------------------------+; 
*+-----------------------------------------------+ 
*To Manually Enter Condition use following code; 
  DATA conditions; 
  conditions=999; 
     Delta=3; *Delta: 0~U(-.1,.1), 1~U(.2,.4), 2~U(.5,.8), 3~U(.8,1); 
     Heterogeneity=0; *Variance Ratio 0=(1:1),1=(1:2),2=(1:1.5),3=(1:3);  
     Shape=1;* Normalcy: 1=(Sk=0,Ku=0), 2=(Sk=1,Ku=3), 3=(Sk=1.5,Ku=5), 
4=(Sk=2,Ku=6), 5=(Sk=0,Ku=25); 
     Group_Ratio=0; *Group ratios 0=(1:1), 1=(1:2), 2=(1:3);  
     Imbalance_bias = 2; *1=Larger Control Group, 2=Larger Treatment Group - 
note: moot if there is balance; 
     Big_N=12; *12,24,36,48,60 or any multiple of 12; 
  n_reps = 3;  
     run; 
 
 *To randomize conditions use following code; 
 /*DATA conditions; 
  conditions=999; 
     Delta=3;  
     Heterogeneity=3; 
     Shape=5; 
     Group_Ratio=2; 
     Imbalance_bias = 2; 
     Big_N=60; 
  Y=RAND("Uniform"); *Delta: T~U(-.1,.1), S~U(.2,.4), M~U(.5,.8), 
L~U(.8,1); 
   If Y < 0.25 then Delta=0; 
   If (0.25 =< Y AND Y <0.5) then Delta=1; 
   if (0.5 =< Y AND Y <0.75) then Delta=2; 
  X=Rand("Uniform"); *Variance Ratio 
0=(1:1),1=(1:2),2=(1:1.5),3=(1:3);  
   If X < .25 then Heterogeneity=0; 
   if (0.25 =< X AND X <0.5) then Heterogeneity=1; 
      if (0.5 =< X AND X <0.75) then Heterogeneity=2; 
  Z=RAND("Uniform"); * Normalcy: 1=(Sk=0,Ku=0), 2=(Sk=1,Ku=3), 
3=(Sk=1.5,Ku=5), 4=(Sk=2,Ku=6), 5=(Sk=0,Ku=25); 
   If Z < 0.2 then Shape=1; 
   If (0.2 =< Z AND Z <0.4) then Shape=2; 
   if (0.4 =< Z AND Z <0.6) then Shape=3; 
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   if (0.6 =< Z AND Z <0.8) then Shape=4; 
  A=Rand("Uniform"); *Group ratios 0=(1:1), 1=(1:2), 2=(1:3);  
   If A < (1/3) then Group_Ratio=0; 
   if ((1/3) =< A AND A <(2/3)) then Group_Ratio=1; 
  *Imbalance_bias only matters if Group Ratio is set to 1 or 2.  
     When Group Ratio is set to 0 Imbalance_bias becomes moot; 
  B=Rand("Uniform"); *1=Larger Control Group, 2=Larger Treatment 
Group; 
   if B < .5 then Imbalance_bias = 1;  
  C=RAND("Uniform"); *Big_N: 12,24,36,48,60;  
   If C < 0.2 then Big_N=12; 
   If (0.2 =< C AND C <0.4) then Big_N=24; 
   if (0.4 =< C AND C <0.6) then Big_N=36; 
   if (0.6 =< C AND C <0.8) then Big_N=48; 
  n_reps = 1; 
  Keep Delta Shape Heterogeneity Group_Ratio Imbalance_bias Big_N 
Rater n_reps conditions; 
  run; */ 
*+--------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 STEP 2: Setup sampling Procedures  
 +--------------------------------------------------------------+; 
 Data _null_;  
 Set conditions; 
*------------------------* 
  Controls Group Balance 
*------------------------*; 
    Group_1=1;  
 if Imbalance_bias = 1 then do; *Larger Control Group; 
 if (Imbalance_bias = 1 AND Group_Ratio=0) then do; 
  Group_2=1; *Balanced (Ratio 1:1); end; 
  if (Imbalance_bias = 1 AND Group_Ratio=1) then do; 
  Group_2=2; *Imbalanced (Ratio 1:2); end; 
  if (Imbalance_bias = 1 AND Group_Ratio=2) then do; 
  Group_2=3; *Imbalanced (Ratio 1:3); end; 
  little_nT = Big_N/(Group_1+Group_2);  
     little_nC = little_nT*Group_2; end; 
  
if Imbalance_bias = 2 then do; *Larger Treatment Group; 
  if (Imbalance_bias = 2 AND Group_Ratio=0) then do; 
  Group_2=1; *Balanced (Ratio 1:1); end; 
  if (Imbalance_bias = 2 AND Group_Ratio=1) then do; 
  Group_2=2; *Imbalanced (Ratio 1:2); end; 
  if (Imbalance_bias = 2 AND Group_Ratio=2) then do; 
  Group_2=3; *Imbalanced (Ratio 1:3); end; 
  little_nC = Big_N/(Group_1+Group_2);  
     little_nT = little_nC*Group_2; end; 
*---------------------------------------* 
  Output Commands throughout Simulation 
*---------------------------------------*; 
 call symput('little_nC',little_nC); 
 call symput('little_nT',little_nT); 
 call symput('Conditions',Conditions); 
 run; 
 
*+------------------------------+ 
 STEP 3: Simulate Samples   
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 +------------------------------+; 
 
DATA Samples; 
 SET conditions; 
 
 Do Replicate = 1 to n_reps; 
 
 *+-----------------------------------------------+ 
    Population Parameters for Treatment Condition  
 +------------------------------------------------+; 
 
 *For conceptual clarity, Delta in this study is defined as the  
  magnitude of the difference between treatment and control populations  
 divided by the control group's sigma; 
 
 if Delta = 0 then do; *Controls location of Treatment Population; 
   Mu=50; end; 
 if Delta = 1 then do;  
   Mu=53; end; 
 if Delta = 2 then do;  
   Mu= Rand("Uniform"); 
   Mu=56; end; 
 if Delta = 3 then do;  
   Mu= Rand("Uniform"); 
   Mu=59; end;  
 
 truth = Mu-50; 
 
 if Heterogeneity = 0 then do; *Controls Scale of Treatment Population; 
   Sigma= 10; end; 
 if Heterogeneity = 1 then do;  
   Sigma= 15; end; 
 if Heterogeneity = 2 then do;  
   Sigma= 20; end; 
 if Heterogeneity = 3 then do;  
   Sigma= 30; end;  
 
 *+--------------------+ 
     Simulate Samples 
  +--------------------+; 
 
 DO ID = 1 TO &little_nC; *Control Condition; 
    X=0; 
       Y = RAND("Normal",50,10); OUTPUT;END; *~N(Mu,Sigma); 
 
 DO ID = (&little_nC+1) to (&little_nT+&little_nC-1); *Treatment 
Condition; 
  X=1; 
  Z= RAND("Normal");*~N(0,1); 
*---------------------------------------------* 
    Fleishman Transformations to nonnormality 
*---------------------------------------------*; 
     * The following give sk= 0, kr= 0; 
 if shape = 1 then do; 
     b=1; 
     c=0; 
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     d=0; 
 end; 
           * The following give sk= 1.00, kr= 3.00; 
 if shape = 2 then do; 
     b= .83221632289426; 
     c= .12839670935047; 
     d= .04803205907079; 
 end; 
           * The following give sk= 1.50, kr= 5.00; 
 if shape = 3 then do; 
     b= 0.78340767306328; 
     c= 0.18620283598117; 
     d= 0.05704195885033; 
 end; 
           * The following give sk= 2.00, kr= 6.00; 
 if shape = 4 then do; 
     b= 0.82632385761082; 
     c= 0.31374908500462; 
     d= 0.02270660525731; 
 end; 
           * The following give sk= 0.00, kr= 25.00; 
 if shape = 5 then do; 
     b= -1.5666815059210; 
     c=  0.00000000000000; 
     d=  0.34817270324943; 
 end; 
 Z = b*Z + c*Z**2 + d*Z**3 - c;  
 Y = Mu + (Sigma*Z); OUTPUT;END;*converts to raw metric; 
 
 output; End; 
*------------------------------* 
  Cleanup Simulation Data Set 
*------------------------------*; 
 DROP Z b c d ; 
 run; 
*+--------------------------------------+ 
 STEP 4: CONDUCT STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
 +--------------------------------------+; 
*---------------------* 
  Classical t-test 
*---------------------*; 
 proc ttest data=Samples; 
by replicate Delta Shape Heterogeneity Group_Ratio Imbalance_bias 
Big_N truth n_reps; 
  title 't-tests'; 
  class X; 
  var Y; 
        ods output conflimits=stats; 
  run; 
*-------------------------------------------------------* 
  Bayesian t-test (w/ Jeffreys Priors for all parameters) 
*-------------------------------------------------------*; 
proc mcmc data=samples thin=10 nmc=100000 nbi=10000  
  monitor=(mudif); 
  by replicate Delta Shape Heterogeneity Group_Ratio Imbalance_bias 
Big_N truth n_reps; 
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     parms muT 50 muC 50; 
     parms sig2T 100; 
     parms sig2C 100; 
     prior muT ~ general(1); *convenience prior; 
     prior muC ~ general(1); *convenience prior; 
     prior sig2T ~ general(-log(sig2T), lower=0); *convenience prior; 
     prior sig2C ~ general(-log(sig2C), lower=0); *convenience prior;   
     mudif = muT - muC; 
     if X = 1 then do; 
       mu = muT; 
       s2 = sig2T; 
     end; 
     else do; 
       mu = muC; 
       s2 = sig2C; 
     end; 
     model y ~ normal(mu, var=s2); 
     ods output postsummaries=pointthree postintervals=intervalthree; 
  run; 
*-------------------------------------------------------------------* 
  Bayesian t-test with Mixed Prior for mean of intervention group 
*-------------------------------------------------------------------*; 
proc mcmc data=samples thin=10 nmc=100000 nbi=10000  
  monitor=(mudif) init=mode; 
  by replicate Delta Shape Heterogeneity Group_Ratio Imbalance_bias 
Big_N truth n_reps; 
     parms muT 55 muC; 
     parms sig2T 100; 
     parms sig2C; 
  lp = logpdf('normalmix', mut, 4, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 50, 53, 
56, 59, .333, .333, .333, .333); 
     prior muT ~ general(lp); *Mixture prior; 
     prior muC ~ n(mean= 50, var=1); *informed prior; 
     prior sig2T ~ general(-log(sig2T), lower=0); *convenience prior; 
     prior sig2C ~ igamma(shape=19, scale=2000); *informed prior;   
     mudif = muT - muC; 
     if X = 1 then do; 
       mu = muT; 
       s2 = sig2T; 
     end; 
     else do; 
       mu = muC; 
       s2 = sig2C; 
     end; 
     model y ~ normal(mu, var=s2); 
     ods output postsummaries=pointfour postintervals=intervalfour; 
  run; 
*-------------------------------------------* 
  Bayesian t-test with Partial Prior 
*-------------------------------------------*; 
proc mcmc data=samples thin=10 nmc=100000 nbi=10000  
  monitor=(mudif) init=mode; 
  by replicate Delta Shape Heterogeneity Group_Ratio Imbalance_bias 
Big_N truth n_reps; 
     parms muT 50 muC; 
     parms sig2T 100; 
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     parms sig2C; 
     prior muT ~ general(1); *convenience prior; 
     prior muC ~ n(mean= 50, var=1); *informed prior; 
     prior sig2T ~ general(-log(sig2T), lower=0); *convenience prior; 
     prior sig2C ~ igamma(shape=19, scale=2000); *informed prior;   
     mudif = muT - muC; 
     if X = 1 then do; 
       mu = muT; 
       s2 = sig2T; 
     end; 
     else do; 
       mu = muC; 
       s2 = sig2C; 
     end; 
     model y ~ normal(mu, var=s2); 
     ods output postsummaries=pointfive postintervals=intervalfive; 
  run; 
*+------------------------+ 
 STEP 5: MANAGE OUTPUT  
 +------------------------+; 
*------------------------------------* 
  Classical t-test Output Management 
*------------------------------------*; 
 data stats; 
 set stats; 
 where Class='Diff (1-2)'; 
 data one; 
   set stats; 
  where Method='Pooled'; 
  mean=mean*(-1); 
        UpperCL=LowerCLMean*(-1);            
        LowerCL=UpperCLMean*(-1); 
  bias = (mean - truth); 
     RMSE = (mean - truth)**2; 
  CI_width = UpperCL - LowerCL; 
  CI_coverage = 0; 
  if LowerCL =< truth and UpperCL >= truth then CI_coverage = 1; 
  CIreject = 0; *Significence Test using Intervals; 
   if LowerCL > 0 or UpperCL < 0 then CIreject = 1; 
  run;  
 proc means noprint data = one; 
   by Delta Shape Heterogeneity Group_Ratio Imbalance_bias Big_N 
n_reps; 
   var bias RMSE CI_width CI_coverage CIreject CIreject; 
   output out = onefinal mean = ; 
   run;  
 data onefinal; 
  set onefinal; 
  RMSE = SQRT(RMSE); 
  Method=1; 
  run; 
 data two; 
   set stats; 
  where Method='Satterthwaite'; 
  mean=mean*(-1); 
        UpperCL=LowerCLMean*(-1);            
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        LowerCL=UpperCLMean*(-1); 
  bias = (mean - truth); 
     RMSE = (mean - truth)**2; 
  CI_width = UpperCL - LowerCL; 
  CI_coverage = 0; 
  if LowerCL =< truth and UpperCL >= truth then CI_coverage = 1; 
  CIreject = 0; *Significence Test using Intervals; 
   if LowerCL > 0 or UpperCL < 0 then CIreject = 1; 
  run;  
 proc means noprint data = two; 
   by Delta Shape Heterogeneity Group_Ratio Imbalance_bias Big_N 
n_reps; 
   var bias RMSE CI_width CI_coverage CIreject CIreject; 
   output out = twofinal mean = ; 
   run;  
 data twofinal; 
  set twofinal; 
  RMSE = SQRT(RMSE); 
  Method=2; 
  run; 
*----------------------------------------------------------* 
  Bayesian T-test with Jeffreys Priors Output Management 
*----------------------------------------------------------*; 
 data pointthree; 
  set pointthree; 
    bias = p50 - truth; 
    RMSE = (p50 - truth)**2; 
 run;   
proc means noprint data = pointthree; 
 by Delta Shape Heterogeneity Group_Ratio Imbalance_bias Big_N n_reps; 
 var bias RMSE; 
 output out = pointestimatesthree mean = ; 
 run;  
data intervalthree; 
 set intervalthree; 
 CI_width = HPDUpper - HPDLower; 
 CI_coverage = 0; 
 if HPDLower =< truth and HPDUpper >= truth then CI_coverage = 1; 
 CIreject = 0; *Significence Test using Intervals; 
  if HPDLower > 0 or HPDUpper < 0 then CIreject = 1; 
 run;  
proc means noprint data = intervalthree; 
  by Delta Shape Heterogeneity Group_Ratio Imbalance_bias Big_N n_reps; 
  var CI_width CI_coverage CIreject; 
  output out = intervalestimatesthree mean = ; 
  run;  
data threefinal; 
 merge pointestimatesthree intervalestimatesthree; 
 RMSE =SQRT(RMSE); 
    Method=3; 
 run; 
*--------------------------------------------------------* 
  Bayesian T-test with Mixed Priors Output Management 
*--------------------------------------------------------*; 
 data pointfour; 
  set pointfour; 
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    bias = p50 - truth; 
    RMSE = (p50 - truth)**2; 
 run;  
proc means noprint data = pointfour; 
 by Delta Shape Heterogeneity Group_Ratio Imbalance_bias Big_N n_reps; 
 var bias RMSE; 
 output out = pointestimatesfour mean = ; 
 run;  
data intervalfour; 
 set intervalfour; 
 CI_width = HPDUpper - HPDLower; 
 CI_coverage = 0; 
 if HPDLower =< truth and HPDUpper >= truth then CI_coverage = 1; 
 CIreject = 0; *Significence Test using Intervals; 
  if HPDLower > 0 or HPDUpper < 0 then CIreject = 1; 
 run; 
proc means noprint data = intervalfour; 
  by Delta Shape Heterogeneity Group_Ratio Imbalance_bias Big_N n_reps; 
  var CI_width CI_coverage CIreject; 
  output out = intervalestimatesfour mean = ; 
  run;  
data fourfinal; 
 merge pointestimatesfour intervalestimatesfour; 
 RMSE =SQRT(RMSE); 
    Method=4; 
 run; 
*-------------------------------------------------------------------* 
  Bayesian T-test with Partial Prior Output Management 
*-------------------------------------------------------------------*; 
 data pointfive; 
  set pointfive; 
 where parameter='mudif'; 
    bias = p50 - truth; 
    RMSE = (p50 - truth)**2; 
 run;  
proc means noprint data = pointfive; 
 by Delta Shape Heterogeneity Group_Ratio Imbalance_bias Big_N n_reps; 
 var bias RMSE; 
 output out = pointestimatesfour mean = ; 
 run;  
data intervalfive; 
 set intervalfive; 
 CI_width = HPDUpper - HPDLower; 
 CI_coverage = 0; 
 if HPDLower =< truth and HPDUpper >= truth then CI_coverage = 1; 
 CIreject = 0; *Significence Test using Intervals; 
  if HPDLower > 0 or HPDUpper < 0 then CIreject = 1; 
 run; 
proc means noprint data = intervalfive; 
  by Delta Shape Heterogeneity Group_Ratio Imbalance_bias Big_N n_reps; 
  var CI_width CI_coverage CIreject; 
  output out = intervalestimatesfour mean = ; 
  run;  
data fivefinal; 
 merge pointestimatesfour intervalestimatesfour; 
 RMSE =SQRT(RMSE); 
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    Method=5; 
 run; 
*---------------------* 
  Merge Output Files 
*---------------------*; 
Data Results; 
 Set onefinal twofinal threefinal fourfinal fivefinal; 
*----------------------------* 
  STEP 6: ISSUE FINAL REPORT 
*----------------------------*; 
proc printto log=junk print=print; *"C:\Users\CCM\Documents\Tyler's 
Stuff\SAS\Test.txt"; *print or 'c:\results.txt'; 
 run; 
PROC FORMAT; 
 Value methodfmt 
  1='Pooled' 
        2='Satterthwaite' 
  3='Convenience' 
  4='Mixture' 
  5='Partial'; 
 run; 
Data Results; 
 Set Results; 
 Format method methodfmt.; 
 Conditions=&Conditions; 
proc print data = results; 
  var Conditions method Delta Shape Heterogeneity Group_Ratio 
Imbalance_bias Big_N n_reps bias RMSE CI_width CI_coverage CIreject; 
  title ' Simulation Results'; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
